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What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

nytimes.com

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Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#251

Post by Klathmon »

tgb wrote: post #242
matthewaveryusa wrote: post #184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's an extremely simple method which is to onion multiple algorithms. If you want to add the promised security features of a new algorithm that hasn't been battle-tested it's well worth the effort.

I know next to nothing about this subject, but this suggestion sounds like the kinds of things that amateurs suggest but experts scoff at. So my question to any actual experts: is this legit? Note that breaking A+B is not necessarily as hard as breaking both A and B, but it certainly seems likely to be true most of the time.

I'm far from an expert, but I believe the big worry with layering systems like this is you double the amount of key management and implementation attack surface (which is often the weakest part of a cryptosystem), and traditionally it's not for much benefit.

Ignoring quantum computing, doubling up algorithms doesn't really protect you against unknown unknowns all that much as there is a good chance that a massive flaw in one of them could apply to the others (since they are all somewhat based on the same "problem").

When you start layering lattice based crypto with traditional crypto the payoff might change and make it more viable.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#252

Post by dang »

developer2 wrote: post #35

This world we live in... the Associated Press permeates through nearly all of the US's media. They are the same reason you can find newscasts about some random throwaway story being repeated word-for-word verbatim. When you have dozens of news anchors across the country reading the exact same words from a teleprompter to push a story, something is very very wrong. I mean, it's nice that the NY Times specifies "By THE…

We detached this subthread from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13844636 and marked it off-topic.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#253

Post by fooker »

Spooky23 wrote: post #160

It only tells you that encryption works against the tools included in the leak. It doesn't seem credible to me that the US government's tooling in this area is pretty much the same as what is generally available, given the billions invested in cyber stuff. There are many reasons beyond self interest (like the viability of online commerce) that would lead an organization like the CIA to compartmentalize more advanced/…

>It doesn't seem credible to me that the US government's tooling in this area is pretty much the same as what is generally available, given the billions invested in cyber stuff.

You can not throw money at mathematics and expect it to change. Some crypto techniques could very well be secure with the hardware available now. And it might also be true that quantum computers are not anywhere close to be useful.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#254

Post by Gregordinary »

iheartmemcache wrote: post #55
cyphar wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're ignoring that most drivers for android phones are proprietary, the baseband is entirely proprietary (required by law), the Google services are proprietary (which many apps use) and most apps are proprietary (including Google's replacements for the AOSP apps). If you want a completely free software smartphone experience, it is simply not possible at the moment. Even Replicant[1] still hasn't cracked the baseban…

Basebands fall under exactly which entities juristiction such that they can regulate a baseband to be 'entirely proprietary' ? I mean, BB + superhet. mixer => IF => carrier wave envelope containing your data. How do you even regulate a concept of physics? If you're paying the proper fees as a subscriber to $provider_foo you could even design your own receiver off the public standards documents.. (used to be a popular…

On the hardware side, there is a project "Free Calypso" to produce a completely libre (software, firmware, baseband, & hardware) "dumbphone" using the Calypso chipset.

Initially looking to reuse old phones with the Calypso chipsets, the project is now working on producing their own. Design files are completed; funding for the dev boards is about 66% complete.

https://www.freecalypso.org/fcdev3b.html

Mailing list is fairly active too.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#255

Post by xenadu02 »

FreeFull wrote: post #38
MarkMc wrote: post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you are being too strict in your definition of 'secure'. 99.99% of devices run Android, iOS or Windows which are closed source and therefore not 'secure'. To me, security is not a binary property but rather a sliding scale. WhatsApp say they use end-to-end encryption and they have a strong financial incentive to be telling the truth. No hacker has demonstrated that WhatsApp are lying and the Wikileaks dump su…

https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.

Large parts of iOS is available at opensource.apple.com, including the kernel, Objective-C runtime, and CoreFoundation. LLVM, Clang, and Swift are also open source.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#256

Post by IncRnd »

matthewaveryusa wrote: post #184
Filligree wrote: post #158

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The sad truth is, until we've spent a lot more time analysing and attacking those algorithms, they aren't as secure as what we've got.

There's an extremely simple method which is to onion multiple algorithms. If you want to add the promised security features of a new algorithm that hasn't been battle-tested it's well worth the effort.

Your proposed use seems intended to add randomness. However, Schor's algorithm (for example) doesn't attack the randomness of a message but factors keys.

How would you propose to securely exchange the keys for the several algorithms? If there is enough meta or implied information for you to know what algorithms are used, an attacker would also know what algorithms are in use.

