Earlier quoted context omitted.
It would seem to be extremely difficult for them to compel you to aim them at a fixed point in space.
The police can forcefully draw your blood with a warrant. Maybe they can also forcefully sedate you or fix your head/eyes with some medical device.
FaceID Security [pdf]
241–250 of 314 posts
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#242Earlier quoted context omitted.
The same holds true for physical keys. If you're arrested then the cops can tie you, grab the keys and unlock your door "and there's literally nothing you can do to prevent it.". Also some guy can just make a copy your key (pretty trivial) -- heck people can even break your door bypassing the key altogether.
Yes, but the police have to get warrants. If they fail to get a warrant, then it's inadmissable in court. In the phone case, they don't need a warrant if your authentication method is literally your face.
If all 3 of these are true, you need a warrant (at least in the US). Doesn't matter if the keys, or in this case your face, are right there. The fact that you locked your phone with something the cop doesn't normally have is enough to require a warrant.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#243Earlier quoted context omitted.
The same holds true for physical keys. If you're arrested then the cops can tie you, grab the keys and unlock your door "and there's literally nothing you can do to prevent it.". Also some guy can just make a copy your key (pretty trivial) -- heck people can even break your door bypassing the key altogether.
Yes, but the police have to get warrants. If they fail to get a warrant, then it's inadmissable in court. In the phone case, they don't need a warrant if your authentication method is literally your face.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#244Earlier quoted context omitted.
In addition to this, don't keep private (and certainly not illegal) data on a compute device that you walk around with. Maybe, just maybe, treat that device as compromised from the start and treat it accordingly. The idea of using them as secure devices should probably stop, at least until they are actually secure. Moreover, if you're committing crimes, maybe don't record them in a way that is recoverable. Not that y…
Why carry a smartphone then? Current tech doesn't allow for regular users to secure their data in this fashion. I mean you'd have to completely log out of something like Dropbox even if you managed to keep your data remote.
That doesn't mean they are useless, just that I consider them compromised right out of the box. I treat it accordingly and will recommend others do the same until they are much more secure.
They are great for lots of things. Privacy and security are not among those things.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#245Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/17/16161758/ios-11-touch-id-... is how you work around that issue. Keep in mind, you don't need to refuse to TouchID/FaceID forever, just for the timeout (which I do wish was configurable -- I think one hour is reasonable).
Here's the sequence of events: 1. You're walking, with your phone in your pocket. 2. Suddenly, a cop accosts you. You don't have time to react. 3. They detain and restrain you (with handcuffs or otherwise) 4. They pat you down and find your phone 5. They hold up your phone to your face to unlock it I know that people who've never been detained or interacted much with cops think that this is a completely unlikely situ…
1. You're walking, with your phone in your pocket.
2. Suddenly, a cop accosts you. You don't have time to react.
3. They detain and restrain you (with handcuffs or otherwise)
4. They pat you down and find your phone
5. They take your hand and place it on the fingerprint sensor.
Ignoring #2 (and the terrible language you used), I don't see how my scenario is significantly more or less likely than yours.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#246Earlier quoted context omitted.
> And I don't see people complaining about the state of home security... Home security is a really poor analogy. * Attacking everybody's house at once is not scalable, unlike attacking many people's electronic devices at once. Furthermore, defending against a SWAT team armed with a search warrant is nigh impossible, no matter what lock you put on your front door. * The contents of most people's houses is far more wei…
How do you attack everyone’s physical camera at once? Sure you could attack other implementation details of the device remotely and “at once” — but how is that relevant to the faceid use case?
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#247Earlier quoted context omitted.
How is it a regression? What kind of scenario exists where the cops can force you to FaceID unlock your phone, but not TouchID unlock it? You think they can force you to look at it ("engage" with it) but not touch the phone?
Technically I could see FaceID being marginally more secure in one very specific edge case... If you are asleep. With TouchID, all that is needed is to push their finger to the phone. With FaceID, your eyes would need to be open (theoretically, let's see in practice).
Honestly, the easiest attack would just be to ask me about my dogs. 99.99% chance I'll unlock my phone, pull up pictures and show them to you (easy grab) or just hand you the phone and let you browse through them.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#248Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The solution is to be proactive. If you are going to walk down the street in an at risk area, you hit the power button five times. If you are about to go through a CBP checkpoint, then do the same. You and I have incredibly different experiences of policing and detention if, for you, "be proactive when you're at-risk" is appreciably different from saying "don't use FaceID ever".
Or I guess our detection of risk differs. I have never been detained when I didn't have a "hair on my neck raise" with enough time to disable my phone. If you are in such high risk situations continuously that "be proactive when you're at-risk" is appreciably the same as "don't use FaceID ever", then I say you are doing something very wrong and not just incidentally being stopped for a suspicion of possibly doing som…
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#249>You can always use your passcode instead of Face ID, and it’s still required under the following circumstances: >The device has received a remote lock command. I haven't had an iPhone since the 3Gs - how are these sent? Via cellular data I assume, but is there some app you have to have on your computer?
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#250Earlier quoted context omitted.
There is a way to quickly disable face id, presumably you would do so in most situations when facing police.
There's also a way to break in your house whilst you're gone or asleep. In the former case, if the device is in your house, would you've disabled FaceID? In the latter case, would you've disabled FaceID? Would you've disabled FaceID when you were going outside (with your device) and you'd be busted then? Answer in all these cases: Of course not. So a PIN alone would've been more secure. It'd have cost the government…