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Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

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Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#161
post #82

I want a way to force sites to become static after they are rendered. Just frozen, as though they were on paper. I am tired of scrolling making menu bars move around or triggering popovers. Just give me a way to turn off javascript and any dynamic CSS junk after X amount of time. I looked into writing this as a firefox browser extension, but extensions now use javascript so we're all screwed.

I tried something like thiswith a user script to attack those fixed banners, but I found that it caused too much breakage. (For instance on Youtube you would not be able to use the menus.)

I settled on hiding the fixed headers and other objects upon scroll down. (They can be brought back by scrolling up.) https://iwalton.com/wiki/#NoFixed

It would be nice if there was browser support, maybe something like tricking the page into thinking the viewport is as long as the page itself.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#162
post #66

- A decent minimum password length, without any funky requirements, just the minimal length. - Being able to prosecute any company that stores passwords in plain text

I think the only way this can happen is zero-knowledge password proofs, i.e. browsers implement a mechanism by which password fields submit a proof that the user has the password, rather than submitting the password. This way the server can only verify the password if they've implemented the proof system correctly, and they can't leak the password because they've never had it. The basic idea is, the server gives a un…

I'm waiting for other people to tell you to implement this, but without JavaScript.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#163
Add SRV lookups to the HTTP standard.

There's a tremendous amount of complexity and cost attached to the fact that browsers look up the IP address of the hostname and then connect to port 80.

First, it's true that you can specify another port in the URL, but nobody does that because it's ugly and hard to remember. If you want to be able to send people to your website, you need to be able to tell people what the url is - "Just go to example.com". The minute you start saying "example.com colon, eight zero eight zero" you're screwed. With a SRV record in DNS, example.com could map to an arbitrary IP address and port, which would give us much more flexibility in deploying web sites.

If you want a bare http://example.com to work, you need to create an apex record for the domain. That can't be a CNAME that maps to another hostname, it has to be an A record that maps to an IP address. This means you can't put multiple websites on a single server with a single IP address, you have to have an IP address for each site. IPv4 addresses are already scarce, this just makes it worse.

Also, port 80 is a privileged port in unix (which does the lion's share of web hosting). That means you have to run web servers as root. That, in turn, defeats the unix security model, and requires hosting providers to either lock down their servers and give limited access to users (cPanel anyone?) or give customers root access to virtualized operating systems, which imposes a tremendous amount of overhead.

Virtual operating systems also impose a bunch of complexity at the networking level, with a pool of IP addresses get dynamically assigned to VMs as they come and go, DNS changes (with all the TTL issues that go along with that), switch configuration etc.

These problems are all solvable and indeed solved, by really clever modern technology. The point is that it's all unnecessary. If browsers did SRV lookups, we could still be hosting like it's 1999, and putting all the tremendous progress we've made in the last 20 years into making it cheaper, faster, easier and more secure to build and run a web site. People that support the "open web" as opposed to "just make a Facebook page" should advocate for SRV support in HTTP.

This doesn't actually have to be "forced" on users of the web - it'd have to be forced on browser implementors, hosting providers and web site operators. If the transition was handled well, users wouldn't even notice.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#164
Ajax without JavaScript. Ability to send a response from server updating only part of DOM. Basically, react with virtual DOM on the server pushing diffs to user with http2 awesomness.

There will be no need for JS on most sites, can be adapted to current frameworks, and with preload/prefetch it might be very fast.

* U can prefetch progress bar / loading state for example, and redirect to partial url of a real content

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#165

Earlier quoted context omitted.

SSH-style login is still something I'd really fucking love. Much more secure way of logging in, easy protocol for storing multiple passwords, and easy authorization/deauthirzation of passwords/keys.

Client TLS certs already exist, and they are a massive pain for the average user.

So I have heard of client TLS authentication, but does it exist for the web (I mean just in principle, not whether it is really used). That is, do browsers support it?

The thing is, if it is a massive pain for average users, then that is an own-goal. Look at SSH: there is no certification chain there. All you do is generate a keypair and then (here's the awkward bit) magic the pubkey over to the server.

It would be easy enough for a website to make pubkey installation a seamless part of the sign-on workflow.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#167

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So IE should say "sorry I suck, switch to another browser?" Doesn't make any sense... I mean sites will already tell users they don't support older browsers.

What would really be nice is to have a spec that either you follow or you don't. If you follow it, you follow all of it and it just works. If you don't Javascript is completely broken. It'd be a good incentive to get browser vendors on board.

This idea sounds great but it misses the reality on the ground - web standardization is broken.

Compare C++ standardization. Most people are using two year old compilers. While the newest compilers do implement draft features, these features are almost all standardized in the next ~3 years. The standards are clearly versioned and you can put newer compilers into modes to check against older standards if your code needs to compiler on multiple compilers. Features are never removed.

By contrast, on the web, everybody is running brand spanking new browsers. Experimental technologies are sometimes implemented before full draft standards are even written. Many or most drafts that are written never become standards. If they do become standards, it's often a decade or more away. Alternatively the living standards of what browsers actually support aren't versioned. It's not possible to put a browser into JavaScript 99 mode - the easiest way to check your code for conformance is to automate your test cases across a variety of browsers. And, features are sometimes removed because they are deemed security or privacy concerns, so conforming to an old standard is not sufficient to ensure proper functionality under modern browsers.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#168

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> And, with federated identity, you can also run your own, if you don’t trust Google or Facebook login. Sounds like OpenID...which was kind of a train wreck. One middle ground could be tighter integration between browsers, sites and password managers. With the right specification, sites could offer a "register with [1Password,KeePass,LastPass,etc]" button which would open the password manager and pre-fill all the fie…

That’s another one of these half-assed solutions that the world has too many of, just like credit cards or using SSN as auth. No. We’ve solved all these issues before, OpenID was a good solution, and OpenID Connect – a complete rewrite – can be used to replace it, and is used already for Google and Facebook login. Just use OIDC, on every page, and allow users to choose an identity provider. Problem solved.

> OpenID was a good solution

Ugh...no. Just no. If you believe that, I'm not sure there's anything I can say that will get through to you...we're just going to have diametrically opposed opinions. But let me tell you that I've implemented it quite a few times on various sites and it's been a nightmare every time, so it's not like my 'half-assed' approach was ignorant of it being an option. It was based on specifically discarding that option as poorly conceived, poorly implemented and simply not being an option in many cases. Banks, for example, should never let a 3rd party IDP be part of their authentication process. And if your solution is inapplicable in situations where tight security is required, you've got to ask yourself whether you're actually solving the problem or just requiring users to be aware of two different ways of logging in instead of the one that they currently understand. Even if they do have to remember different passwords for most sites, most people can deal with username/password conceptually in a way that using a third-party IDP confuses them.

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#169

Ability to mark HTTPS site as "not secure" using HTTP headers if it's asking for things like logins and passwords. Would be useful for things like free static HTML web hosts and CDNs for combating phishing. Could be something put in CSP.

Is that different from CSP form-action?

Re: Ask HN: What feature would you want the web to “force” next, after HTTPS?

#170
post #66

- A decent minimum password length, without any funky requirements, just the minimal length. - Being able to prosecute any company that stores passwords in plain text

- no max length on password at all, or allow a 3 digit number of chars. Never silently truncate passwords either. - never disable paste on a password field.

You'll have half your users with passwords like '123'. You could say it's the user's fault and their account is compromised, but when it's half the users on your site, really your site is compromised.

Better to have a minimum password entropy.

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