The obstacle isn't lack of randomness or an excess of decipherability but not using a quantum resistant algorithm.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#257

Post by tastythrowaway2 »

cyphar wrote: post #41
FreeFull wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.

You're ignoring that most drivers for android phones are proprietary, the baseband is entirely proprietary (required by law), the Google services are proprietary (which many apps use) and most apps are proprietary (including Google's replacements for the AOSP apps). If you want a completely free software smartphone experience, it is simply not possible at the moment. Even Replicant[1] still hasn't cracked the baseban…

what is the regulation that mandates proprietary baseband?

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#258

Post by 1001101 »

andai wrote: post #249
1001101 wrote: post #164

The only encryption I truly trust is one-time pad. Discrete log may be NP-intermediate (if P!=NP, which is open), and we know from the Snowden disclosures that NSA was working with U Maryland on a quantum computer which will be a reality at some point (Shor's algorithm). With 'collect it all,' today's ciphertext is tomorrow's plaintext. Always be skeptical.

Your downvotes courtesy of NSA's botnet ;) Do you use OTP? I've done some little experiments. I'm surprised at the lack of interest in the only form of encryption that is literally unbreakable, in this age of surveillance paranoia.

I have not. I had discussed a theoretical len(CT) == len(key) system with a friend for about 30 mins as a thought experiment, but we immediately poked a number of holes in it -- not the least of which being that we couldn't say anything about the security of the system on which it was deployed. Other questions: what to do with the key material files (their remnants would no doubt be left intact in NAND by opaque eMMC and SD controller implementations - and if not, some signal processing on the charge of the cells themselves combined with the regularity of whatever language was being used would give it up anyway - encrypting the key material might solve this to a degree). Also: where to get quality key material in the first place, and how to exchange it (NFC was discussed). I'll certainly take Claude Shannon's word on the security :)

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#259

Post by cyphar »

tastythrowaway2 wrote: post #257
cyphar wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're ignoring that most drivers for android phones are proprietary, the baseband is entirely proprietary (required by law), the Google services are proprietary (which many apps use) and most apps are proprietary (including Google's replacements for the AOSP apps). If you want a completely free software smartphone experience, it is simply not possible at the moment. Even Replicant[1] still hasn't cracked the baseban…

what is the regulation that mandates proprietary baseband?

The FCC has requirements for manufacturers to make sure that their radios output to-spec EMR. In addition to this, they've been working toward trying to stop people from being able to arbitrarily modify their radios.[1]

While (AFAIK) there isn't a regulation stopping someone from selling radios that have completely free software basebands, you can bet that the manufacturer will be prosecuted if users suddenly start outputting radio waves that don't follow regulations (suing users is harder than suing a manufacturer). As a result, there's a disincentive for manufacturers to ever sell free software radios (because by definition they would have to allow modification).

[1] https://www.infoq.com/news/2015/07/FCC-Blocks-Open-Source

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#260

Post by andai »

1001101 wrote: post #258
andai wrote: post #249

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your downvotes courtesy of NSA's botnet ;) Do you use OTP? I've done some little experiments. I'm surprised at the lack of interest in the only form of encryption that is literally unbreakable, in this age of surveillance paranoia.

I have not. I had discussed a theoretical len(CT) == len(key) system with a friend for about 30 mins as a thought experiment, but we immediately poked a number of holes in it -- not the least of which being that we couldn't say anything about the security of the system on which it was deployed. Other questions: what to do with the key material files (their remnants would no doubt be left intact in NAND by opaque eMMC…

1. Security of the system: I'm thinking about this lately: below in this thread I mentioned a setup involving an airgapped non-intel (eg. Rpi) computer that communicates ascii in morse code. This machine would hold the keys and encrypt / decrypt.

2. What to do with the files? You'd need to keep them as long as you need to use them. In my scenario it would be on an SD card in the raspberry pi. Afterwards.. there are many creative ways to destroy them :) i think an advantage of SD over HDDs is they are small enough to reasonably melt.

3. Key exchange: exchange the key on physical media, in person. Ensure the key does not come into contact with a networked computer (ask your friend nicely) and keep it away from any untrusted USB devices.

4. Quality key material: Hardware random number generator (also done on an airgapped etc machine).

I think I've covered everything, the only thing that crypto people on IRC could really complain about (it seems they really don't like OTP?) was integrity: an attacker could modify the message if they guessed parts of it.

I'm still figuring out how that would work (they assumed it would be used for a standard protocol with something like "From: andai@andai.tv" at the start of every message).

Now I'm just trying to make it so that anyone could set this up, which is turning out to be the trickiest step.

For the simplest form of encryption there sure aren't a lot of implementations out there...

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