US nuclear C&C systems still use 8 inch floppies: http://time.com/4348494/pentagon-nuclear-floppy-disks/
So, 3.5" floppies are probably used in much more modern weapon designs. Perhaps orbital lasers or something. /s
CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
11–20 of 63 posts
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#12On the face this seems ridiculous. It's a big stretch, but we do know that some US adversaries use portable media (usually thumb drives) to currior data. Maybe they had a target that was using floppies? Maybe Iran's centrifuges or N. Korea still uses really old tech?
It could be organizations in the US itself. I remember somewhere that the military was still requriing 3.5 floppies at least within the last 5 years. (no, I'm not talking about the nuke software that uses the bigger floppies)
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#13To me an interesting piece is the systemd / Linux references. The protocol to talk to floppy drives is not all that complex. If battery life is a concern, dedicated embedded code (not using Linux) seems likes a better option and not all that much more difficult to implement. Then again, I suppose embedded Linux keeps getting lighter / better. That requirement strikes me as classic non-/semi-technical product owner tr…
I think most storage mediums are amenable to easy clearing with an open flame.
True. But some people would be surprised at what you can do to a spinning disk hard drive before it becomes unrecoverable.
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#14Does that mean going down to Fry's for a couple USB floppy drives in sunglasses and a hat?
Because that shit cute.
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#15I don't understand why crypto doesn't help avoid detection?
Imagine I have a usb thumb drive with gigabytes of mp3s on it, and I devise a way to embed and extract a floppy image into the mp3s (i.e. steganography), or perhaps family pictures. unless the images are viewed before and after, it can be difficult to determine what was stored or even if anything was stored.
Of course, not impossible as their attacks that can be done on this, but I'd argue that if one is already suspected of using steganography and they have access to the device you are storing the data on, you are most likely screwed anyways, even if they can't prove it.
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#16On the face this seems ridiculous. It's a big stretch, but we do know that some US adversaries use portable media (usually thumb drives) to currior data. Maybe they had a target that was using floppies? Maybe Iran's centrifuges or N. Korea still uses really old tech?
"Really old tech" is everywhere. For example Germany's high speed trains' reservation system runs on floppy disks.
...and if you're not careful when ordering Siemens Simatic software, the accompanying licence file arrives on a yellow 3,5" floppy.
Don't ask me how I know. It took AGES to purge our ERP system of any reference to the Siemens item# which resulted in a floppy showing up.
On the other hand, it resulted in some business for both DHL and whoever still manufactures floppy drives nowadays - service engineers opening a package somewhere in the world, finding what kids today would assume was a 3d-printed 'save' icon - and order a drive, double haste...
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#17Just to be clear, they actually made this. Not only that, but it appears like they had 3 different versions.[0]
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#18I don't understand why crypto doesn't help avoid detection? Imagine I have a usb thumb drive with gigabytes of mp3s on it, and I devise a way to embed and extract a floppy image into the mp3s (i.e. steganography), or perhaps family pictures. unless the images are viewed before and after, it can be difficult to determine what was stored or even if anything was stored. Of course, not impossible as their attacks that ca…
Steganography actually causes distortions that are noticeable. Unencripted data often has very odd patterns, encrypted data looks unusually random.
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#19I don't understand why crypto doesn't help avoid detection? Imagine I have a usb thumb drive with gigabytes of mp3s on it, and I devise a way to embed and extract a floppy image into the mp3s (i.e. steganography), or perhaps family pictures. unless the images are viewed before and after, it can be difficult to determine what was stored or even if anything was stored. Of course, not impossible as their attacks that ca…
If you get caught with a hidden floppy drive near a place that uses floppy disks for any interesting purposes, it is pretty clear what you were up to. Being able to conceal whether you already copied anything and if, what exactly, wouldn't probably make a big difference. You are almost certainly in some serious trouble at that point.
Re: CIA wanted a way to copy 3.5“ floppy disks ”in a covert manner“ in 2013
#20On the face this seems ridiculous. It's a big stretch, but we do know that some US adversaries use portable media (usually thumb drives) to currior data. Maybe they had a target that was using floppies? Maybe Iran's centrifuges or N. Korea still uses really old tech?
"Really old tech" is everywhere. For example Germany's high speed trains' reservation system runs on floppy disks.
Sadly they replaced that with a wireless system in most trains a few years ago. But you find a lot of old tech in the train system. Some traffic control was built 50+ years ago with even older technology.