Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are use cases that make sense. My home linux router intercepts and sends all DNS and NTP requests, then routes all DNS requests to multiple VPS nodes that in turn, use multiple DNS recursors at each VPS datacenter. I intentionally avoid google and opendns. I override the min-ttl of all requests to avoid some shenanigans and I am well aware of the issues this can cause. At a minimum, my ISP can not see or tamper…
"At a minimum, my ISP can not see or tamper with DNS requests." Are you encrypting each DNS packet at the source (e.g. your home recursor/DNS-forwwarder)? If yes, when are your sent packets decrypted? At the authoritative nameserver, or at some intermediary recursor? If no, how do you believe that your DNS packets are opaque and tamper resistant? There are very few authoritative nameservers on the internet that accep…
OP is "creating a chain of recursors (that you control?) to make tracing the requests more difficult"
but also, as a result less difficult to tamper with by a less trusted party such as a mass market commercial ISP - tampering with his forwarder would entail either tampering with random many other peoples traffic or compromising the 'percieved as more secure' ISP.
Pretty sure someone mucking around with TTL's on these packets to make sure they don't get too far out of intended range and the numerous other things would be aware of these issues..