161–170 of 253 posts
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
At the same time, anti-Soviet propaganda also took many things wrong.
Truth always takes a personal effort to discover; it can't be spoon-fed by the New York Times, or Pravda, or Facebook.
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
Or you can see what's happening through others who actually travelled there, like this photographer: https://www.dprk360.com
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know who did it. I'm just saying it's not a stretch to accuse the NSA given their history with hacking tools becoming public and the Snowden leaks. To use the revenue generating argument from the OP article as a good indicator of the author is weak at best.
Why is the revenue generating argument weak? Even Kasperky who was unsure of the author is leaning towards it being NK.
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
Correct me if I'm wrong, but WannaCry isn't highly sophisticated. It weaponizes already known vulnerabilities to exploit soft targets on a large, but unsophisticated scale (because most of the victims are soft targets in terms of computer/network security). Ransomware is not a new idea either. Combining these things (known exploits, soft targets, ransomware) doesn't require genius or _highly_ specialized domain knowledge, hard to acquire intelligence or huge amounts of resources (labor or money). Any state capable of consistently spending a couple million dollars per year on a team for offensive security operations could, I suppose, pull this off.
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
>that only a domain expert with highly specialized experience Correct me if I'm wrong, but WannaCry isn't highly sophisticated. It weaponizes already known vulnerabilities to exploit soft targets on a large, but unsophisticated scale (because most of the victims are soft targets in terms of computer/network security). Ransomware is not a new idea either. Combining these things (known exploits, soft targets, ransomwar…
> that only a domain expert with highly specialized experience could even recognize
Notably, it's about the expertise needed to recognize and identify the attack, not to launch it.
It's ~impossible to prove who's behind any attack these days given code-reuse, false flags & TOR. Anyone who claims to be able to do it reliably, is bullshitting you and likely has an agenda.
They clearly had a fluent Chinese speaker working with them. https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/blog/linguistic-analysis-wa... Of course I'm sure the NSA has a number of fluent Chinese speakers.
No native Chinese speaker would unintentionally make such mistakes. Any decent Chinese pinyin input method would have corrected that typo mistake, not to mention handwriting methods. Also, it is highly unlikely to miss a letter when typing Chinese pinyin, unless the person have been pronouncing it wrongly and is unaware of the mistake.
> The text uses certain terms that further narrow down a geographic location. One term, “礼拜” for “week,” is more common in South China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore; although it is occasionally used in other regions of the country. The other “杀毒软件” for “anti-virus” is more common in the Chinese mainland.
No, ＂礼拜＂ is used interchangeably across China and it is one of the standard translations of days of the week. And ＂杀毒软件＂ is the default translation of antivirus in Google translate.
I am not saying that the person behind the note is not Chinese. It's just the poor analysis in this article makes me both want to laugh and cry as a native Chinese speaker. The bottom line is, I would not trust a report on Chinese linguistic analysis by three non-native Chinese speakers.
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
Developing cyberwarfare capabilities seems like a relatively low cost (compared to developing ballistic missiles at least), low risk investment, with a potentially large payoff, so I would be surprised if they didn't try to develop these skills.
Of course, all evidence tying N.Korea to this specific attack is circumstantial and almost impossible to definitively prove unless they admit it and show proof themselves.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
While I don't think this is the case here, specifically, propaganda isn't always about swaying people from anti- to pro-; it could be for swaying people from "they are bad, but not that dangerous" to "they are dangerous enough that we should intervene with force"
I think it's more like "there is your bogeyman, stop looking at us".
The only rational response to this is deep, deep skepticism. In the old days of the USSR, while very difficult, it was at least conceivable that you could just fly to moscow and see if they were eating their children there or burning priests or god knows whatever else. There was a natural limit to the deception that could occur and further a normal person could make conclusions about the things they saw with their ow…
>that only a domain expert with highly specialized experience Correct me if I'm wrong, but WannaCry isn't highly sophisticated. It weaponizes already known vulnerabilities to exploit soft targets on a large, but unsophisticated scale (because most of the victims are soft targets in terms of computer/network security). Ransomware is not a new idea either. Combining these things (known exploits, soft targets, ransomwar…
Or one of many different groups of people who can do computers.