Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think this is accurate for modern Android or iOS devices. AIUI basebands are connected via HSIC (a chip-to-chip variant of USB) nowadays, which doesn't give the baseband DMA.
HSIC (and USB in general) is a very complicated stack. Host-controlled DMA is probably in use, which is fragile at best. Historicically evil has definitely been possible with USB, and we all know how good phones are about getting updates.
Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
201–210 of 227 posts
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#202Earlier quoted context omitted.
On modern phones --- for the last $many years --- the baseband processors are connected to the AP via things like HSIC, not DMA. Don't ever get your security news from Boing Boing.
That Boing Boing article did reference actual CVEs. Though I like him as an author, Doctrow's writing style in articles rub me the wrong way too. I'm not privy to HSIC details for phones, but most high-speed chip interconnects I've seen are a proprietary, vendor unique solutions with little global commonality, and some of them do feature direct memory access too. So, though I'm speaking with a fair amount unknown on…
In modern flagship phone designs, the baseband is an adversarial component. It isn't trusted with access to AP memory. It's accessed like a peripheral.
Nobody doubts that there are vulnerabilities in baseband processors. There certainly are. What I object to is the accompanying story that an exploit in the baseband gives you unfettered access to memory on the phone. I don't know how far back you have to go for that to be the truth, but it isn't true today for flagship phones.
Nobody should minimize the importance of baseband flaws. They're very bad for the security of the phone in its cellular phone capacity. But there's a reason why an Apple phone has separate silicon for the Secure Enclave and for the encrypted memory bus it uses to access memory: it's because the components of the phone don't trust each other. Should you trust GSM? Fuck no. Are your SSH keys more secure on an iPhone than they would be on your laptop? Fuck yes.
If you must use Android, don't use random Android phones. Stick to Google's phones.
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#203Earlier quoted context omitted.
The agent process is tricky to set up and persnickety, especially if you use the token for anything else besides SSH. At one point, before I tableflipped and switched back to software keys, I had to switch agent processes any time I used my Y4 to sign into a VPN. The theater is that you're protecting a key but not the account the key protects . Yes, you'll never lose the actual RSA key bits to an attacker. But that'l…
I switched my SSH keys on my Yubikey from using the OpenPGP applet and all the funkiness of gpg-agent over to using X.509 certificates with the PIV applet. Added bonus is that not only does it work with SSH, but you can use those certificates for TLS mutual authentication in web browsers. Works out of the box on Mac/Windows.
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#204Earlier quoted context omitted.
So if I buy such a phone, what is the relationship between the baseband chip/OS and all the bullet points you listed above? https://www.fsf.org/blogs/community/replicant-developers-fin... It's a real pain, but I can buy a laptop/desktop that doesn't have Intel ME (or its AMD equivalent) running on it. But there's no such thing as a working phone without a baseband OS. And AFAICT there isn't a single available baseban…
Use a Google or Apple phone and stop worrying about their basebands, which are effectively USB peripherals.
Are there cases where a similar situation has been described with a USB 1.1 audio device using an open source driver? Or any other class of USB device used by tens of millions of people?
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#205Earlier quoted context omitted.
Use a Google or Apple phone and stop worrying about their basebands, which are effectively USB peripherals.
> While working on Replicant, a fully free/libre version of Android, we discovered that the proprietary program running on the applications processor in charge of handling the communication protocol with the modem actually implements a backdoor that lets the modem perform remote file I/O operations on the file system. Are there cases where a similar situation has been described with a USB 1.1 audio device using an op…
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#206Earlier quoted context omitted.
HSIC (and USB in general) is a very complicated stack. Host-controlled DMA is probably in use, which is fragile at best. Historicically evil has definitely been possible with USB, and we all know how good phones are about getting updates.
Wait, so you were talking about the baseband chips? Both Google and Apple design against the baseband chips as adversarial components. Before we play the "but HSIC is complicated and there's DMA in it", we're talking about security teams that have designed and implemented encrypted memory busses; I think they can handle bog-standard interconnects. I can't speak to random Xiaomi phones, but the baseband security risk…
However, I'll admit that you seem more knowledgable than me on the subject, so I won't spout FUD if you say so.
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#207Earlier quoted context omitted.
Wait, so you were talking about the baseband chips? Both Google and Apple design against the baseband chips as adversarial components. Before we play the "but HSIC is complicated and there's DMA in it", we're talking about security teams that have designed and implemented encrypted memory busses; I think they can handle bog-standard interconnects. I can't speak to random Xiaomi phones, but the baseband security risk…
I trust Google, but I don't trust vendors. I expect vendors to make compromises left and right to deal with shitty hardware (oh, the radio doesn't work with this security feature enabled? Meh, we don't need it). However, I'll admit that you seem more knowledgable than me on the subject, so I won't spout FUD if you say so.
For those of you playing along at home, it's this "there are a lot of crappy Android phones" thing that dominates our concerns about Android, and is the reason we recommend to laypeople (lawyers, reporters, NGOs) to get iPhones and avoid Android phones.
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#208Earlier quoted context omitted.
My read is that tptachek claims that not all android phones are insecure. You should avoid those android phones whose vendors don't do serious security updates. Among the vendors that are well known to care about updating their phones there is Google. So, he seems to say that an android phone branded directly by Google (e.g. Nexuses, pixels) is a valid alternative to iPhones as far as this topic is concerned.
He did not say that, but it's natural to assume that. All android phones run android (naturally) so if for whatever reason you believe iOS to be more secure and you also know most android phones do not receive updates correctly then it's probably easier to avoid all android phones than try to accurately predict the development roadmaps for companies other than Google's flagship phones. Personally, I think Android its…
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#209Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is it possible to use a chip/EMV credit card as an X.509 certificate? Let the credit card company know your private key (paranoid assumption; not necessarily true) & skip straight to step 3!
Look, I'm not an expert, I just dabble a bit. In theory there's no need for anyone to know your private key, it is generated on the card and kept there, unextractable. As I understand it there's nothing stopping credit card companies from allowing you generate your own keys on it (on a technical side that is), it just wasn't done AFAIK.
Re: Show HN: Kryptonite – a new home for your SSH private key
#210Earlier quoted context omitted.
Was that satire? Security Problems: Android-specific -- Android 5 was supposed to make encryption mandatory, but it killed performance, so they rolled that back. Android 6 was supposed to do it again, but if your phone isn't fast enough, or you are upgrading, again it isn't mandatory. My Android 6 phone didn't use encryption until I enabled a pin and biometrics. -- Many of the old versions of Android that will never…
I didn't bother reading the Android list. If you're concerned about Android security, as I am, don't use Android phones. Your iPhone list has virtually nothing to do with the difference in security between phones and computers. It's just a bunch of things you don't like about phones. What on earth does A5/1 have to do with any of these issues? Cracking A5/1 keys doesn't break your IP sessions.
If you break the encryption you can intercept 2fa at the least. Any time encryption is broken security assumptions have to be re-evaluated. Your HTTPS session might be secure but that doesn't mean there aren't new holes somewhere else in the stack.