This is truly such an obvious exploit, given well-acknowledged risks of opening files downloaded via Tor browser. I'm quite embarrassed that I didn't think of it. And I'm pretty sure that others have exploited it. But on reflection, this is actually excellent news. At least, for those of us who don't rely on Tor browser. That is, Tor users occasionally get pwned. And now there's less reason to suspect unreported vuln…
With an implementation like Whonix, arguably the only safe and (relatively) easy way to use Tor, this exploit wouldn't have worked. The Tor Project's insistence on placing ease of use above security is admirable and understandable, but it provides a very false sense of security for the majority of users, to the point where it can potentially be detrimental. We sometimes take for granted our intelligence in this domai…
Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
31–40 of 91 posts
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
/dev/tcp doesn't exist on the filesystem, only in bash, and only if enabled; some distributions like Debian disable it.
Yeah, it was a wild guess. I just looked over all the new bug tracker entries in Tor since Oct 28th, but none of them seem particularly critical. Our best bet would be to look at Firefox's commit history since the 28th. One crafty way to determine the exploit would be to bindiff the hotfix'd firefox binary vs the previous release and examine the diffs in a disassembler to see what code changed. Non-deterministic buil…
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#33Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#34> TorMoil, as the flaw has been dubbed by its discoverer, is triggered when users click on links that begin with file:// rather than the more common https:// and http:// address prefixes. When the Tor browser for macOS and Linux is in the process of opening such an address, "the operating system may directly connect to the remote host, bypassing Tor Browser," according to a brief blog post published Tuesday by We Are…
Agree completely. If you are running a TOR service/browser you should at least have an option to block all data that wants to move outside of TOR. Imo, the option should be enabled by default. It is better to have a "broken" service rather than risk leaking the real IP. If I recall correctly, wasn't silkroad and alphabay compromised by such a flaw? silkroad leaked the server IP through the captcha and I think somethi…
At that point, it's game over. No firewall rules will protect you. The moment you shut off Tor, you're owned.
This is exactly why it's crucial to use Whonix or Tails.
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yeah, it was a wild guess. I just looked over all the new bug tracker entries in Tor since Oct 28th, but none of them seem particularly critical. Our best bet would be to look at Firefox's commit history since the 28th. One crafty way to determine the exploit would be to bindiff the hotfix'd firefox binary vs the previous release and examine the diffs in a disassembler to see what code changed. Non-deterministic buil…
Isn't this pretty standard practice?
(I can't right now else I would.)
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#36> TorMoil, as the flaw has been dubbed by its discoverer, is triggered when users click on links that begin with file:// rather than the more common https:// and http:// address prefixes. When the Tor browser for macOS and Linux is in the process of opening such an address, "the operating system may directly connect to the remote host, bypassing Tor Browser," according to a brief blog post published Tuesday by We Are…
What do you mean the FBI's NIT used basically the same thing? Do you have a source?
[edited for coherence]
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
Agree completely. If you are running a TOR service/browser you should at least have an option to block all data that wants to move outside of TOR. Imo, the option should be enabled by default. It is better to have a "broken" service rather than risk leaking the real IP. If I recall correctly, wasn't silkroad and alphabay compromised by such a flaw? silkroad leaked the server IP through the captcha and I think somethi…
If an adversary can achieve network access on your box, they can usually download malware. At that point, it's game over. No firewall rules will protect you. The moment you shut off Tor, you're owned. This is exactly why it's crucial to use Whonix or Tails.
I'm not sure that Tails protects as well against malware. Its emphasis is on leaving no traces on your computer. Being a LiveCD, and wiping RAM during shutdown.
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#38> TorMoil, as the flaw has been dubbed by its discoverer, is triggered when users click on links that begin with file:// rather than the more common https:// and http:// address prefixes. When the Tor browser for macOS and Linux is in the process of opening such an address, "the operating system may directly connect to the remote host, bypassing Tor Browser," according to a brief blog post published Tuesday by We Are…
Agree completely. If you are running a TOR service/browser you should at least have an option to block all data that wants to move outside of TOR. Imo, the option should be enabled by default. It is better to have a "broken" service rather than risk leaking the real IP. If I recall correctly, wasn't silkroad and alphabay compromised by such a flaw? silkroad leaked the server IP through the captcha and I think somethi…
Dream Market may have had a similar problem, but I don't know specifics. AlphaBay failed more simply. The founder allegedly used his real-name email address on the site. And sadly, after being arrested, he reportedly killed himself.
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#39This is truly such an obvious exploit, given well-acknowledged risks of opening files downloaded via Tor browser. I'm quite embarrassed that I didn't think of it. And I'm pretty sure that others have exploited it. But on reflection, this is actually excellent news. At least, for those of us who don't rely on Tor browser. That is, Tor users occasionally get pwned. And now there's less reason to suspect unreported vuln…
With an implementation like Whonix, arguably the only safe and (relatively) easy way to use Tor, this exploit wouldn't have worked. The Tor Project's insistence on placing ease of use above security is admirable and understandable, but it provides a very false sense of security for the majority of users, to the point where it can potentially be detrimental. We sometimes take for granted our intelligence in this domai…
And mostly, it's just that the VPN provides another level of IP obscurity. If an adversary compromises Tor somehow, and learns your VPN exit IP, there's at least a chance that they won't get your ISP-assigned IP. And if you use nested VPN chains, the adversary would need information from multiple VPN providers. It's the same logic behind three-relay Tor circuits.
Re: Critical Tor flaw leaks users’ real IP address
#40Ugh. Linux has this shiny feature called network namespaces. Tor Browser should run in a network namespace such that it has no access to the Internet and doesn't know it's real IP address in the first place and therefore can't have this kind of leak barring a code execution attack and a sandbox break.
-A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner [Tor uid] -j ACCEPT
-A OUTPUT -j DROP