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Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

orchidprotocol.com

21–30 of 196 posts

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#21
post #6

This is a funded startup. How do they intend to make money?

Sustainability isn't even the greatest concern: where there are customers (people who pay for access to the network) there is a database of customers (in order to allow authentication) that has to be kept out of the grasp of government agencies.

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#22
post #6

This is a funded startup. How do they intend to make money?

ICO

Not exactly, though I can appreciate why it might seem like that at first glance; we are selling a "utility token". This distinction is interesting and important as we are not selling a token to raise money to do development, instead having taken on seed investors to help us get the right team of developers and advisors to do this initial build out. The sale of tokens will be made after we have this network fully working and launched, meaning that we are really targeting a group of people you might call "customers" who will buy bandwidth tokens (as opposed to "investors", which is the target market of an ICO).

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#23

The FAQ says "Bandwidth contributors simply install Orchid and activate their Internet connected device as a node - either as a relay or proxy - and then they set permissions like sites they want to blacklist or whitelist, and they earn tokens into their Orchid wallet for sharing their bandwidth." So hopefully the blacklisting will eliminate the problem of nasty content that plagues anonymous networks like Tor.

For that purpose I would think optional whitelisting would make more sense. Instead of spyware lists you subscribe to in uBlock Origin, you would subscribe to a vetted, whitelist of known to be generally acceptable Orchid content. Others might want to have empty filter list to be a complete transit/peer. Therefore I don't think there's much room for users who want to blacklist but are not rather looking for a whiteli…

FWIW, as the person who has been doing the initial implementation, I can tell you that we currently only have a whitelist. I can appreciate why the person who was editing the FAQ for the website put in the world "blacklist" as it makes the sentence flow really well, but I agree with you about the issues (and there are also problems doing the distributed hashtable search to find nodes that don't have some property rather than ones that do have some property). I will poke about this to see if I can get it changed ASAP!

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#24
post #6

This is a funded startup. How do they intend to make money?

Sustainability isn't even the greatest concern: where there are customers (people who pay for access to the network) there is a database of customers (in order to allow authentication) that has to be kept out of the grasp of government agencies.

Actually, that's the great part about what we are doing: it is all built on Ethereum, so there is no centralized database, and the users are generally pseudonymous! OK, you might then say "isn't that just a decentralized database?", but in addition to a form of "probabilistic micropayments" that ends up shrouding most of the participants, we are also working on integrating other techniques to make the payments fully anonymous (and have brought on a team of advisors which includes a professor of cryptography who specializes in this area).

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#25

The FAQ says "Bandwidth contributors simply install Orchid and activate their Internet connected device as a node - either as a relay or proxy - and then they set permissions like sites they want to blacklist or whitelist, and they earn tokens into their Orchid wallet for sharing their bandwidth." So hopefully the blacklisting will eliminate the problem of nasty content that plagues anonymous networks like Tor.

For that purpose I would think optional whitelisting would make more sense. Instead of spyware lists you subscribe to in uBlock Origin, you would subscribe to a vetted, whitelist of known to be generally acceptable Orchid content. Others might want to have empty filter list to be a complete transit/peer. Therefore I don't think there's much room for users who want to blacklist but are not rather looking for a whiteli…

If you're only using a "stable whitelist" of websites on the internet then you're not the target audience

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#26
post #5

Hello! My name is Jay Freeman (saurik), and I was both deeply involved in the design of Orchid's protocol as well as in charge of the initial implementation of the networking and routing logic, and am happy to try to answer any questions people might have about what we are working on! (edit:) g_simonsson, who now has an account on Hacker News and has joined this thread, is Gustav Simonsson, another developer working…

How do you solve the problem of penetrating NATs and firewalls without relying on a central coordination server?

If I understand your question correctly, and you are looking at "how do we do hole punching and NAT traversal without a way to get your canonical external IP address", in addition to techniques that don't require that kind of functionality (such as modern routers with UPnP port forwarding support), other nodes on the network can run something analogous to ICE servers (we have yet to decide if it should literally be STUN or if we need to integrate it into the security model), so all you will need is the address and public key of another node (which you will need anyway in order to connect to the network).

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#29
post #20
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(edit: When I wrote this answer, the person I was responding to had not yet added "or Tor".) Freenet builds its own domain of content where people post websites that are hosted in a distributed fashion by the platform. What we are working on with this initial implementation is a fully-decentralized tunneling service to access existing content posted on the internet (so if you were to compare it to an existing technol…

So what are the benefits over Tor?

It seems intended to be more anonymous and decentralized than Tor, and safer thanks to the strength of numbers, but their whitepaper is diseharteningly incomplete and disingenuous, particularly about problems that are shared with Tor.

For example:

"The distribution of Entry Nodes is a difficult topic. If oppressive governments are able to access this list, they will block user’s abilities to access the list."

Or simply, you know, go after whoever runs entry nodes. Or run their own entry nodes and, even if they can't compromise the network, trace the evil cypherpunks who want to use encryption.

Unfortunately, some practical and political problems cannot be solved with improved cryptography.

Re: Orchid: a new surveillance-free layer on top of the existing Internet

#30
post #14

The FAQ says "Bandwidth contributors simply install Orchid and activate their Internet connected device as a node - either as a relay or proxy - and then they set permissions like sites they want to blacklist or whitelist, and they earn tokens into their Orchid wallet for sharing their bandwidth." So hopefully the blacklisting will eliminate the problem of nasty content that plagues anonymous networks like Tor.

How so? If it's under individual control, you'll just end up with sub-networks where people will agree to distribute that type of content. You cannot pair anonymity and security with censorship. They are fundamentally incompatible. So either accept that nasty content will be out there, or acknowledge that you don't actually want perfect anonymity and security.

FWIW, if you look at Tor, Facebook now runs a hidden service that allows people to access Facebook's website. This is essentially the same thing as someone having provided a number of exit nodes that will only route to Facebook. The problem, though, is that this requires the client and maybe even the website to be modified to use the .onion URLs for all accesses back to the site (at least, any absolute URL on the site back to the site will cause a problem). I will personally contend that it is worth it to allow Facebook to do this, or to allow anyone to do this for any website, in order to get more people using the network for everything, as the more users you can get using the service to do normal traffic the more easily you can hide everyone.

This is particularly noticeable given that in some countries, such as the United States where I live, simply accessing the Tor website to download Tor will end up flagging you for further monitoring. If Tor had only as many users and exit nodes as it does right now, but additionally had, for example, a billion people in China accessing Wikipedia through exit nodes that refused to go anywhere but Wikipedia, that makes a world of difference. As it stands, people are actually actively discouraged and even shamed for using Tor to access random websites or ones that use a lot of bandwidth, as that means that they are using (or even "abusing") a limited amount of donated bandwidth that somehow needs to be reserved for those who "really need it" (and thereby, will be targeted just for that).

https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/d73yd7/how-the-ns...

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