The author of http://blog.intothesymmetry.com/2017/03/critical-vulnerabili... here FWIW. Personally I would not be so drastic. JOSE per se is not too bad (at least the idea is cool). Some crypto choices though have been really arguable...
That post is great work. Thanks again. But I think you're wrong about JWT. The problem with JWT/JOSE is that it's too complicated for what it does. It's a meta-standard capturing basically all of cryptography which, as you've ably observed (along with Matthew Green), was not written by or with cryptographers. Crypto vulnerabilities usually occur in the joinery of a protocol. JWT was written to maximize the amount of…
But I admit never thought of it as a particularly bad crypto protocol. It's actually pretty good compared to most negotiable crypto standards out there. I mean, yeah, JWK allows you to embed X.509 (but you don't have to do it), the value of supporting RSA is questionable, their selection of curves is regrettable (but all the world went with the NIST curves), compression on JWE (and not JWS?!) makes me suspicious, and yeah, JSON is kinda verbose compared to MsgPack et al.
But then I remember that before that before JWT came SAML+XML-DSIG (and the whole WS-* ecosystem) and CMS/PKCS#7 (and the whole ASN.1 ecosystem). Ah, compared to these JOSE is a fresh breath of air.
What a lightweight and uncomplicated serialization format - It couldn't even be used for amplified DDOS attacks!
What a modern set of ciphers (besides 'none', sorry, missed that on there ;). No more DES, RC4, or unpopular untested ciphers just there to fill the slots.
Yeah, JOSE still has some parts which are over-engineered but for a STANDARD it's the best one there. Management demands standards, it's a fact of life. And I'd choose JWT over SAML or CMS any day.