Class actions can be effective where the class members are relatively large, sophisticated entities. E.g. the data-breach class action brought by banks that is mentioned in the article. But in the consumer-protection space, we should consider alternatives. Where the class members are individual consumers, litigation ends up being lawyer-driven. Cases settle for pennies on the dollar of potential damages, and end up s…
>Where the class members are individual consumers, litigation ends up being lawyer-driven. Cases settle for pennies on the dollar of potential damages, and end up serving neither to compensate consumers nor really to deter illegal conduct. You're completely misunderstanding the purpose of class actions, and are using an oft-repeated error. The article itself explains the value of class actions. Class actions are an i…
If you think of litigation in economic-theoretic terms, yes, that's the purpose of class actions. But while you're in that head space, you also need to consider the principal-agent problem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal%E2%80%93agent_proble.... Where the claims are small and the class members are unsophisticated, the principals (the consumers) don't have sufficient incentive to control their agents (the lawyers).
That manifests in class action litigation in two ways. Class action lawyers are incentivized to bring cases that are marginal on the merits: http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_opinion_blasts.... They also are incentivized to settle good cases for for a fraction of potential damages.
The end result is a system that doesn't do a great job of really anything. Consumers get only a tiny fraction of what they've lost. Companies aren't deterred--they just treat the occasional payout as the cost of doing business.