If it works for you, great. Maybe I was being deliberately controversial calling xkcd/diceware bullshit. Kudos for raising bad password awareness and improving practices, I suppose.
But, I still contend it basically knocks down a straw man with bullshit. Yes, they correctly point out that if you're using a mnemonic method, a long passphrase is better than a short password. I'm pretty sure the PGP folks pointed that out at least a decade or two ago.
At the end of the day, if you're not using, recalling, and exercising a strong secret, you will forget it. That's how memory works. With Diceware you have three things to learn; your silly mnemonic, what it translates to, and how to type it quickly. True, you might (just might) forget the muscle memory of exactly how to type it before you forget the entire mnemonic, and then be able to recover the password from your memory of the mnemonic cues. That seems intuitive, at least, but misleadingly so.
But my years of experience has taught me that muscle memory is the most durable memory. There's nothing inherent in "correct horse battery" that's going to give you "staple" once you've forgotten it; it's gone. It was random, after all. If you're not exercising and remembering your secret, then you have to have a backup to fall upon--written down or stored somewhere? If your goal is muscle memory with minimum pain, fewer, maximally-random higher-entropy keystrokes is better.
I don't think most people sit down at their desk all day uninterrupted without leaving. I lock my terminal when I leave my keyboard and type a password to unlock when I return. I enter a password whenever I unlock an encrypted volume (e.g., to get other passwords).
You can use biometrics or tokens, but purely memorized passwords can have unique utility. In America, for instance, you generally can't be rubber-hosed to give up a memorized passphrase, and it's not generally a crime to do so. You can be compelled in a variety of settings to provide a physical token, including biometrics, or disclose their existence. There can be civil coercive techniques to pursuade you to give up a password, but at a bare minimum, in a criminal situation or where the 5th amendment applies under my current understanding you cannot be forced to give a password from memory.
Of course if you're the surveillance target of a nation-state then potentially they can do what they need to do to covertly intercept your passphrase through physical access, evil maid etc., but that's a different ballgame.