Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can do crypto as a side-hobby and safely put it into production. Of course, you can also do it wrong, but it is with little work possible to do it correctly. Normally I wouldn't speak against what you said because the critique is only very minor, but I heard this too often. Your warning is too strong. People should try their own crypto and with little care it is not unsafer. Maybe giving a list of do's for that w…
> Of course, you can also do it wrong, but it is with little work possible to do it correctly. GCHQ loves people who think this. Have a look at some of the game console cryptography. These are companies with strong financial incentive to get it right. They're large well funded multinational organisations. They still get it wrong.
a) Well known, well studied but also attractive targets for attackers to study
b) Unknown (aside from the developer) until an attacker encounters a specific piece of encrypted data
It is a common assumption that well-known methods are better (and it is the assumption I work under) but does empirical data on security breaches back that up? There are plenty of examples of security breaches where 'standard' methods were being used. Are there similar examples where people using previously unknown methods have been compromised?
GCHQ and others invest a huge amount of resources in finding vulnerabilities in well known encryption methods. When they find one, everyone who used that method is vulnerable.
I have no doubt that if they really wanted a piece of data that I had encrypted with a homemade method, they would be able to break it.
However, are they going to invest the resources to do that if I am not being specifically targeted? Are they going to invest the resources to crack hundreds of different people's home-made encryption methods? Thousands? Hundreds of thousands?
If am being specifically targeted by something like GCHQ, they will get what they want one way or another.