Earlier quoted context omitted.
How many BT and Virgin home routers will be patched? Somewhere around 0?
Both Virgin & BT force upgrade consumer routers overnight.
Latest Virgin upgrade was a year ago, so I'm not holding my breath...
Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
271–280 of 424 posts
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#272Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is that these aren't phones anymore; they're small computers. They should have support lifetimes that are comparable to desktop computers.
> they're small computers. And they are more expensive than many computers you can buy on the market. 2 years support on a device that can cost $500+ isn't acceptable.
And yet people buy them.
We are 4-5 years into the period where people have had sub $300 choices, so there is an alternative to spending $500+ on a device that comes with 2 years of support. Maybe not a fantastic alternative, but the $300-$500 extra that people choose to spend says something about what they care about.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#273Earlier quoted context omitted.
Magisk (/system/less root) currently passes the SafetyNet checks and it, and it's MagiskManager App, are both FL/OSS and hosted on github [0] as well as pre-built images linked from XDA [1]. I'm using it successfully with LineageOS 14.1 (Android 7.1.2). [0] https://github.com/topjohnwu [1] https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk
Which is probably a game of cat and mouse at best.
Not really - ultimately they're root, Google SafetyNet isn't, it has to run at the application level. Meaning Magisk will always win until remote attestation is enforced. There hasn't been a breaking update since July if I recall correctly and the Magisk developer had it patched in about a day.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#274Assuming neither client and router is upgraded, can this be mitigated my making the SSID hidden, so the attacker wouldn't know which AP to spoof?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#275This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
So, even if I'm using the extension HTTPSEverywhere I'm safe?
HTTPSEverywhere will not magically upgrade a site that doesn't serve HTTPS to HTTPS. If you connect to a site that doesn't support HTTPS, you are vulnerable.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#276Matthew Green's blog on why it happened and how it escaped detection is a really good read. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/10/16/falling-...
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#277This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
So, even if I'm using the extension HTTPSEverywhere I'm safe?
Theoretically. The extension can refuse to load sites that aren’t using HTTPS, but the real flaw is sites that use SSL instead of TLS. Attackers can reject SSL but they can’t do anything about TLS, so the security of your browsing would be affected by the website’s HTTPS configuration, and whether they use SSL, TLS, or both (the only 100% safe method is TLS only). I know for most people disabling SSL and going TLS-only isn’t high on their list of priorities so I expect this attack to be very successful on the internet as it is right now.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#278This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
Most IoT devices never get patched. With this vulnerability you can just drive around and spy on webcams. I mean, that's pretty bad. It's enough to make me want to build rpi wifi-wired bridges/gateways for every IoT I own (which, thankfully, isn't all that many, but enough to annoy me).
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#279Earlier quoted context omitted.
So, even if I'm using the extension HTTPSEverywhere I'm safe?
HTTPSEverywhere will not magically upgrade a site that doesn't serve HTTPS to HTTPS. If you connect to a site that doesn't support HTTPS, you are vulnerable.
Oh I see, Thanks for the answer! For what is useful the extension then?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#280It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…
For reference, the OpenBSD patch in question released on August 30: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/patches/6.1/common/027_n...
On GitHub, appears at [0] with comments coming in today at [1].
0 - https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/2e40dd69ac29d6a858309b... 1 - https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/cc66e8f557d6f3d4dea5ea...