Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
81–90 of 254 posts
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#82Yet another attack vector that doesn't exist at all in Linux distributions but invented by language package managers, sadly. They solved the issue 2 decades ago by heavily vetting packages before accepting them into repositories. Users are allowed to add and use packages from 3rd party repositories. Maybe solution to this is creating curated repositories based on publicly open ones and using them by default (and requ…
Sure its nice (and easier) to use the distro's package management system, but it often just isn't up to date enough. You end up using thing that are a while out of date and may have security flaws as a result.
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#83Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#84Last year someone wrote his thesis describing python typosquatting and standard library name squatting: http://incolumitas.com/2016/06/08/typosquatting-package-mana...
However after that the packages used in this thesis - the most successful one being urllib2 - weren't blocked, they were deleted. Benjamin Bach was able to register urllib2 afterwards. Benjamin and I decided that we'd now try to register as many stdlib names as possible.
See also: https://www.pytosquatting.org/
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#85Yet another attack vector that doesn't exist at all in Linux distributions but invented by language package managers, sadly. They solved the issue 2 decades ago by heavily vetting packages before accepting them into repositories. Users are allowed to add and use packages from 3rd party repositories. Maybe solution to this is creating curated repositories based on publicly open ones and using them by default (and requ…
> Yet another attack vector that doesn't exist at all in Linux distributions but invented by language package managers, sadly. Language package managers solve the problem that we don't have neither an universal package format that works across all programming language requirements and all sort of OSes, nor the time to create an OS specific package for all sort of OSes.
There is nothing wrong with inventing their own solution if they're solving other problems, what is wrong is not learning from previous examples and fucking up creating problems that have been already solved in the process.
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
Package managers are providing (in the most case) a free service, so it's hard to see a strong case for them providing more services here. The problem is one of scale. npm has over 500,000 packages, so no manual review will address their scale over the whole repository. Until the developer market shows that they'll pay for a more secure service (e.g. package signed, reviews done etc) I doubt much will change.
Five hundred thousand packages, am I reading it right? I dont believe top ten OS package managers combined would reach that number. Either this is a typo or it's crazy.
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
I believe urllib3 is built-in. So if you have installed it from PyPI you've gotten a malicious version.
urllib and urllib2 are built-in for Python 2, and were merged and reorganized as just urllib in Python 3. urllib3 is a third-party module.
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#88Whoa urlib & urllib3. Those are pretty popular packages, especially to newbies. Hundreds of websites that teach web-scraping use those libraries. Wonder what is an effective form of protection against such attack vectors? Do digitally signed certificates fit into this usage scenario??
> Do digitally signed certificates fit into this usage scenario?? No, because either the package author would have to sign them, in which case you have to choose to trust each package author, or the repository would sign them, in which case there would be no improvement for this current issue, since the repo would sign the fake packages as well.
Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#89Re: Malicious software libraries found in PyPI posing as well known libraries
#90Personally, I prefer the uncurated, caveat emptor approach, but this could do witha third party stepping up. (moz seems keen to do anything to get us to like them)
Ultimately, sounds like something that could be solved with a blockchain of legitimisation. (ran by moz)
;)