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Have you seen https://github.com/bitly/oauth2_proxy ?
I love that thing - I use it with nginx to secure access to stuff running on my home machine that I want to expose publicly (e.g. the Transmission Web UI).
Can anyone recommend this? https://github.com/bitly/oauth2_proxy
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I love that thing - I use it with nginx to secure access to stuff running on my home machine that I want to expose publicly (e.g. the Transmission Web UI).
What types of webservices? Just pure L7 stuff that has forms on it? Is that oauth2proxy just an authenticated reverse proxy or can it add some security context to the internal interface?
As you can sort-of see from the linked site, this is a public version of what Google uses internally, which is called BeyondCorp[0]. It's really an amazing way to think about security for a company. If you deploy it universally across your company, VPNs become obsolete. This solves a popular attack vector where bad-actors just need to get onto a corporate network to do damage. If you can authenticate at every service…
I'm super happy to see this. Square uses something similar for employee access to our datacenter, and I hope more people follow this trend. It's one of the annoying parts of open-sourcing our infrastructure -- we can't generally assume folks have an authenticating proxy around. With a few examples in the wild, I'll be happy to start doing that. We use mutually-authenticated TLS (ie, the proxy presents a client cert t…
Though client certs is definitely safer all around, more involved to spread around to apps talking to each other though.
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Google's model requires two factor user auth, and trusted hardware. Even someone with serious hardware-foo would only be able to maybe break the trusted hardware bit (by cloning one device id to another, or emulating a device). They couldn't get round the two factor authentication bit. I'd say it's still a pretty watertight model.
Like many things, I'm sure you can make a case for exceptions or whitelists --although granted they likely monitor and or shunt traffic to less trusted vlans or something?
Obviously, getting entirely to that model is a lot of work, mostly for services which don't use HTTPS (network shares, ftp, smtp, ssh, enterprise java apps, etc.)