Can I use MAC whitelisting to mitigate the attack?
Not really. As far as I can tell, the attack basically requires spoofed MACs anyway because the keys are derived in part from the MACs, so whitelisting won't get you much benefit if any at all.
Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
41–50 of 424 posts
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#42Can I use MAC whitelisting to mitigate the attack?
Nope,
This will fool your client (eg: your phone) to connect to it, before it reaches your access point, then forward packets to your AP (basic man in the middle).
On the other hand, I am wondering if it manages to correctly forward packages back to the AP if that has MAC filtering on...
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#43> This can be abused to steal sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords, chat messages, emails, photos, and so on. ... if transmitted over plaintext http
Exactly, this particular sentence seems to overly dramatise the situation. Is this issue any different to using open wifi at a cafe, which many many people do, relying on HTTPS for their security? (This is an honest question)
At its worst, this attack reduces a protected network to an open wifi, yes.
The risk is that you may do things on a protected network assuming it really is protected - this is more of a thing for organisations rather than consumers, for example organisations might have unprotected services accessible over their office wifi.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#44It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…
This feels like some kind of prisoner's dilemma game theory problem. By defecting from the embargo, OpenBSD gained potential security for its users at the expense of all other users. Overall, this is a loss, unless you use OpenBSD. I have to agree with the researchers on this one; OpenBSD acted selfishly here.
It's a loss, even if you use openbsd. If you break the embargo, you won't be notified in advance anymore. Basically, you get an advantage once but will get several losses for a very long time. Overall it's bad, even for OpenBSD users.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
Read that again. We asked to commit without revealing details, he said yes, that's what happened. I guess he changed his mind about that after the fact, but nobody promised not to commit. We didn't "defect" from an embargo unilaterally.
Sounds like a "we technically respected the embargo, just not in principle" sort of thing to me.
They agreed, but now they regret the decision and wouldn't make it again. To prevent themselves from doing so, they will not speak with OpenBSD until later in the process.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#46Correct me if I am wrong but basically the attack is against clients, not access points which means simply patching the AP will not do, one would have to patch all of the clients. And the AP patches that are now coming in are probably for client mode, so they fix a certain scenario when the AP is a client which is far from the common one?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sounds like a "we technically respected the embargo, just not in principle" sort of thing to me.
They agreed, but now they regret the decision and wouldn't make it again. To prevent themselves from doing so, they will not speak with OpenBSD until later in the process.
What's the word for pressuring a person until they make a decision they immediately regret?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#48This is too big, I doubt it's not a backdoor.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not the first time OpenBSD does not respect embargoes, for example https://lwn.net/Articles/726585/ and https://lwn.net/Articles/726580/
A bunch of dudes on a linux mailing list lack the authority to prevent openbsd from fixing things.
True, they don't. However, this researcher has the authority to not notify the openbsd team in advance any more and he already announced that he'll keep his cards closer next time. What happens if sufficient researchers come to the same conclusion?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#50Finally a way to get all IoT devices connected to WiFi!
Remember, 'S' in IoT is for Security.