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A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

gizmodo.com

161–170 of 242 posts

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Engineering needs to stop being subordinate to anything but top management (if at all). An MBA can always outrank an engineer's decision and that is a big reason why we have crap devices out in the field.

It's simply difficult to secure devices. It's hard the same way engineering is hard. I know it's fashionable to blame the MBAs instead of blame ourselves, but at the end of it, we're the ones who write insecure code. And I don't think that if you give an engineer an extra week or two to focus on security that you'd end up with a measurably more secure device. Securing something is a different skillset from building i…

"It's simply difficult to secure devices. It's hard the same way engineering is hard."

Put OpenBSD and OpenSSH on them with configuration explained in a good book on the subject. Write your apps in memory-safe language that validates external input. The End [for vast majority of attacks in IoT space]. It's not as hard as you detractors claim. They just don't care.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#162

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm the author of the Gizmodo post. Having covered IoT hacks for a few years, it's obvious that drastic measures would be necessary to convince manufacturers to build more secure products. While I'm not necessarily endorsing this hacker's methods, I do salute his taking a stand. It might land him in jail. But still, the mission is worthwhile.

This captures the essence of the type of activism that I so dislike — an unaffected, third party (a person who doesn't use your bluetooth lightbulb) taking the job upon himself to tell you what level of security your lightbulb should employ... By breaking it.

I don't see this as activism per se. I see this as similar to a virus or bacterium coming into existence, forcing us toward better hygiene practices. You don't blame a virus or bacteria for existing; it's just sort of... there, part of the ecosystem. Instead, you blame things for being vulnerable to it and therefore spreading it. You try to kill it not by eliminating its "source", but by eliminating the spread.

Right now, we're beginning to treat DDoSes in that "infectious agent"/"your responsibility if you don't act to protect yourself" way. So many people do them, so often and so easily, that "shutting down the botters" one-by-one will never make DDoSes go away. So we have to just figure out how to deal with them. (Which will, coincidentally, make DDoSes actually go away, if everyone ends up immune to them such that it's no longer useful to do one.)

But, annoyingly, we still handle bots programmed to scan for and exploit software vulnerabilities (worms, ransomware, what-have-you) as only intentional malicious action on the part of their original author, to be solved by catching the author. (Not that you can't catch the author—but that won't stop a worm, and especially won't stop someone else from just slightly-modifying and then re-releasing the worm.) We haven't bothered nearly at all with the "how do we make software vulnerabilities, as a class, less exploitable" part of the equation.

Personally, I'm hoping that this decade sees "A-Life" computer worms, that self-modify using (machine-readable?) 0days they discover by spidering the web from their infected hosts. Computers would be being attacked with novel exploits, even with no new malware authors to do the attacking! Then we'd really have to treat vulnerabilities as a fact of life to secure around, rather than something we can stop by just stopping people from bothering to exploit them.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#163
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

wait a fucking minute people are connecting medical devices to the internet?

If you connect it to a network, it's entirely plausible that there is a path to the internet. Even if it's on an airgapped network, laptops and phones end up on both through accidents...

Or people plugging in USB drives they found outside on ground. Or CD's before that. Or floppy discs before that. ;)

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#164

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Whether the car is hijacked to carry out attacks, or bricked by a vigilante trying to prevent another attack, I'd be pissed. But the blame lies squarely on the manufacturer who decided "meh, securing our devices against attack sounds expensive".

I think the problem is as often not about careing, and being unaware of anything outside their little subsystem. You used to have what was essentially airgapped and self contained. But then feature x needed an ongoing net connection, and it happens to run on the same soc as feature y that talk to the can bus, and boom. Neither of the teams responsible for the features considers that something can jump from x to y, al…

> But then feature x needed an ongoing net connection, and it happens to run on the same soc as feature y that talk to the can bus, and boom.

So then the question becomes: How are we going to educate engineers about this class of problems?

