Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can revert the funds to the address that paid into the contract in the first place, since transactions are public.
That wouldn't move the money to their rightful owner but to the previous owner.
153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
161–170 of 754 posts
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#162Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not really true. Nothing has to be perfect if there is insurance infrastructure. People should not use contracts they have no reason to trust. As a contract becomes more important it should be viewed/vetted/trusted by as many entities as possible. Users of the contract should pay an insurance fee that goes to the vetters, who promise to reimburse in case of unpredictable behavior. Yes, this means applying some meatsp…
Seems like a chicken and egg problem. The crypto currency space is currently so fraught with fraud and crime that I assume no sensible insurer would touch it with a long stick. Insurers need a boatload of seed capital and - if they would be to act as expert intermediaries as you suggest - must invest lots and lots of R&D to due diligence. But as long as ETH mostly remains a get rich quick scheme for computer criminal…
> The crypto currency space is currently so fraught with fraud and crime
The lack of KYC requirements has led to some criminals using cryptocurrencies, but BTC is fully public and so money laundering, counterfeiting, and tax evasion both go away when we move to a public blockchain.
Those three crimes are all so much bigger and more costly to society than the petty crime that has fled KYC to use the blockchain that I think the truth is the opposite of your insinuation.
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#163I'm sure they'll just hard fork again. And nobody cares because ethereum isn't actually being used for anything real, just a bunch of enthusiasts trying to get rich.
Vitalik on why there will be no hard fork for this: https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/887783867129745412 (not to suggest that Vitalik can just decree there won't be one like some people think, he's just listing the reasons why the community is very unlikely to support a hard fork).
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#164Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well for one, perhaps systems should not be designed in such a way that a single flaw or mistake brings down the entire system...
Absolutely. A critique one could also point at TCI/IP before anyone running servers began to load balance their websites and other services. Would you blame the the steel (or the concept of bridges in whole) for the Tacoma Narrows bridge waving in the wind?
In essence, TCP/IP is engineers trying their utmost to design a system where a single flaw doesn't result in the whole data stream being corrupted.
Add HTML browsers into it, which is extremely tolerant of input mistakes and you have a total system that will handle random losses pretty well.
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#165I've posted this before [0], but it's still apropos regarding the foolishness that is Ethereum. [Ethereum] only makes sense if all of the following obtain: (a) the code is 100% bug-free (b/c accidents cannot be rewound) (b) all code-writers are 100% honest (their code does what they say) (c) all contract participants are 100% perfect code readers (so as to not enter into fraudulent contracts) (Strictly speaking, only…
Can't you say the same thing about software that uses encryption in general? For example your browser, yet you still trust it. Also, what you said applies to critical software in airplanes, and cars like Tesla, yet you still somehow trust it without reading the code. Maybe you should replace the word "Ethereum" with "sotware". "Software in general makes sense is all the following are true"
To clarify, my point isn't "software has bugs! don't trust it for anything". My point is "software has bugs! don't make it the forum of last resort for contractual disputes".
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#166"my favorite part of this latest ICO hack is that it appears to have gone to same wallet as the dao hack ....." https://mobile.twitter.com/IamNomad/status/88777698177709261... "incredible plot twist: whitehat hacker supposedly saved most tokens from being stolen using the same vuln." https://mobile.twitter.com/bcrypt/status/887775417406431232?... "Multisig wallets affected by this hack: - Edgeless Casino (@edgelesspr…
my favorite part of this latest ICO hack is that it appears to have gone to same wallet as the dao hack ..... Any proof of this? EDIT: This appears to be false. From https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-... The leaked ether is in a child DAO at https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c... But that site shows the account hasn't received anything since July 8.
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#167Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't follow Ethereum closely at all, but I don't really understand a few things about this: - Who's the "white hat group"? Why do people have confidence in it? - Why does everyone believe they'll give back $75M+? If they decided to just keep it, what could anyone do? - How will people even be able to claim ownership of the ETH in a way that's verifiable so they know they're giving it back to the right person?
The question makes sense, but really why do people have confidence in any of this, you know what I'm saying?
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#168Can someone explain how immutable contracts get updated? From what I understand you can have one contract forward requests to another, and you can use some storage in the forwarding contract to determine the real target contract. But why would someone participate in a contract that is mutable? I guess I am just wondering how this contract can be updated, given its on the blockchain and considered immutable.
When it's about your money, you should be able to do all that.
And yes, Solidity is pretty horrible. I hope there will be better options such as Idris in the future.
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#169Here's the root error I believe: https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/master/js/src/cont... The initWallet function should have been marked internal, but was instead not marked. Unmarked functions default to public in Solidity, so anyone can call that function and reinitialize the wallet to be under their control
> Unmarked functions default to public in Solidity Facepalm Wasn't this lesson learned long ago? C# defaults to private on unmarked members. Why would you ever want to default public?
Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack
#170Earlier quoted context omitted.
Damn, you're right. And if people use smart contracts to do things that are technically allowed, but have unexpected downsides, we should have a review system in place where impartial third parties review the contract language. Two people should be assigned to speak for and against the unexpected behavior, and then maybe a panel of 12 regular citizens could render the actual verdict.
> do things that are technically allowed, but have unexpected downsides Unexpected downsides for whom? Smart contracts cease to be smart if we have to rely not on the VM but on a small group of human overlords. If a smart contract exists and you don't know clearly how many times it has been used and what percentage of the parties who used it are pleased with its functioning, you really should not use it unless you fe…
With the insane decision to use a Turing-complete language, the contract's behavior undecidable. You don't even know if the contract will halt.
Limited "gas" (execution time) isn't the solution, because the lesson of the Halting Problem isn't that a program might not terminate. Even if the program halts within a finite time (or "gas"), the behavior of the program on the current input is still undecidable.
Any serious attempt at writing "smart contracts" should demonstrate their understanding of the science of insecurity[1] and limit the contract language's complexity to deterministic context-free.
[1] https://media.ccc.de/v/28c3-4763-en-the_science_of_insecurit...