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Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

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Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#81
I've gotten this phishing e-mail 3 times over the past month or so. The first time I almost fell for it.

Looking at the attacker's code, they are currently trying to steal cloudflare api keys in addition to stealing cookies from all sites the extension users visit :(

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think more policies will make a better place. One of the team member screw up and stuff like this happen. I am questioning his security education to have been phished so easily.

It's counter intuitive. I bet you $5 that if I target you, and you're not expecting it, I can phish you. I've seen this happen in the field, and it doesn't have much to do with education. Relax for an instant and I have you. The only real defense is to glance at the url bar every time you're about to enter your password. And even I find myself not doing that 100% of the time. It's a numbers game. A policy of popping…

That too can be fooled. Much better to login to your relevant account by manually opening a new tab and navigating to it. In this case one they saw no link and call to action on their Google developer's website they should realize something was a foot.

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#83
post #52
post #49

Can someone explain to me why the attacker wrote the script source tag as "var config_fragment = ' ';" Instead of just: var config_fragment = ' ';

It’s usually done to prevent the parser from interpreting the closing script tag early: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/236073/why-split-the-scr...

If this is truly the reason the coder went overboard in parsing it up IMO.

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#84
post #10

> “Click here to read more details” the email said. The click opened the “Google” password dialog, and the unlucky team member entered the password for our developer account. This looked all legit to the team member, so we did not notice the pishing attack as such at this point. Pishing for Chrome extensions was simply not on our radar screen. First, it is excellent that you disclosed the issue. Second, based upon th…

Given it's a team account might have made usage a bit more complicated, but this sounds like something 2FA would have prevented, as even with the passsword the hackers wouldn't have been able to login.

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#85
post #77
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

but apparently non-maliciously

What do you mean? I thought the attacker stole the account maliciously, but hadn't quite gotten around to inserting the malware by the time it was taken back.

The live http headers hacking was quite embarrassing for myself personally.

I had strong suspicions that a certain webhost a new client of mine utilized was both prone to attack, and not very forthcoming when past attacks had occurred.

So when I loaded their own website one day and found it full of ads for russian pornography... I confirmed my own bias that the webhost had been hacked... deleted the account, and moved everything over to AWS.

Changed all the passwords, freaked out a bit, etc...

Then I realized that it was just the extension I was running that injected those ads... d'oh!

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#86
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The only real defense is to glance at the url bar every time you're about to enter your password. With i18n not even that: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/19/phishing-... Benign POC: https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/ (open it and it'll look like a normal "l" in the url box)

Browser shows https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com to me, Chrome on Android. What browser are you using that shows non-ascii with .com?

Firefox on OSX shows it appearing as "www.apple.com"

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Every time you're about to paste your password, glance at the url bar. Actually - I disagree with this. You can no longer "glance" at the url bar to determine if you are on the right domain due to Unicode chars if you clicked a link. The only safe way is to type the url yourself into the browser. If it is a long link - then at least typing the base domain, and pasting the "rest" is probably safe?

This actually isn't true. A website like https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/ won't show up as apple.com. Browsers don't allow Unicode rendering in the URL bar. Maybe IE is affected though. I haven't tested every browser. But it's a known security concern.

It shows up as www.apple.com on Firefox 54.0.1 (latest, up-to-date) on OSX.

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#88
Chrome's security policy is surprisingly poor and is the reason why I stay away from most extensions. "Read data from all websites" is like root on the phone. It should be allowed only via deliberate, explicit user action. While this will be an interesting UX challenge, defaulting to domain-specific permissions is the sane thing to do in this age.

Case in point, I don't care about a readability or bookmarking plugin reading a news link, but it shouldn't read my bank page.

Re: Our Copyfish extension was stolen and adware-infested

#90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think more policies will make a better place. One of the team member screw up and stuff like this happen. I am questioning his security education to have been phished so easily.

It's counter intuitive. I bet you $5 that if I target you, and you're not expecting it, I can phish you. I've seen this happen in the field, and it doesn't have much to do with education. Relax for an instant and I have you. The only real defense is to glance at the url bar every time you're about to enter your password. And even I find myself not doing that 100% of the time. It's a numbers game. A policy of popping…

In this particular case, though, there were enough warning signs that I wouldn't want to run code by anyone who wouldn't notice them on my machine. The email was clearly not professionally written or machine-generated (note the comma inside the quotation marks around the app name; the oblique "fix the issue" doesn't seem like the right expression to match "did not comply with our program policies"), the ID is clearly non-random (a cluster of keys on the left-hand side of a QWERTY keyboard interspersed with a cluster of keys on the right-hand side, as you would get if you mashed keys randomly) and then there's of course the URL shortener link.
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