NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer • Hacker News Board

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#21

Post by phicoh » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:10 PM UTC

Animats wrote: post #16

Is this really about a "code-breaking computer", or just some big data collection and analysis cluster? A code-breaking machine would look like a Bitcoin mining farm - all ASICs, very little storage, not much I/O, no disks. An collection and analysis machine looks like an ordinary data center. Is this maybe the Cyrogenic Computer Complexity Program? [1] That's an attempt to build a 10GHz machine running in liquid hel…

Breaking an RSA public key consists of two phases. The first phase is massively parallel and indeed doesn't require much storage.

However, the second phase requires solving a massive set of linear equations and requires a more conventional big computer.

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#22

Post by coldcode » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:24 PM UTC

It is also slightly nauseating that a US company finds it perfectly acceptable to undermine US citizen's privacy for profit. I suppose money is attractive.

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#23

Post by jackhack » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:26 PM UTC

mapgrep wrote: post #14

tptacek wrote: post #12

This is malpractice: Widespread modern encryption methods like RSA, named for the initials of the cryptographers who developed it, rely on the use of hugely complex numbers derived from prime numbers. Speaking very roughly, so long as those original prime numbers remain secret, the integrity of the encoded data will remain safe. But were someone able to factor the hugely complex number — a process identical to the so…

Sorry to see you conclude the piece, or that portion, is malpractice :-\ The paragraph you quote was intended to give an overview of one type of work a machine like WindsorGreen might do, in broad terms. While it's true we mention RSA as a very basic example of the sort of thing a government would be /interested/ in breaking, we also specifically quote a security researcher saying WindsorGreen “might also have applic…

"supercomputers" are archaic in a day when one can rent a 40,000 core GPU system with 732GB of RAM for $14/hour, on demand, via Amazon Web Services. Available whether you need one or a hundred (4 million cores crunching on a problem with 20Gb/second throughput is still only $1400 per hour). edit: more thorough response.

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#24

Post by dman » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:34 PM UTC

jackhack wrote: post #23

mapgrep wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sorry to see you conclude the piece, or that portion, is malpractice :-\ The paragraph you quote was intended to give an overview of one type of work a machine like WindsorGreen might do, in broad terms. While it's true we mention RSA as a very basic example of the sort of thing a government would be /interested/ in breaking, we also specifically quote a security researcher saying WindsorGreen “might also have applic…

"supercomputers" are archaic in a day when one can rent a 40,000 core GPU system with 732GB of RAM for $14/hour, on demand, via Amazon Web Services. Available whether you need one or a hundred (4 million cores crunching on a problem with 20Gb/second throughput is still only $1400 per hour). edit: more thorough response.

Where are you getting the 40000 core number from?

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#25

Post by pvg » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:37 PM UTC

jackhack wrote: post #23

mapgrep wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sorry to see you conclude the piece, or that portion, is malpractice :-\ The paragraph you quote was intended to give an overview of one type of work a machine like WindsorGreen might do, in broad terms. While it's true we mention RSA as a very basic example of the sort of thing a government would be /interested/ in breaking, we also specifically quote a security researcher saying WindsorGreen “might also have applic…

"supercomputers" are archaic in a day when one can rent a 40,000 core GPU system with 732GB of RAM for $14/hour, on demand, via Amazon Web Services. Available whether you need one or a hundred (4 million cores crunching on a problem with 20Gb/second throughput is still only $1400 per hour). edit: more thorough response.

No, they aren't. Unless you think everyone building them is stuck in the past and wasting a lot of money, unaware of Amazon's offerings.

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#26

Post by jackhack » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:40 PM UTC

dman wrote: post #24

jackhack wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"supercomputers" are archaic in a day when one can rent a 40,000 core GPU system with 732GB of RAM for $14/hour, on demand, via Amazon Web Services. Available whether you need one or a hundred (4 million cores crunching on a problem with 20Gb/second throughput is still only $1400 per hour). edit: more thorough response.

Where are you getting the 40000 core number from?

https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/new-p2-instance-type-for-am...

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#27

Post by eganist » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:45 PM UTC

strictnein wrote: post #4

The title here on HN misses a really important word: "Project" The title at the Intercept is: "NYU ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSED MILITARY CODE-BREAKING COMPUTER PROJECT TO ENTIRE INTERNET" (their caps) The computer itself wasn't connected to the Internet, a backup drive was. edit: title was updated

Was it? Title still reads "NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer"

It should in its condensed form read "NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Project"

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#28

Post by MrMetlHed » Thu, May 11, 2017, 5:57 PM UTC

So no one else had to open that Gif to find out the password?

NSACHDU0VSKYEP!CTHNDR

I guess Chudnovsky can't spell his own name (or is tricky with his passwords,) and calls himself EPIC THUNDER

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#29

Post by ryao » Thu, May 11, 2017, 6:01 PM UTC

mapgrep wrote: post #14

tptacek wrote: post #12

This is malpractice: Widespread modern encryption methods like RSA, named for the initials of the cryptographers who developed it, rely on the use of hugely complex numbers derived from prime numbers. Speaking very roughly, so long as those original prime numbers remain secret, the integrity of the encoded data will remain safe. But were someone able to factor the hugely complex number — a process identical to the so…

Sorry to see you conclude the piece, or that portion, is malpractice :-\ The paragraph you quote was intended to give an overview of one type of work a machine like WindsorGreen might do, in broad terms. While it's true we mention RSA as a very basic example of the sort of thing a government would be /interested/ in breaking, we also specifically quote a security researcher saying WindsorGreen “might also have applic…

Why did you not publish the documents for readers? The story seems pointless without the documents.

Re: NYU Accidentally Exposed Military Code-Breaking Computer

#30

Post by mapgrep » Thu, May 11, 2017, 6:21 PM UTC

schoen wrote: post #19

cavanasm wrote: post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They're classified...if the guy who discovered they were publicly revealed on accident had actually provided them to the Intercept, he would certainly have lost his job, and likely ended up in prison.

The Intercept article says that they gave the documents to at least three (named) experts to review in their entirety, suggested that the Intercept does possess them but decided to publish only a small excerpt.

In terms of the prior commenters assertion about source protection, that was not a factor as the source alerted various of the original parties directly that their material was in public view (as we mention in the story).

In terms of the (admittedly) small volume of original documents we published, all I feel comfortable saying at this point is that we were interested in publishing more, but there were significant legal concerns.