Daniel Dennett’s Science of the Soul • Hacker News Board

Re: Daniel Dennett’s Science of the Soul

#61

Post by [deleted] » Fri, Mar 24, 2017, 11:04 PM UTC

metaxy2 wrote: post #59

Aaargh20318 wrote: post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> In my father's last months, I saw him medicated on morphine to the point of being near unconscious, and it's easy to imagine that he was having the same sort of weak experiences as I've had. None of this rattles my dualist intuitions at all. But if your consciousness is separate from your physical brain, how come pumping certain chemicals affect consciousness on a very fundamental level ? With your examples, you co…

Modern, sophisticated dualists tend to think that consciousness just sits "on top" of brain activity, experiences are generated based on what's going on the brain. Many are "epiphenomenalists," who say that the content is determined only by brain activity, so the information flow is one way: brain -> conscious experience. This has loads of problems (if consciousness has some influence over behavior, then what's the p…

[deleted]

Re: Daniel Dennett’s Science of the Soul

#62

Post by Qcombinator » Sat, Mar 25, 2017, 9:46 AM UTC

naasking wrote: post #54

Qcombinator wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Materialism can classify qualia as an illusion But can it? To say something is an illusion is to say that is really an experience of something else. And qualia are qualitative experiences, so the claim is that certain experiences are not experiences… which is problematic. Of course, a proper argument needs to be fleshed out more than that, but eliminativists face a real difficulty, unless they broaden the definitio…

> But can it? To say something is an illusion is to say that is really an experience of something else. Your definition for "illusion" begs the question by simply assuming a subject is needed, ie. an "I" must experience an illusion. Rather, an illusion is simply describing the relation between perception and truth. If a perception, taken at face value, entails a false conclusion, then it's an illusion. Even the basic…

I made no reference to a subject either. For "my" experiences to be not really "anybody's" experiences is a somewhat separate problem. As is a belief that I don't really have any beliefs, and so on. Any attempt to eliminate qualia or self or intentionality, etc. as being fundamental realities runs into the problem that all these things are more fundamental to my understanding than any proposed alternative.

Re: Daniel Dennett’s Science of the Soul

#63

Post by naasking » Sat, Mar 25, 2017, 2:00 PM UTC

Qcombinator wrote: post #62

naasking wrote: post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But can it? To say something is an illusion is to say that is really an experience of something else. Your definition for "illusion" begs the question by simply assuming a subject is needed, ie. an "I" must experience an illusion. Rather, an illusion is simply describing the relation between perception and truth. If a perception, taken at face value, entails a false conclusion, then it's an illusion. Even the basic…

I made no reference to a subject either. For "my" experiences to be not really "anybody's" experiences is a somewhat separate problem. As is a belief that I don't really have any beliefs, and so on. Any attempt to eliminate qualia or self or intentionality, etc. as being fundamental realities runs into the problem that all these things are more fundamental to my understanding than any proposed alternative.

Your definition of illusion still begs the question, either by assuming a subject or assuming a reduction to further experience is needed. Like I said, illusion only requires that perception differ from truth.

> Any attempt to eliminate qualia or self or intentionality, etc. as being fundamental realities runs into the problem that all these things are more fundamental to my understanding than any proposed alternative.

1. Perception is fundamental to understanding. Whether experience is fundamental is very questionable.

2. Being fundamental doesn't entail something is irreducible. Being in a car is fundamental to driving on a road, that doesn't entail cars are irreducible.