Earlier quoted context omitted.
* Conditions were clear. The pilot landing would likely have seen the aircraft on the ground in plenty of time to go around. * Conditions were clear. The pilot landing would have an increasing probability of noticing their mistake from lights on the runway and taxiway as they got closer to landing. * After being alerted that the pilot landing could see lights on what they thought was the runway, the ATC would likely…
> And finally, the one factor that happened to be the first of these to happen: > * Multiple pilots looking directly toward the oncoming aircraft, one of whom alerted ATC. I don't get this. You're an engineer/pilot/whomever filing for {the current system/pilot/plane/whatever-needs-approval} to get approved. The power-that-be (e.g. FAA) asks you what your safety margins are. You cite "other pilots looking directly at…
Incidentally, Aviation Herald reports[1] that "AC-759 had already overflown taxiway C by about 0.25nm when ATC instructed the aircraft to go around" and further that "it is estimated that AC-759 overflew the first two aircraft by 100 feet".
100 feet isn't much, and I imagine this was utterly terrifying for the pilots lined up on the taxiway, but 0.25nm past the beginning of taxiway C is basically touchdown point on the runway (had they been lined up with it), and they were still 100 feet above the ground. That indicates pretty strongly that the pilot of AC-759 had noticed their mistake and was taking evasive action already, before ATC instructed them to go around.