Live data from Hacker News

What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

nytimes.com

41–50 of 270 posts

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#41
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you are being too strict in your definition of 'secure'. 99.99% of devices run Android, iOS or Windows which are closed source and therefore not 'secure'. To me, security is not a binary property but rather a sliding scale. WhatsApp say they use end-to-end encryption and they have a strong financial incentive to be telling the truth. No hacker has demonstrated that WhatsApp are lying and the Wikileaks dump su…

https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.

You're ignoring that most drivers for android phones are proprietary, the baseband is entirely proprietary (required by law), the Google services are proprietary (which many apps use) and most apps are proprietary (including Google's replacements for the AOSP apps).

If you want a completely free software smartphone experience, it is simply not possible at the moment. Even Replicant[1] still hasn't cracked the baseband puzzle (and is still struggling with the firmware for a couple of phones).

So no, Android is definitely proprietary -- even if some parts are not.

[1]: http://www.replicant.us

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#42
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you are being too strict in your definition of 'secure'. 99.99% of devices run Android, iOS or Windows which are closed source and therefore not 'secure'. To me, security is not a binary property but rather a sliding scale. WhatsApp say they use end-to-end encryption and they have a strong financial incentive to be telling the truth. No hacker has demonstrated that WhatsApp are lying and the Wikileaks dump su…

https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.

The modifications installed by your phone company, etc. are not open source. The baseband chip's firmware is not open sourced. I've even heard of DMA being allowed over baseband as part of the Lawful Intercept Protocol.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#43
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you are being too strict in your definition of 'secure'. 99.99% of devices run Android, iOS or Windows which are closed source and therefore not 'secure'. To me, security is not a binary property but rather a sliding scale. WhatsApp say they use end-to-end encryption and they have a strong financial incentive to be telling the truth. No hacker has demonstrated that WhatsApp are lying and the Wikileaks dump su…

https://source.android.com/ The source code for Android is open under the Apache 2.0 license. Of course, iOS and Windows are closed source.

Google has moved a lot of the platform code to their closed source parts. So for the purposes of security your typical Android phone is just as closed source as Windows. These days, unless you're running a classic Linux distro or BSD the OS code isn't auditable. And even if you were running Ubuntu on the phone the baseband is completely closed and almost always has memory access with no MMU so you should never trust a phone with anything important.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems that most people are completely in the dark when it comes to security, including myself, but there are some principles that should be unwavering that regularly get ignored again with every new iteration of "secure" software: * If there is a weak layer in the stack, from the physical layer to to UI, then the system is not secure. Even if your messaging app is secure, your messages are not secure if your OS is…

This post is grey, and I'm not quite sure why. It's a bit on the "pessimistic" side, but... that philosophy is actually spot on IMO when it comes to security. So why downvote this? I'm honestly a bit new to this community but to me this sceptic perspective as it pertains to software security is ... well, actually it isn't even enough. Is this a weakness w/HN where even justified pessimism is eschewed?

Oh, HN is plenty pessimistic...

But this sort of pessimism isn't really useful. The attitude that "anything is insecure if there is any closed source software anywhere in the stack" means that it's impossible to advance security, because it's almost impossible to avoid binaries (i. e. firmware).

Apple, for example, has done a few things that are laudable in this field – i. e. risking a public court fight with the FBI to keep the iPhone secure. If we say that such actions are meaningless because they ship binaries, they have no incentive to do such things. Just rolling over and giving the US gov big-pipe-access to everything like yahoo did becomes the better business proposition.

Similarly, what do you answer when a friend who works at the EPA asks you how to securely contact a journalist? If it starts with ordering a custom open-firmware mainboard from somewhere in China, your advice will be ignored.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's something we can't do anything about though.

We can't do anything about the phone number requirement?

The phone number is not required as per the Signal protocol -- it's an implementation detail -- another token could be used. At this time, phone number verification is used in the initial authentication flow to protect against someone else spoofing your phone number and pretending to be you.

See https://github.com/WhisperSystems/Signal-Android/issues/1181

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#46

This world we live in... the Associated Press permeates through nearly all of the US's media. They are the same reason you can find newscasts about some random throwaway story being repeated word-for-word verbatim. When you have dozens of news anchors across the country reading the exact same words from a teleprompter to push a story, something is very very wrong. I mean, it's nice that the NY Times specifies "By THE…

AP, and similar wire services, are what allow the news media to at least somewhat offset their losses in revenue. Using them to send their own people everywhere is meaningless without a plan how to double or triple revenue.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#48
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems that most people are completely in the dark when it comes to security, including myself, but there are some principles that should be unwavering that regularly get ignored again with every new iteration of "secure" software: * If there is a weak layer in the stack, from the physical layer to to UI, then the system is not secure. Even if your messaging app is secure, your messages are not secure if your OS is…

The Signal protocol ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_Protocol ) has been vetted, and the code is online available to be audited: - Signal code: https://github.com/whispersystems/ Telegram has had known flaws, which have been discussed in part here: - Telegram protocol defeated. Authors are going to modify crypto-algorithm https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6948742 - A Crypto Challenge For The Telegram Develop…

How much of that Telegram info applies to anything in the last 2 years or so?

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#49
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not hard to demonstrate that apps are performing end-to-end encryption even if you don't have access to the source code. Reverse engineering this stuff is really pretty straightforward.

It's not just that they're performing encryption, but also assurance that (1) they're using the keys they declare and (2) they aren't sending other data over unannounced side-channels. You can't just insert yourself in the message stream since the client and server use pinned, mutual certificate authentication. So you have to start from first-principles and step through decompiled code.

You can do whatever you want with your system, if you've complete control. So even pinned certificates are not a big deal. You can read the messages unencrypted or you can remove the certificate checking in the code for example.

Re: What the CIA WikiLeaks Dump Tells Us: Encryption Works

#50
It's not just software but hardware. There have been persistent controversies about encryption, random number generators, standards, organized infiltration and things like Intel ME and basebands in phones.

It's simply not possible for individuals or groups to vet this against nation state adversaries on an ongoing basis. I think its high time technologists accept this instead of trying to lull themselves and others into a false sense of security.

There are multiple layers of social trust in action which are broken because security services are now brazen and face no consequences.

There is no 'hacking' your way out of this. The solution is to try to restore the social trust by first understanding why its suddenly ok to run mass surveillance operations in a 'free democratic country' and refusing to accept it. And then try to restore some of the trust by making sure there are consequences, proper oversight and due process.

Post reply on HN