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FaceID Security [pdf]

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Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#151

Post by AdamJacobMuller »

chimeracoder wrote: post #125
c22 wrote: post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It sounds like fpgaminer's argument is that biometric keys can't be compromised because of "liveness tests". An argument against would have to rebut this assumption. My gut instinct tells me that this assumption is absurd, but I lack the specific knowledge of these systems to prove it.

> It sounds like fpgaminer's argument is that biometric keys can't be compromised because of "liveness tests". You're arrested, and the cops hold the phone up to your face to unlock it. That's a pretty big compromise, and there's literally nothing you can do to prevent it.

https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/17/16161758/ios-11-touch-id-...

is how you work around that issue.

Keep in mind, you don't need to refuse to TouchID/FaceID forever, just for the timeout (which I do wish was configurable -- I think one hour is reasonable).

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#152

Post by AdamJacobMuller »

chimeracoder wrote: post #139
coldtea wrote: post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The same holds true for physical keys. If you're arrested then the cops can tie you, grab the keys and unlock your door "and there's literally nothing you can do to prevent it.". Also some guy can just make a copy your key (pretty trivial) -- heck people can even break your door bypassing the key altogether.

> The same holds true for physical keys. Nobody's saying that home security is good. The point the parent was making is that, even with a "liveness test", compared to other biometric identification, this is a regression from fingerprint-based authentication for the iPhone.

How is it a regression? What kind of scenario exists where the cops can force you to FaceID unlock your phone, but not TouchID unlock it?

You think they can force you to look at it ("engage" with it) but not touch the phone?

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#153

Post by oflannabhra »

jagger27 wrote: post #103
oflannabhra wrote: post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FaceID will be incompatible with burqas, just like TouchID is incompatible with gloves.

What about an IR transparent burqa?

FaceID uses a combination of IR and visible light. So, theoretically, if you had a perfectly EMR-transparent burqa, it would not interfere with FaceID. Although an EMR-transparent burqa might not even qualify as a burqa anymore.

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#154

Post by misterdata »

rimliu wrote: post #127
Manozco wrote: post #55

I'm genuinely interested in knowing how apple can tell that FaceID is better than TouchID - TouchID is already very fast - I can give access to someone else with TouchID without giving my password - It's unlikely that someone will be able to unlock my phone without me knowing it when using TouchID - In case of coercion, I still have the possibility to give the wrong fingerprint 9 times before the good one - I have to…

One common scenario where I often have problems with TouchID and FaceID should solve them: wet hands.

That, and gloves!

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#156

Post by skygazer »

bsenftner wrote: post #95
Manozco wrote: post #55

I'm genuinely interested in knowing how apple can tell that FaceID is better than TouchID - TouchID is already very fast - I can give access to someone else with TouchID without giving my password - It's unlikely that someone will be able to unlock my phone without me knowing it when using TouchID - In case of coercion, I still have the possibility to give the wrong fingerprint 9 times before the good one - I have to…

It's a competitive move; it gives Apple and their users a bragging point, causing competition an expensive countermove. Competition has to move to depth sensor cameras and more on their phones, while Apple is reducing the expense and improving the quality of theirs. The Face ID tech is immature today, but a quarter or three? The quarter after that once support issues have had a few cycles, and the Face ID team has it…

Pardon my ignorance. FR industry? Foreign Relations? First Responder? Flame Resistant? Google was no help. Edit: Oh, do you mean facial recognition?

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#157

Post by chimeracoder »

AdamJacobMuller wrote: post #151
chimeracoder wrote: post #125

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It sounds like fpgaminer's argument is that biometric keys can't be compromised because of "liveness tests". You're arrested, and the cops hold the phone up to your face to unlock it. That's a pretty big compromise, and there's literally nothing you can do to prevent it.

https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/17/16161758/ios-11-touch-id-... is how you work around that issue. Keep in mind, you don't need to refuse to TouchID/FaceID forever, just for the timeout (which I do wish was configurable -- I think one hour is reasonable).

Here's the sequence of events:

1. You're walking, with your phone in your pocket.

2. Suddenly, a cop accosts you. You don't have time to react.

3. They detain and restrain you (with handcuffs or otherwise)

4. They pat you down and find your phone

5. They hold up your phone to your face to unlock it

I know that people who've never been detained or interacted much with cops think that this is a completely unlikely situation, or easily avoidable, but I promise you it is not.

TouchID isn't great from a law enforcement perspective, but it's light years ahead of FaceID.

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#158

Post by AdamJacobMuller »

chimeracoder wrote: post #144
new299 wrote: post #141

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It doesn't activate unless you look at the lock screen, so you can just refuse to look at it? https://www.wired.com/story/iphone-x-faceid-security/

> It doesn't activate unless you look at the lock screen, so you can just refuse to look at it? Have you ever been detained? As far as I'm concerned, "refuse to look at it" is useful as a prevention tactic as not having any lock at all.

By that metric it is just as useful as "I won't give you my password" and "I won't touch the phone"

https://xkcd.com/538/

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#159

Post by mbgerring »

fpgaminer wrote: post #88

I'll bet most people who dismiss TouchID and FaceID as useless because they're "usernames" and not "passwords", have a bog standard lock and key on their house. Funny thing about those house keys. They can be stolen, lost, or duplicated from pictures. But TouchID and FaceID have liveness tests to prevent forgeries, your biometrics can't be easily stolen, and you can't lose them. A house key is called a "key" though,…

It all depends on your threat model. Police are perfectly capable of breaking into my home, but it doesn't matter, because if they do it without a warrant everything they find is inadmissible in court. Whereas with FaceID, if I'm arrested and they point my phone at my face to unlock it against my will, anything they find is now admissible as evidence.

Re: FaceID Security [pdf]

#160

Post by ovao »

mgleason_3 wrote: post #121

The problem I have is with the lack of TouchID. FaceID is fine. But, I don't always want to have to stop what I'm doing, loooook at the phone and then proceed. Sometimes I even unlock my phone in my pocket to sneak a look. How do you do that with FaceID when the sensor's been removed?

By “removed” do you mean “occluded”?

If you have access to the screen but not to the sensor array, you can use a passcode. This is obviously very difficult to do when the phone’s in your pocket, so that’s a very small regression in usability there, but that seems like an extreme edge case.

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