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#165
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So you think the consumers should be punished for something you think the producers do wrong? Do you apply this to other products as well? Would it be ok to soak peoples cigarettes in water, break the motor of your neighbours high fuel consuming SUV or destroy the guns of people since these products can cause damage to other people?

The problem is, I think, what choice do we have (we == rest of the world) when somebody's messed up camera starts spamming the entire Internet? And how much does cost the mirai botnet to everyone when some client rents it? Best case scenario: users claim warranty and replace their devices something better Worst case scenario: users need to buy new gear, they probably won't buy from that same manufacturer because last…

Really worst-case scenario: Someone is killed or maimed due to bricked system.

FTFY

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#166

I see a lot of people blaming the manufacturers, or blaming the hacker. Then coming up with analogies to support their point of view. I blame the users and don't feel bad for them at all. The analogy I'm going with is if one of your neighbors bought a canon as a piece of art, and left it pointed at your house. Ignorance is not an excuse.

These users don't think they're buying a cannon, they think they're buying a lightbulb which will mimic the sun or a blender which will automatically make a smoothie for them every morning.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#167
post #160

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think the problem is as often not about careing, and being unaware of anything outside their little subsystem. You used to have what was essentially airgapped and self contained. But then feature x needed an ongoing net connection, and it happens to run on the same soc as feature y that talk to the can bus, and boom. Neither of the teams responsible for the features considers that something can jump from x to y, al…

> VMs sharing hardware could talk to each other using the CPU cache That sounds similar to a paper I read ~20 years ago that described a way to move data from a high privilege process, bypassing mandatory access control (>= TCSEC B), using page faults as a covert channel. > it happens to run on the same soc as feature y that talk to the can bus I wonder how many people will have to die to teach car manufacturers the…

Yep. The TCSEC had covert channel analysis as a requirement. Actually, two of the products (GEMSOS, STOP OS) certified at A1 can still be OEM licensed today in some form with a third (SNS Server) only sold to defense sector. They have plenty of competition, too, in MILS space. Solutions exist.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#168
Shouldn't be so merciful to brick it. Should have taken over some garage door openers, measured the average time between open and closing, and then close it suddenly after t == t_Signal+(t_Average)*1/3. Security is when your door is not trying to get into your car. The carcrackodile would raise awareness.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#169

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm the author of the Gizmodo post. Having covered IoT hacks for a few years, it's obvious that drastic measures would be necessary to convince manufacturers to build more secure products. While I'm not necessarily endorsing this hacker's methods, I do salute his taking a stand. It might land him in jail. But still, the mission is worthwhile.

Engineering needs to stop being subordinate to anything but top management (if at all). An MBA can always outrank an engineer's decision and that is a big reason why we have crap devices out in the field.

Of course the other way around most often just gives you devices in the field nobody buys.

In this, like most things, you need a balance. If you aren't commercially driven in some fundamental way you probably won't last long enough for any of this to make a difference.

Of course if you apply that the wrong way, you end up with devices that suck and/or harm users. This way leads to regulation typically, since Smiths invisible and myopic hand usually acts too slowly for people to be convinced it will get to the right place, if we just wait long enough.

Re: A vigilante trying to improve IoT security

#170
post #157

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The bigger problem with pentests is not the current cost but, as I see it, is that security is inherently and inescapably expensive somewhere in the chain, and that vendors have been getting a free lunch for too long. The viability of security analyses/pentests will go down if your goal is to reduce the cost by an order of magnitude because the people who are any good will find something better to do--and the consume…

I think the parent was arguing that this: > security is inherently and inescapably expensive somewhere in the chain ...is the thing that needs to change. Presumably using more automation (e.g. employing more software like http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/ ), such that "pen-testing" shifts from being a labor cost to a capital cost.

Open telnet servers are a solved problem (taking the solution off the rack is a question of time and, effectively, the willingness to be negligent). The automation exists.

It's the hard stuff that is context- and environment-dependent to a degree that it resists automation.

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