Questions: * Does one explicitly set up their FaceID with the option to skip, like how TouchID works currently? I see (when...enabled) verbiage, which is a good sign. * "The probability that a random person in the population could look at your iPhone X and unlock it using Face ID is approximately 1 in 1,000,000 (versus 1 in 50,000 for Touch ID)" If you have a face that causes most people you meet to say "oh, you look…
Would be cool/weird if you could find out who they were and have a meetup.
FaceID Security [pdf]
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Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#32> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you Apple mentioned this on stage, which to me was quite significant since they don't waste a single word during their keynotes. They still haven't given approximate collision chances and to me this must mean they think it's below the 1/50,000 touch id had. My understanding is fingerprint collisions are highly random. That is very d…
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, any kind of biometric auth is vulnerable to the adversary forcing your physical compliance. However you can disable TouchID and FaceID both by pressing the power button five times in quick succession, after which it will require your passcode.
For the iPhone X it's hold both the power button and either volume button for 2 seconds.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#34I still wish it had an "unlock under duress" mode, where you could authenticate with a subtle difference (different gaze, alternate passcode, etc). The phone would unlock itself but then signal back to the mothership, cloud services and even apps that it's in "duress mode". Display in that mode should look totally normal, just some of the information missing (e.g. emails/messages/contacts from certain groups of conta…
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#35> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you as well as among children under the age of 13, because their Face ID Security September 2017 2 distinct facial features may not have fully developed. If you're concerned about this, we recommend using a passcode to authenticate. I was really hoping they'd provide the probability for identical twins, but maybe they don't have eno…
I believe the probability for identical twins is 1 in 1; they mentioned in the keynote that some people will have to stick with passcodes, including those with "evil twins". (Presumably if you trust your identical twin to not be evil, you don't care if they're able to unlock your phone.)
Also regarding the "evil twin" thing, evil twins came from another dimension so, aside from the goatee, they really were literally identical down to every last detail. It's unclear to me if that joke was meant as "your identical twin will be able to unlock your phone, so hopefully they aren't evil", or was just meant as "someone who looks like you might be able to unlock your phone". Probably a bit of both. But this is why I want to know what the actual probability is that an identical twin can unlock the phone. Maybe it really is 1 : 1, but maybe it's not.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#36> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you Apple mentioned this on stage, which to me was quite significant since they don't waste a single word during their keynotes. They still haven't given approximate collision chances and to me this must mean they think it's below the 1/50,000 touch id had. My understanding is fingerprint collisions are highly random. That is very d…
They said in the keynote the chance a random person could unlock your phone with FaceID is 1 in a million.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#37So it matches on a math model created using face data and 'a device-specific random pattern'. So unless someone cracks the algorithms used here, you need the device data to spoof the model, assuming the pattern is used in a way that you can't simply ignore it and generate matching models using just a spoofed face.
"We worked with participants from around the world to include a representative group of people accounting for gender, age, ethnicity, and other factors."
If the model is really hugely inclusive, it could be too general. But also it would be very difficult to get the same number of scans from some minority populations, and that could affect the functionality of the result.
"An additional neural network that’s trained to spot and resist spoofing defends against attempts to unlock your phone with photos or masks."
Gruesome thought: what if somebody obtained your face?
Additional thought: could we train the neural network to detect faces under duress and immediately lock the device?
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#38> The probability of a false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you Apple mentioned this on stage, which to me was quite significant since they don't waste a single word during their keynotes. They still haven't given approximate collision chances and to me this must mean they think it's below the 1/50,000 touch id had. My understanding is fingerprint collisions are highly random. That is very d…
They said in the keynote the chance a random person could unlock your phone with FaceID is 1 in a million.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#39"Face ID confirms attention by detecting the direction of your gaze" So to the argument that police can force you to open your iPhone if secured with TouchID, is this perhaps more secure? If you refrain from looking at your phone?
No, any kind of biometric auth is vulnerable to the adversary forcing your physical compliance. However you can disable TouchID and FaceID both by pressing the power button five times in quick succession, after which it will require your passcode.
I would prefer it to be a double-tap on the power button, or at the very absolute worse, a triple tap. Two buttons simultaneously five times? Impossible to do under any sort of external pressure/duress.
Re: FaceID Security [pdf]
#40I still wish it had an "unlock under duress" mode, where you could authenticate with a subtle difference (different gaze, alternate passcode, etc). The phone would unlock itself but then signal back to the mothership, cloud services and even apps that it's in "duress mode". Display in that mode should look totally normal, just some of the information missing (e.g. emails/messages/contacts from certain groups of conta…
That sounds like a cool feature, but probably applicable to 0.0001% of the population. Think of all the work app developers would need to do to make their app "duress compatible" in the very rare chance someone is being held at gunpoint and the person is asking to see their emails.