Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002) • Hacker News Board

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#71

Post by CuriouslyC » Sun, Jun 25, 2017, 3:25 AM UTC

13of40 wrote: post #63

CuriouslyC wrote: post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is entirely possible that language development created a self-reinforcing feedback loop for the development of intelligence. I don't think intelligence and consciousness are necessarily correlated though.

Unless you think a shrimp is as conscious as a person, or that a dog is completely lacking in consciousness, you have to accept that consciousness comes in degrees. Unless you believe consciousness is supernatural, you have to accept that it has an organic origin. What that says to me is that humans have evolved brain structures that give us a higher level of consciousness than other animals, and IMO the best candida…

I don't know that the experience of being a human is any more vivid or real than the experience of being a shrimp. Don't conflate the ability to reason with the quality of having an internal experience. Perhaps the shrimp lives more truly, undistracted as it is by meaningless thoughts.

The state of consciousness is correlated with the state of matter. We don't know more than that. We've assumed that physical reality is the ground state and consciousness is the phenomenon, but reality could just as easily be a dream in the mind of the universe. If consciousness can influence reality that would seem to indicate it is either equally fundamental to, or even precedent over material reality. The alternative, that consciousness is a passive observer, is both depressing and unlikely.

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#72

Post by sjeohp » Sun, Jun 25, 2017, 4:14 AM UTC

sametmax wrote: post #67

chronolitus wrote: post #37

I've always been more on the materialist side. Reading this, I finally managed to put a finger on something that's been bothering me. Our brain knows it is conscious. If consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon, emerging from those processes, how can the brain know it is conscious? What way could a brain possibly have to measure consciousness? When I refer to brain, i mean the physical, scientifically measurable com…

You forgot : we are not conscious but our program simulate the believe we are.

In that case what else is consciousness but the illusion?

If the only known example is my subjective experience then what I call conscious experience is identical to the simulation of conscious experience. IE there's no distinction.

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#73

Post by sametmax » Sun, Jun 25, 2017, 7:25 AM UTC

sjeohp wrote: post #72

sametmax wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You forgot : we are not conscious but our program simulate the believe we are.

In that case what else is consciousness but the illusion? If the only known example is my subjective experience then what I call conscious experience is identical to the simulation of conscious experience. IE there's no distinction.

The fact we can't make a distinction doesn't mean there isn't one. Just that we can't know about it.

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#74

Post by gus_massa » Sun, Jun 25, 2017, 12:16 PM UTC

taneq wrote: post #17

gus_massa wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is there any proof that we are not only philosophical zombies, i.e. a loosely defined bunch of atoms?

It goes right back to 'I think, therefore I am. I think.

Pzombies are so cute. They "believe" that they believe that they can think.

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#75

Post by fmoralesc » Sun, Jun 25, 2017, 7:36 PM UTC

pmoriarty wrote: post #52

fmoralesc wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The concepts of 'qualia' and 'lifeworld' are not directly comparable. Qualia are qualitative aspects of experiences, but lifeworlds are complexes of objects associated to a 'perspective' which operates on them (and possibly constitutes them) - essentially subjective worlds. The point of contact between those ideas is this: different lifeworlds could include the same objects but have a different qualitative character.…

It sounds like with the lifeworld concept, the Phenomenologists were coming up with another way to talk about solipsism. Would I be mistaken in thinking about lifeworlds like that?

Well, they didn't necessarily give in to solipsism. The original idea was meant to accommodate, I think, the idea that different subjects could have entirely different experiences and still share a world. Actually, I think Husserl's idea that lived worlds have 'horizons' (beyond which you can somehow anticipate something you don't see) can capture the thought that the experience of others can be somehow be part of our own, so solipsism is partially defeated. But this is just a rough thought.

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#76

Post by lazyant » Mon, Jun 26, 2017, 2:04 AM UTC

newuser3000 wrote: post #41

chronolitus wrote: post #37

I've always been more on the materialist side. Reading this, I finally managed to put a finger on something that's been bothering me. Our brain knows it is conscious. If consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon, emerging from those processes, how can the brain know it is conscious? What way could a brain possibly have to measure consciousness? When I refer to brain, i mean the physical, scientifically measurable com…

Without language there is no consciousnesses. That's it. The brain does what it does. We think, occasionally, then imagine that we cause brain to function. All animals are just dandy without complex language, it's not really a miracle that we are conscious, just a different too.

"Without language there is no consciousnesses" meh - how can I sometimes have thoughts (imagining going somewhere) and be conscious (for ex, waking up) while not having any internal monologue (not using any language) at those times?

Re: Consciousness and its Place in Nature (2002)

#77

Post by seanccox » Thu, Jun 29, 2017, 11:45 PM UTC

chronolitus wrote: post #37

I've always been more on the materialist side. Reading this, I finally managed to put a finger on something that's been bothering me. Our brain knows it is conscious. If consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon, emerging from those processes, how can the brain know it is conscious? What way could a brain possibly have to measure consciousness? When I refer to brain, i mean the physical, scientifically measurable com…

You might find Max Tegmark's lecture about 'consciousness as a state of matter' engrossing, given your questions. It's rooted in quantum physics and mathematics, and it's a fairly accessible exploration of hypothesis on the nature of consciousness.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MjhEtqhUZkY