Earlier quoted context omitted.
They also voted "yes" to the proposal and had 6 months to implement it.
Exactly. For some contrast: I use tinydns, which doesn't natively support CAA records. But I wanted them so I read the CAA spec and wrote a little tool to add support for these records using the generic record format. And I'm not even a programmer! (I can write a little code, nothing serious, and nobody would hire me for it.) And yet with all of Comodo's resources, they couldn't get this done? I can't take them serio…
Comodo fails to check CAA records
51–60 of 71 posts
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#52Earlier quoted context omitted.
>working with a malware company Why is this a bad thing? A cert says "Yes, person x REALLY IS person x, and I can prove it mathematically." It doesn't say "Person x is trustworthy enough for me to vouch for them."
Who do you imagine they verified was Person X? More on the malware cert issuance: https://blogs.msmvps.com/donna/2009/05/18/microsoft-mvp-mike... For malware concerns there's also Comodo's relationship with PrivDog. I'm not clear on whether PrivDog is deliberate malware or just incompetent insecure software.
The legitimate owner of that domain or operator of the website. That's what certificates are supposed to attest to.
Malware authors might be bad people, but they're definitely people who exist in real life and have an identity that can be attested to.
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
You may find my CAA website helpful: https://sslmate.com/caa/support
I used your site - it was quick and easy. It soon went downhill from there. I don't run my own DNS or I'd be done pasting the line into my config. Instead I ran into a UI that doesn't support CAA as a type.
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#54If this is the first time you've heard of CAA records, note that the "dig" command isn't yet aware of these records types, so you need to tell it to use "type257" as the record type: $ dig empty.basic.caatestsuite.com type257 More resources here: https://support.dnsimple.com/articles/caa-record/ https://caatestsuite.com/
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#55If you're not already familiar with his work, you should know that Hanno Böck is a machine, and someone worth following. If there's some mistake you can make with the web PKI that is so stupid nobody would ever bother to check for it, rest assured that Hanno will eventually check.
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#56Wikipedia has a nice list of previous Comodo malfeasance: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comodo_Group#Controversies Highlights include allowing fraudulent certs to be issued for Google, Yahoo, and Mozilla; working with a malware company; and trademark shenanigans with Let's Encrypt.
https://threatpost.com/chromodo-browser-disables-same-origin...
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#57If this is the first time you've heard of CAA records, note that the "dig" command isn't yet aware of these records types, so you need to tell it to use "type257" as the record type: $ dig empty.basic.caatestsuite.com type257 More resources here: https://support.dnsimple.com/articles/caa-record/ https://caatestsuite.com/
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#58This inspired me to add a CAA record for my domain - but https://www.namecheap.com doesn't support that record type. Has anyone had better luck other places?
Re: Comodo fails to check CAA records
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
Revocation for being three days late in implementing a new standard would be a massive overreaction. It would harm thousands of businesses in the process and would be extremely petty. Symantecs misdeeds are far worse than this.
Revocation can be done only for new certs. It's time to throw a CA to the dogs once in a while pour encourage les autres.
It's just that when trust has been revoked in CAs recently, it's been done in a more gradual fashion to not hurt customers too much and give them time to migrate. After all, it's not the customer's fault the CA went rogue. This usually starts with not accepting certificates past a certain date but still validating previously issued ones, until sometime 6 months to a year later they're completely distrusted.