Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps we can move on from only caring about the stock price, if we stop providing bonuses/compensation to executives in stock, and also stop making the stock price a benchmark to getting many of those bonuses.
As an [outside] investor in the company, I'm more than happy to vote for compensation packages that are driven by stock price (management wins iff shareholders win). I'm unlikely to vote for a compensation system where management can win big without shareholders gaining. It's not accidental that the tie between share price and executive comp came into being.
The challenge with this approach is share price is a highly lossy metric. By the time it all rolls up into the share price, you've lost a pile of other information. And a whole hell of a lot can hide under that lost information.
Example. IBM long ago sold off their PC hardware division and low-end servers. Those divisions' low profitability was dragging down the overall profitability metrics when the total numbers bubbled up the reporting. Selling off those assets gave a cash boost, and the shareholders were especially happy when the overall profitability numbers weren't getting held back by those laggard divisions. Big win!
Now for the rest of the story. This comes from what I saw at the ground level, from speaking with many IBM sales people at the time. After the sale, extremely good, higher-end sales reps saw the front-end of their pipelines collapse. By getting rid of those "low-value" divisions, many of these reps no longer had a built-in excuse to frequently see many different accounts.
Clients had no problem frequently seeing reps for these "low-value" products. The higher-end reps lots of times tagged along and found opportunities to help solve the client's pain points with higher-end solutions by simply being in the discussions, because these low-end products, in volume, interfaced with higher-end infrastructure all the time.
Without this channel of contacting clients, these higher-end reps were reduced to cold-calling and bringing in hordes of inside sales staff to bring the cold-calling volume up to the point where they could get back to their original sales volumes. The low-profit products were making IBM a profit, just not enough, but what the shareholders really should have seen was those products were a sales and marketing channel where the clients paid for the sales and marketing to reach them. Now IBM is spending cash it can't really afford on brute-forcing that channel, which clients hate.
I see this kind of "rest of the story" game played out in many different companies under many different guises, and the destruction of company value is pretty intense when it happens.