Earlier quoted context omitted.
OpenBSD wifi maintainer here. I was informed on July 15. The first embargo period was already quite long, until end of August. Then CERT got involved, and the embargo was extended until today. You can connect the dots. I doubt that I knew something the NSA/CIA weren't aware of.
Really makes me wish you'd told the world. I know all the arguments against that, but this sort of thing is no good either.
Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
171–180 of 424 posts
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#172This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#173Does anyone know if Apple release security fixes for Airport? I know it isn’t actively developed, but you’d hope they’d release critical security fixes as they still sell them.
The main attack targets 4-way handshakes, so doesn't target access points. You should worry about updating your clients, not your AP. Source: https://www.krackattacks.com/
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#174Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#175Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even for a more modern smartphone. I don't want to lose access to my 32bit apps by migrating to iOS 11. So I hope a patch for iOS 10 will be made available.
Out of interest, what apps are you using that are still 32bit only?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#176Earlier quoted context omitted.
3 months is more of a joke than a reasonable time, but one can argue about that if he wants... > even users of non-proprietary projects Actually many FOSS projects get only notified on the disclosure date. Hiding the vulnerability for such a long time makes more harm good. The vulnerability can potentially be exploited by security agencies that necessarily know about them and could also be leaked to a bad actor by an…
The state actor should be least of your worries compared to the millions of script kiddies would could use the vulnerability once it is disclosed publicly.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#177As an Android user is there any mitigation for this other than ditching my handset and switching to an iPhone or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor. This really does highlight the absolute disaster zone that the Android handset market has become as far as updates are concerned. I'm sure the Pixels will get a fix relatively quickly but almost every other Android user is going to be left in security limbo.
or waiting (hopelessly) for a patch from my vendor If this is an actual in the wild exploitable issue, there will be patches very quickly for handsets in the support period, as quickly as there is for iOS. This has been the case repeatedly before as well. What a weird post in general. Maybe wait to complain about this a month down the line or so? Instead it's just effectively noisy rhetoric.
The use of the word hopelessly was probably unnecessarily dramatic I agree but I'll leave it there so your comment makes sense.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#178I'm not sure I understand the concern with breaking WiFi. Okay, so you're vulnerable to snooping and injection by people in the same coffee shop or your neighborhood. But you're already vulnerable to that from anybody on the Internet between you and the site. HTTPS solves both of these. Am I missing something?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#179Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#180This is not an end-of-the-world type vulnerability. 1. Does not affect long-term credentials - certs, wifi passwords are still safe. Rather, confidentiality (secrecy) from client --> AP is affected, and in some cases packet forgery is possible (integrity). 2. Actually accomplishing this attack, for now, requires special and expensive hardware (med to high range SDR gear). Its also not that reliable outside of a lab e…
Also doesn't it require the attacker to have access to your wifi already? If that's the case, it's a hazard for connecting in a Starbucks or on your mobile service wifi, but you would be safe on your home or corporate wifi (unless the attacker is a colleague or relative!).