201–210 of 270 posts
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The sad truth is, until we've spent a lot more time analysing and attacking those algorithms, they aren't as secure as what we've got.
There's an extremely simple method which is to onion multiple algorithms. If you want to add the promised security features of a new algorithm that hasn't been battle-tested it's well worth the effort.
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The Signal protocol ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_Protocol ) has been vetted, and the code is online available to be audited: - Signal code: https://github.com/whispersystems/ Telegram has had known flaws, which have been discussed in part here: - Telegram protocol defeated. Authors are going to modify crypto-algorithm https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6948742 - A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Develop…
The protocol is secure, but we have no idea if the implementations are secure (except Signal itself), because we can't audit them. In fact, Facebook Messenger's implementation of Signal has very questionable security right out of the box, because if one party "reports" an encrypted conversation, the whole thing is decrypted and sent to facebook support staff.
The Signal Protocol provides end-to-end encryption so you don't have to trust the intermediate parties/servers involved in relaying the message (e.g. you don't have to trust Facebook's servers), and to protect against the other person reporting and revealing your conversation to someone else, the Signal Protocol provides message repudiation [1], which effectively gives the sender plausible deniability because the receiving party cannot prove to a third party that a message came from you.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_Protocol#Properties
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There's an extremely simple method which is to onion multiple algorithms. If you want to add the promised security features of a new algorithm that hasn't been battle-tested it's well worth the effort.
I've never heard of such technique, what does onioning do?
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The protocol is secure, but we have no idea if the implementations are secure (except Signal itself), because we can't audit them. In fact, Facebook Messenger's implementation of Signal has very questionable security right out of the box, because if one party "reports" an encrypted conversation, the whole thing is decrypted and sent to facebook support staff.
So someone reporting a message to Facebook would be the equivalent of that person (either Alice or Bob) reporting and sending the content of the other person's encrypted conversation to a third party. The Signal Protocol provides end-to-end encryption so you don't have to trust the intermediate parties/servers involved in relaying the message (e.g. you don't have to trust Facebook's servers), and to protect against t…
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Symmetric encryption not being broken doesn't really help you if the encryption key has been exchanged using a (presumably quantum-breakable) form of asymmetric encryption. Most encryption in the wild works this way.
I saw that strongSwan had already supported two post-quantum key exchange algorithms (NTRU and NewHope) for IPSec IKEv2. Good. https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/IKEv2Ci...
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg123...
https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-ipsec.pdf
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The Associated Press is a wire service [1] -- writing and distributing articles to other news papers is what it does: [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_agency
In blog spammer terminology, the AP is a shallow content farm that subscribers can either copy verbatim or spin into new articles to avoid duplicate content filters, as long as they provide credit/backlinks.
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There is still tremendous value in symmetric encryption for off-site storage, especially cloud-based storage. This allows storage to be off-loaded wherever without needing the storage location to be trusted. All that needs to be stored locally is the key. Done right, this means quantum won't get you access to dropbox-like stuff. (Dropbox itself probably doesn't work like that, it'll store the symmetric keys server si…
Dropbox de-duplicates your files with other users who have the same ones, and are capable of serving them all to you through a web site. There's no encryption there at all, except TLS in transit.
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It also doesn't have to be a central authority, since "anyone" (meaning: anyone who can afford to operate a mailserver, which is actually a surprisingly-high number) can be such an authority for one's own mail.
Practically nobody is running own mail server these days. Email is extremely centralized
I don't see any mention of quantum computers in here so I thought I'd mention: the NSA themselves are concerned that quantum computing will be a great threat to encryption in the near future. Keep in mind that the NSA and god knows who else are storing encrypted communications to break them later. Quantum computing will defeat RSA, DH, ECC, asymmetric crypto, but it will only weaken symmetric crypto (eg. AES) by a fa…