This is like a variant of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which posits that your language constrains what you can think about, but I am not convinced (not in general, and not in this particular case.) It is not a failing of language that it can be used inconsistently, or to lie; this is inevitable. The problem in current political discourse is a growing preference among the electorate for having their emotions stimulated…
I think you're conflating the two. Take, for example, the word "election". If the word "election" can mean both an election, and a not-election – of the sort experienced in the USSR – then how do you describe the election you want to have? The word is meaningless, and thus it throws the very concept into doubt. This has nothing to do with Sapir-Whorf, which isn't really a strong proposition anyway. You have a concept…
- it conveys more bits of information
- plausible deniability -> capacity to retroactively compress the word's meaning
- people 'analyze'/recognize simpler words (only one meaning, i.e. GitHub) differently than they do loaded words (multiple meanings, i.e. dream)
- people take their own personal uncertainty (over which meaning is the correct one that they need to interpret the word as) as a sign that if they share their recognition, it's more likely to make them look like a fool in public
Observers realize that the original speaker's (e.g. Trump or Stalin) plausible deniability is a kind of insurance policy against audience members calling them out