Earlier quoted context omitted.
Small note, but 3,000 trillion is 3 quadrillion, not 3 quintillion. Which is their total, over a significant amount of time. The bitcoin network does over 3 quintillion (>3,000,000 trillion) hashes a second. So even if they were doing a significantly harder to compute hash -- they're still only a very small part of the computational power the bitcoin network is using. So it's probably already more effective to attack…
> So it's probably already more effective to attack wallets than join a mining pool. That's not how you make the calculations. The reason the idea was called stupid is because the math doesn't add up. My guess is that these 3 private keys had weaknesses in them. Even the probability that they were found by "luck" is way far off. Given merge mining is possible, I'd assume with some tweaking side-colliding + mining is…
Google found a SHA-1 collision (160 bit hash, same size but different method) in 9 quintillion hashes (plus some crypto work). The article claims they found a collision against 3 of millions of targets in 3 quadrillion hashes (likely plus some crypto work). Given the birthday paradox, it's not a priori impossible.
Could you explain why you don't believe their attack is mere hash collisions?