Twitter is probably still using Rails 2.3, where you have to explicitly tell the framework to html escape every time you're outputting a string. Rails 3 changes this by always html escaping strings.
Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
11–19 of 19 posts
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#12Twitter is probably still using Rails 2.3, where you have to explicitly tell the framework to html escape every time you're outputting a string. Rails 3 changes this by always html escaping strings.
Security shouldn't be a matter of the framework, especially if it belongs to well known problems like XSS.
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#13Twitter is probably still using Rails 2.3, where you have to explicitly tell the framework to html escape every time you're outputting a string. Rails 3 changes this by always html escaping strings.
Security shouldn't be a matter of the framework, especially if it belongs to well known problems like XSS.
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#14Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#15They should just be sure that they _render_ the application name field appropriately. Angle brackets should be escaped, minimally. It's really not so difficult, Ruby does it with three calls to gsub: http://rdoc.sourceforge.net/rd/doc/classes/CGI.src/M000003.h...
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#16I'm curious what people here think of that idea, ie, preventing string injection attacks at the language level.
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#17Twitter is probably still using Rails 2.3, where you have to explicitly tell the framework to html escape every time you're outputting a string. Rails 3 changes this by always html escaping strings.
Security shouldn't be a matter of the framework, especially if it belongs to well known problems like XSS.
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#18This has been demo'd a long time ago already [1], and it seems they haven't done anything yet ? Wtf. [1] http://www.davidnaylor.co.uk/massive-twitter-cross-site-scri...
Re: Persistent XSS on Twitter.com
#19Twitter is probably still using Rails 2.3, where you have to explicitly tell the framework to html escape every time you're outputting a string. Rails 3 changes this by always html escaping strings.
Security shouldn't be a matter of the framework, especially if it belongs to well known problems like XSS.
Rails' conflation of these types guarantees that whatever the default for escaping, there will be bugs in applications written in/on rails.