Is there a way I can install an open source phone OS on my old Android phones to keep them patched? I'm not prepared to keep buying new phones just because manufacturers only provide intermittent updates for a year or two. Anyone got any suggestions for options?
Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
11–20 of 424 posts
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#12It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is that tons and tons of devices will not receive update until they die.
Don't you only need to patch one end of the communication? Eg if phones are patched, they're safe, even if the AP is not. Then again, I didn't read the attack fully, this might be a client-only problem.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#14Is there a way I can install an open source phone OS on my old Android phones to keep them patched? I'm not prepared to keep buying new phones just because manufacturers only provide intermittent updates for a year or two. Anyone got any suggestions for options?
You could just ... buy an iPhone and get timely security updates for years.
EDIT: Downvote if you want, but if iOS 11 contains this security fix exclusively and not iOS 10, then an iPhone 5s bought on 20 September 2013 is going to get this fix. If Apple release an iOS 10 update and you bought an iPhone 5 on 21 September 2012 you're covered too.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#15Is there a way I can install an open source phone OS on my old Android phones to keep them patched? I'm not prepared to keep buying new phones just because manufacturers only provide intermittent updates for a year or two. Anyone got any suggestions for options?
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#16It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#17It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…
Not the first time OpenBSD does not respect embargoes, for example https://lwn.net/Articles/726585/ and https://lwn.net/Articles/726580/
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#18Can anyone explain the timeline of releasing such significant security findings? Why is it disclosed to the public 1/2 year after submitting to review? I'd guess the (publicly funded) research behind it is a lot older than that.
Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#19Re: Key Reinstallation Attacks – Breaking WPA2 by Forcing Nonce Reuse
#20It seems that OpenBSD already patched their source code and that wasn't to the likings of the researcher. In the future he will now delay notifying OpenBSD of vulnerabilities. Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo? OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure…