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Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

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101–110 of 139 posts

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#101
I read that Sen. Diane Feinsetin is supporting an anti-encryption bill. It's never been completely clear to me if she, and those like her, fall more on the stupid side, or more on the evil side.

But the arguments against this aren't that difficult... so I have to guess it's the evil. Power corrupts.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#102
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I would not be so sure of that. I really believe the President's guiding principle is to do whatever it is that will enrage liberals the most. If Republicans see that liberals want strong encryption, they might decide to oppose it just to piss off liberals. It's amazing to me that a lot of the same people advocating gun rights are also the ones that support government mandated encryption backdoors.

Eh.. it's messy isn't it. Politically motivated libertarians strongly support both 2nd amendment and oppose back doors. Generally speaking, the govt is always seen as the biggest threat to guard against. Probabaly the ones supportive of backdoors are as you said, simply "trusting" of the current leader they voted for but would immediately oppose the same policy coming from a Democrat. ...which is the exact impulse an…

As a libertarian socialist, I continually struggle to get US progressives to understand this argument.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#103
post #21

Just think of the outrage if the government required master keys to everyone's homes? I know there is a difference, but it's not a huge leap to compare the two. We don't want the government to have such easy access to our homes because we can't trust every government employee not to abuse it. I think the same goes here. No mater what safe guards you put in place it's a scary thought that you simply can't keep the gov…

Disclaimer: I agree with you but I always struggle to convince people that this line of reasoning makes sense. The government can already enter anybody's home upon receiving a warrant to do so. If you don't let them in, they can bust through a door or tear down a wall. We trust the government not to do this without court oversight. We trust courts to provide good and honest oversight. It is far from a perfect system,…

It's not the government I fear with this concept, it's that anyone with a brain can steal the master keys from the (generally inept) government and break into your house - and you can't prove who it was.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Government already has master key to anyone's home. They'll just break the door, it can be done easily. Proper encryption is a different beast, you just don't have that option to break the door.

Maybe there needs to be a publicly accessible/downloadable/searchable registry to which all warrants issued by any court in the us gets logged? Who has the mandate to create such a requirement?

Government actions fly in the face of pesky requirements.

Black bag operations have always existed, and will always exist, despite legislation or other rule-making to the contrary.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#105
post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Personally I think you can make it a crime not to produce a key if a warrant has been issued to search what ever you've encrypted. Personally, I find that suggestion repugnant.

How is this different to getting a warrant to search say a safe deposit box at a bank? Is there something about encrypted data that should be beyond the reach of the law?

The difference is that the physical box at the bank is not subject to being stolen by foreign adversaries remotely. With information that is stored in databases or on phones that may be lost or stolen there is no border. And when you start to consider the critical national infrastructure that is managed by private companies and individuals, it becomes clear that on balance Americans are safer if the FBI cannot read Tony Soprano's email because any tool they can use to get his data can be used by sophisticated adversaries to get at the emails of the CEO of the nuclear power plant and more. While I do not have a link at the moment to share, Retired General Michael Hayden, the former NSA and CIA director, says the same thing.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#106

I did my Extended Project Qualification (EPQ) [1] on this issue, and it actually surprised me how many people think that the governments are right in this debate. When presenting the work, I had a chance to ask ordinary people, and they all pretty much agreed that the government should be able to "break" encryption with a warrant. This is a scary prospect, and I feel that educating citizens as well as the government…

They're right, they just don't understand it doesn't really work like that.

In theory, being able to break encryption with a warrant is exactly the right scenario.

In practice, if you an break it with a warrant, someone else can break it without a warrant and can do so without your knowledge.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#107
post #25
post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>But very short messages (in an unknown format) aren't generally breakable, anyway, and that's the likely case. Hell, in most cases they wouldn't be detectable! With so much random data flying around today, you could encode short messages in just about anything. comments on reddit or hn or one of the alternatives, image metadata, etc... If you are looking to hide data on the scale of kilobytes, your options are basic…

For example, such covert channels as packet timing. Edit: On a 5 Mbps video stream, that could give you 5-50 kbps bandwidth.

[deleted]

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#108
post #36

Does anyone here remember the clipper chip? If you don't, I'd recommend boning up on this chapter of the crypto wars. The 'because terrorism' excuse falls a bit flat with me. Thought experiment: how hard would it be for a terrorist organization with access to 100's of millions of dollars (eg. ISIS) to come up with a secure communications scheme? One time pad. A reasonable cipher that hasn't had any 'help' during deve…

I was too young at the time to understand it then, but based on history its a good thing that the ill-planned scheme did not become law.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#109
post #89
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly what? My point is that encryption is fairly common right now, even for average consumers. If political activists use Tor and Signal quite regularly, why wouldn't criminals do the same? I still don't quite understand why you're comparing what criminals did back then to what they could do right now.

I'd expect that currently, most criminal use of encryption is accidental. That is, everyone switched from SMS to whatsapp, criminals just did what everyone did. Sure, there might be exceptions for high-level criminal conspiracies. But most crime isn't of that kind. For terrorist, I imagine there is a large spectrum of covert abilities.

> That is, everyone switched from SMS to whatsapp, criminals just did what everyone did.

How are you so confident that this was what happened? Do you have some concrete data and/or stats to back this statement? What if most criminals are using something like Signal? Besides, I personally wouldn't trust WhatsApp if I were partaking in illicit activities.

Re: Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Open Letter to Congress

#110
post #106

I did my Extended Project Qualification (EPQ) [1] on this issue, and it actually surprised me how many people think that the governments are right in this debate. When presenting the work, I had a chance to ask ordinary people, and they all pretty much agreed that the government should be able to "break" encryption with a warrant. This is a scary prospect, and I feel that educating citizens as well as the government…

They're right, they just don't understand it doesn't really work like that. In theory, being able to break encryption with a warrant is exactly the right scenario. In practice, if you an break it with a warrant, someone else can break it without a warrant and can do so without your knowledge.

You're absolutely right. Encryption is either strong for everyone all of the time, or it isn't.
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