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Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

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Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#191

Post by pfg »

endorphone wrote: post #166
Perseids wrote: post #155

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To underline your point, even my Nexus 5 (_from Google_), which is a little less than 3 years old, will never receive security updates. And one of the main reasons I chose the Nexus was to be sure to get updates on time. Except for the security vulnerabilities, everything of the device is totally fine. It's such a waste of resources… (In this case I at least have an alternative in the form of Lineage OS, which will o…

The Nexus 5 was released 4 years ago. At the same time the iPhone 5C was released. The 5C also won't receive a patch for this. There is a problem with handset abandonment, but this is true across all vendors, and it does not underline sequence7's claim that this is solely an Android problem.

To be fair, these two examples are both on the extreme end: The Nexus 5 being one of the longest supported Android phones on the market, and the 5C having a rather short support period, compared to other iPhones like the 5S, which was released along with the 5C and got iOS 11. Security updates for the Nexus 5 also stopped shipping about a year earlier. There's still room for improvement for Apple (5 years of security updates seems reasonable), but there's still a large gap.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#192

Post by jstanley »

tedunangst wrote: post #26
titzer wrote: post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This feels like some kind of prisoner's dilemma game theory problem. By defecting from the embargo, OpenBSD gained potential security for its users at the expense of all other users. Overall, this is a loss, unless you use OpenBSD. I have to agree with the researchers on this one; OpenBSD acted selfishly here.

Read that again. We asked to commit without revealing details, he said yes, that's what happened. I guess he changed his mind about that after the fact, but nobody promised not to commit. We didn't "defect" from an embargo unilaterally.

From what I've read, I don't see why everyone is giving you a hard time about this. It sounds like you did exactly what he agreed you could do, and then he changed his mind.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#193

Post by andygambles »

Have I got this right in lay-mans terms.

The client is forcibly disconnected from the WiFi network and reconnects to the attackers network instead.

The attacker doesn't need to know the WPA2 password but it accepts the connection setting the encryption to zeros.

The client thinks it is connected to the original wifi network and continues as normal.

Wifi traffic is intercepted and unencrypted.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#194

Post by lagosc »

occultist_throw wrote: post #130
stsp wrote: post #82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

OpenBSD wifi maintainer here. I was informed on July 15. The first embargo period was already quite long, until end of August. Then CERT got involved, and the embargo was extended until today. You can connect the dots. I doubt that I knew something the NSA/CIA weren't aware of.

In other words, its malfeasance by the security community for holding out. There's only a few courses of actions. One is to sit quietly and let everyone eventually do the solution. And that doesn't work. No fire under peoples' asses, and the work is delayed. The other, is to release it promptly. Then, at least we can decide to triage by turning down X service (even if wifi), requiring another factor like tunnel-login…

No one should care about a community that agrees that releasing silent patches is a good idea. This is exactly the same behavior that created the need for full disclosure in the first place. And no, there aren't just two options nor are processes binary. It's rather mind boggling how "the community" has managed to go full circle in such a short time and themselves become the opinionated people they were supposed to be the alternative to.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#195

Post by mtgx »

peterwwillis wrote: post #86
pfg wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

All major browsers implement a HSTS preload list[1] to get around the first connection problem. Manually deleting the HSTS pin for a site is quite involved and not something I'd expect most users to do. [1]: https://hstspreload.org/

Preload lists are not a realistic solution (you can't preload the whole internet) and a sufficiently complicated site will be subverted due to 3rd party dependencies. And does uninstalling a browser not clear the hsts cache?

> you can't preload the whole internet

"You wouldn't HSTS the whole internet, would you?"

Google: "Hold my beer..."

https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2017/10/03/google-is-making...

Right now it's mostly unimportant new domains, but it's a start, and they could convince other domain registrars to follow-suit.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#197

Post by mimi89999 »

user5994461 wrote: post #186
mimi89999 wrote: post #176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No as I would know about it by following security news?

Are you so great that you know all the vulnerabilities all the time since the second of disclosure? Do you seriously expect the other billions of people on the planet to be that great too?

For most of them the day after, when I get a notification from my RSS app...

No. I also don't expect them to choose device based on security. That is very bad as vendors won't care about patching their older devices (look at Android devices, home routers...) and vendors won't care about patching their flagship devices fast as they have the possibility to request very long embargos.

Making compromises for those vendors and giving more time for security agencies and other bad actors to silently exploit the vulnerabilities (where FOSS projects would have made patches for users that care) is not the way to go. That philosophy actually makes everybody less safe.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#199

Post by mikehollinger »

twitchyliquid64 wrote: post #162

This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…

Special gear isn't all that expensive. From a cursory view of the video and a skim of the paper, they're using hostapd, which means that they simply need a wifi adapter with a sufficiently-good driver. Anything with the RTL8188CUS seems to be pretty nice (that's what I'm using in a raspberry pi project, myself).

So - I agree with you that there's a barrier to entry, but it's not that big of a barrier.

Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse

#200

Post by creatrixcordis »

Fnoord wrote: post #183
creatrixcordis wrote: post #152

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So if i use my wired in node as an ssh tunnel out to the "internets" to tunnel all traffic from my wifi connected nodes then this mitigates the issue till updates come through?

That's a feasible option on laptops running macOS or Linux, but not for Android clients. Running a SSH VPN (tunneling all traffic) requires root and has a severe performance penalty (which you will notice on your battery). You'd notice it on the laptops as well, but I guess that matters less. Funny enough, OpenBSD didn't impleemnt WPA(2) for a while. Instead, they were forcing their users to use IPsec and OpenSSH ins…

Debian repos and inherently Ubuntu's repos also have wpa_supplicant 2.4, we will see if they update to 2.6 or release a patch. Probably patch before 2.6.

It would be nice if there was a rule which package repos and distros would adhere to. The rule would adapt, such as all the packages that have had a security issues, will always be required to be updated to the latest versions in the next release or sooner. As vulnerabilities are discovered, the list of packages would grow and hopefully would prevent some future attacks. Obviously it's not full proof but every little bit counts.

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