If there's a new argument to be had here (I'm doubtful, it sounds like a re-hashing of governance issues that have played out over the last year), it's this claim:
"This rule-making is what we refer to as governance."
This conception of governance is the premise for the conclusion, what Lehdonvirta calls a "paradox":
"And this leads me to my final point, a provocation: once you address the problem of governance, you no longer need blockchain; you can just as well use conventional technology that assumes a trusted central party to enforce the rules, because you’re already trusting somebody (or some organization/process) to make the rules. I call this blockchain’s ‘governance paradox’: once you master it, you no longer need it."
My own analysis draws on a more expansive definition (from Introna; Saurwein et al.): http://iqdupont.com/assets/documents/DUPONT-2017-Preprint-Al...
This expansiveness is necessary, as Lehdonvirta recognizes. Contracts are not just enforcement, they also encapsulate the processes of making ("rule-making"), or better, negotiating contracts.
So, are we authorized to go from a rule-making notion of governance to the conclusion that once this is addressed blockchain technologies will be redundant? Lehdonvirta doesn't give us any analysis of this move, but I don't think so. Rather, we need to recognize the contested forms, which are the essence of governance, and then create a socio-technical structure around them. Consider: double-entry bookkeeping is just as much a technology for governance as blockchain technology (and, of course, they share a historical lineage). Does double-entry bookkeeping go away because we "address the problem"? Hardly. Rather, we need to recognize the ways that it has developed, and by whom, and for what use. Just like blockchain technologies.