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Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

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Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#51

Good on Virginia. When I voted there they had pretty modern and well run machines in my county with some sort of printout to confirm that you vote was cast. Voting is a messy process, but really important, and really important to have the counting be transparent and beyond reproach.

All new electronic voting machines in Virginia have been required to be optical scan since 2007. Unfortunately when the law was changed the state didn't mandate a date for localities to replace their current touch screen machines with optical scan. The board of elections was given the power to decertify existing machines, which they just used, but have been hesitant to do so due to political pressure from localities that don't want have to pay for new machines.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#52
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not familiar, but why not? Don't we only care about the authenticity of the vote (is the castor a citizen or not), and the votes. Computer and hand count does its own thing, and in the end the numbers should agree.

Because once there is a layer of "electronic" between you and the vote, there are millions of things that can be done to falsify one side or the other. 4% of the time it prints a different paper receipt, it just makes the electronic numbers go in someone's favor by a few percent in a couple choice districts. Or it uses crafty UX to make people vote for people or things they normally wouldn't. And what if the numbers…

I can understand the risk of having a layer, and I do agree paper ballot does give better transparency. Here is the proposal:

Cast the ballot on paper. Every ballot has unique counterfeit patterns (totally randomized). The ballot is scanned and send to server, with both the scan of the ballot and the eletronic reading. Voter should be asked to verify (but we know half don't do it). The paper ballot is casted the same way as it has always been. We can also read the paper ballot one more time if we have to during the first round of counting. You can't have a fraud unless you cab mainpluate both paper and eletronic. Either both come to same number or they don't. I am just not familiar with how we verify eligibility tbh.

When we count paper ballot, we scan for the counterfeit. If the final number has mismatched, we either have a miscount or an error. Paper ballot will alwsys get recount when there is dispute.

Have we had a re-election in the entire American history, or at least in the past 30 years? Regardless, paper ballot fraud can lead to reelection so regardless of what proposal we will face re-election if we have to, but we normally don't.

This seems like over engineering, but we have to take into account people living abroad almost always now rely on eletronic voting if EV is offered.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#53
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So why not have both? A receipt and eletronic? They should both matched.

Because you can't verify that both were recorded the same way. And even if you fully count both records, what happens when there is a discrepancy?

In the event of a discrepancy you trust the paper record, and throw away the electronic machine.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#54
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because once there is a layer of "electronic" between you and the vote, there are millions of things that can be done to falsify one side or the other. 4% of the time it prints a different paper receipt, it just makes the electronic numbers go in someone's favor by a few percent in a couple choice districts. Or it uses crafty UX to make people vote for people or things they normally wouldn't. And what if the numbers…

I can understand the risk of having a layer, and I do agree paper ballot does give better transparency. Here is the proposal: Cast the ballot on paper. Every ballot has unique counterfeit patterns (totally randomized). The ballot is scanned and send to server, with both the scan of the ballot and the eletronic reading. Voter should be asked to verify (but we know half don't do it). The paper ballot is casted the same…

But what problem does that whole thing solve that can't be solved by requiring a few people keep eyes on the locked ballot box at all times?

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because you can't verify that both were recorded the same way. And even if you fully count both records, what happens when there is a discrepancy?

In the event of a discrepancy you trust the paper record, and throw away the electronic machine.

Then why add the electronic on in the first place?

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#56
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I can understand the risk of having a layer, and I do agree paper ballot does give better transparency. Here is the proposal: Cast the ballot on paper. Every ballot has unique counterfeit patterns (totally randomized). The ballot is scanned and send to server, with both the scan of the ballot and the eletronic reading. Voter should be asked to verify (but we know half don't do it). The paper ballot is casted the same…

But what problem does that whole thing solve that can't be solved by requiring a few people keep eyes on the locked ballot box at all times?

Maybe not, but we should never stop entertaining other possibile improvements. The fact that mailing in ballot can be intercepted or even discarded is a problem. Sure sometimes the most primitive and simplest solution is often the best. Reasons we are having this conversation is because eletronic voting has flaws, and having a few people watching a locked box also has problem. The whole counting by hand also has problem. Is there an intersection we can meet between traditional method and technical method?

I am a novice on the whole voting system, but just off the top of head my proposal would seem to work in ideal situation. The fact we have a record of ubique vote electronically and on paper is cruical to the integrity of each vote. There must have been a few dozen studies already on this topic. I'd suprise if no one has a bullet proof system yet. It CAN'T be that hard. Just emulate cryptography here.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#57
In WA we have absentee ballots which is really the best of all worlds. You fill it in, sign it and mail it back. Couldn't be easier and you don't have to worry about polling locations. They are also hardcore about checking your signature; If it doesn't match your voter registration the ballot isn't counted and you get a letter in the mail.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#58

In WA we have absentee ballots which is really the best of all worlds. You fill it in, sign it and mail it back. Couldn't be easier and you don't have to worry about polling locations. They are also hardcore about checking your signature; If it doesn't match your voter registration the ballot isn't counted and you get a letter in the mail.

I've read accounts that many absentee ballots are invalidated by a very sketchy process of signature verification. And that was in Alameda County in CA, a very liberal place. It seems attacks on voting are coming from all sides.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#59
post #34

In the UK I walk into my local primary school/church/community hall (no more than a 5-10 min walk away), utter my name and address as identification (no other ID needed), and use a pencil to write a big 'X' against my preferences on a piece of paper I was handed when I entered the polling station. There are multiple local party volunteers (I was one in the last election) from all the major parties at all stages of th…

In the Japan I walk into my local school/community hall(on rare occasion, the church was used, no more than a 5-10 min walk away), present the voting announcement paper the govt send it to my physical address, and use a pencil to write a name of a candidates on a piece of paper I was exchanged it with my voting announcement paper. In the Japanese writing system, candidate's name can be written in multiple ways. If wr…

How do people vote who don't know how to read/write?

Japan's literacy rate is very high, but it's not 100%.

Re: Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

#60
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But what problem does that whole thing solve that can't be solved by requiring a few people keep eyes on the locked ballot box at all times?

Maybe not, but we should never stop entertaining other possibile improvements. The fact that mailing in ballot can be intercepted or even discarded is a problem. Sure sometimes the most primitive and simplest solution is often the best. Reasons we are having this conversation is because eletronic voting has flaws, and having a few people watching a locked box also has problem. The whole counting by hand also has prob…

> The fact that mailing in ballot can be intercepted or even discarded is a problem.

You don't need to mail anything anywhere in a paper vote, count by hand system.

> having a few people watching a locked box also has problem. The whole counting by hand also has problem.

What problem do they have?

> I'd suprise if no one has a bullet proof system yet.

We do have one: no electronics, count by hand in public view.

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