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Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

dymaxion.org

41–50 of 73 posts

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#41
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I maintain the Fingerprint stack on Google Nexus/Pixel devices. > your fingerprints don't leave the device and are implemented by a piece of hardware in such a way that even Apple doesn't have access to them. This is true for Google, too. > Compare that to the Android implementations which have fingerprints in the filesystem. They're not stored in plaintext. They're encrypted with keys that remain in hardware. You ca…

First of all, I understand your taking offense (though none was intended) since this is the thing you work on. I feel the same way about stuff I work on! Second, I simply used that as a straightforward example, not to say "Apple good, android bad." Security is always a risk tradeoff. My house uses special Medeco keys (modified in violation of the Medeco license as it happens) because what I want to defend against is…

> My house uses special Medeco keys (modified in violation of the Medeco license as it happens) because what I want to defend against is copying when I lend out one of my numbered keys.

I would like to hear more about these modifications.

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#42
post #18
post #5

I totally agree with this guy, but who is he in the industry? Someone famous for something? Just curious.

If you really cared about the author's credentials, then why didn't you even bother to do the most basic of Google searches before coming here to complain about not knowing immediately who the author was? I mean you didn't even get the author's gender right. What exactly are you contributing to the conversation here?

Who said I was complaining? I was asking the HN communty about the author.

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#43
post #10

The essay I wish she had written would have said, "we don't need more 'secure messaging systems' -- we should be making all the following tools secure by design" For example, (and whether you love them or hate them) Apple takes this seriously: your fingerprints don't leave the device and are implemented by a piece of hardware in such a way that even Apple doesn't have access to them. Compare that to the Android imple…

Fingerprints are insecure. They can be optained by police. They can force you to tuch to your smart phone's fingerprint sensor phisically.

Best security is passprase with a TPM chip.

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#44
post #11

> Because we have too many other tools we also need. Yes, but secure messaging is a well understood domain I suppose so it's the kind of app that is simple(not easy) to write and most tools compete on UX. A lot of tools on the list at the end have complex domains that are not that well understood by stock developers, or they might require a lot of R&D or actually talking to teams that have a problem to solve. Further…

I would think that at least half of the domains mentioned are being used in some way by developers. So it's entirely possible to dogfood them. Some examples I know I've used: PMS, Wiki, Calendar, VFM. I'd love a good group password vault, so far I've come up empty for something open source...

https://bitwarden.com

self-hosted / free / open-source password vault. extensions for every major browser out there (edge / ff 57)

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#45
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would think that at least half of the domains mentioned are being used in some way by developers. So it's entirely possible to dogfood them. Some examples I know I've used: PMS, Wiki, Calendar, VFM. I'd love a good group password vault, so far I've come up empty for something open source...

https://bitwarden.com self-hosted / free / open-source password vault. extensions for every major browser out there (edge / ff 57)

> extensions for every major browser out there (edge / ff 57)

Can't really say that if the stock browser on macOS isn't supported...

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#46
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

First of all, I understand your taking offense (though none was intended) since this is the thing you work on. I feel the same way about stuff I work on! Second, I simply used that as a straightforward example, not to say "Apple good, android bad." Security is always a risk tradeoff. My house uses special Medeco keys (modified in violation of the Medeco license as it happens) because what I want to defend against is…

> My house uses special Medeco keys (modified in violation of the Medeco license as it happens) because what I want to defend against is copying when I lend out one of my numbered keys. I would like to hear more about these modifications.

If you want stringent key control at the consumer level, I've found a good one in Abloy's Protec2 system, with a Ruby Abloy dealer. Under that system, an exclusive key blank is manufactured and made only available to a specific dealer. No other Abloy dealer is able to get that blank. [1] Put a Drumm Geminy Shield in front of a Protec2 cylinder to put a long delay on typical hand-held destructive attacks against the cylinder, or force an attacker to bring in heavy equipment to break the lock, and most attackers will opt for either softer targets or a brick through the window.

That key system also lets you do the usual key control designing, like a master key that opens everything, and a loaner key that only opens the front door, for example. Like any security system, you will want defense in depth, and have other layers protecting other aspects.

[1] http://lockwiki.com/index.php/Abloy_Protec

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#47
post #9

I think matrix forms a nice basis for a secure chat platform. Only the apps are not really all that good. The desktop apps are electron based and the android app is just not up to par with telegram or WhatsApp.

I don't know if it's the app, server or protocol problem but the last time I've evaluated Matrix (Sep 19, based on logs) as a possible Telegram/WhatsApp/Skype/Discord replacement there were some weird issues with "Unable to decrypt: The sender's device has not sent us the keys for this message" even after both parties verifying the fingerprints. I've used a desktop/Electron Riot client, the other party had used the web version.

Restarting the Riot had helped me to see the new messages, but not the old ones (which feels to be a correct behavior in regards to PFS). The actual problem is other party didn't knew I had issues receiving their messages until I've contacted them out-of-band - conversation looked just normal from the other side (except for me writing "test test" and not replying any meaningfully).

We ended up with a decision to try Matrix again sometimes later. Like, next year.

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#48
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

First of all, I understand your taking offense (though none was intended) since this is the thing you work on. I feel the same way about stuff I work on! Second, I simply used that as a straightforward example, not to say "Apple good, android bad." Security is always a risk tradeoff. My house uses special Medeco keys (modified in violation of the Medeco license as it happens) because what I want to defend against is…

Those are all fair points, I don't disagree. Maybe disingenuous was the wrong word?

It is completely the wrong word since it describes me to be, at best, deceptive. If you don't disagree you can hardly describe claim I was lying!

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#49
post #10

The essay I wish she had written would have said, "we don't need more 'secure messaging systems' -- we should be making all the following tools secure by design" For example, (and whether you love them or hate them) Apple takes this seriously: your fingerprints don't leave the device and are implemented by a piece of hardware in such a way that even Apple doesn't have access to them. Compare that to the Android imple…

Fingerprints are insecure. They can be optained by police. They can force you to tuch to your smart phone's fingerprint sensor phisically. Best security is passprase with a TPM chip.

Thing is though that the fingerprints in the Apple design are a "if you want it, it's there" feature. Yes it's strongly encouraged, but those more security minded could bypass it's setup (if that's still possible) or remove the only enrolled finger.

Re: Please Stop Writing Secure Messaging Tools (2015)

#50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://bitwarden.com self-hosted / free / open-source password vault. extensions for every major browser out there (edge / ff 57)

> extensions for every major browser out there (edge / ff 57) Can't really say that if the stock browser on macOS isn't supported...

you're right. https://github.com/bitwarden/browser/issues/17
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