Since I know someone will bring up the insecurity of browser crypto: this app is entirely self-contained (the HTML file can be saved and run offline).
SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
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Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#22Is there a market for end-to-end encrypted app in the browser?
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
Keep in mind that today's browsers have native crypto APIs that weren't available when this was written. ( https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Crypto_... )
I wasn't aware of this, and checked caniuse, nad there's already some solid support, although the standard isn't complete.
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#24More interestingly, and recent, there is Web Crypto: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Crypto_... Although I have no idea about the state of the thing.
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#25Is there a market for end-to-end encrypted app in the browser?
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#26Browser crypto is really problematic. For one, the client is downloading the crypto JS implementation (almost) every time they are using the app. Server compromised? crypto.js is rendered useless. HTTPS certificate compromised? crypto.js is useless. And also: XSS vuln on your website? crypto.js is useless since attacker will just exfiltrate your private key / password through XSS. The browser is wonderful for UI but…
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#27In every one of these threads, there are inevitable comments along the lines of "in-browser crypto is inherently unsecure", which often follows to a more general "javascript crypto is inherently unsecure". This question might be slightly off-topic here, given this seems to be an in-browser library, but can anyone who knows a bit more about this topic than I comment on the state of out-of-browser JS crypto (e.g. NodeJ…
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#28In every one of these threads, there are inevitable comments along the lines of "in-browser crypto is inherently unsecure", which often follows to a more general "javascript crypto is inherently unsecure". This question might be slightly off-topic here, given this seems to be an in-browser library, but can anyone who knows a bit more about this topic than I comment on the state of out-of-browser JS crypto (e.g. NodeJ…
One challenge is that SJCL is a very well-designed library that assumes it has no low-level primitives to work with, but in a Node environment you have native code to lean on, and you're better off doing than than using pure-Javascript crypto. But Node's native crypto is just bindings to OpenSSL --- not great.
Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#29Re: SJCL – Stanford JavaScript Crypto Library
#30More interestingly, and recent, there is Web Crypto: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Crypto_... Although I have no idea about the state of the thing.
I feel WebCrypto (strange architectural choices made by people whose priorities are availability of crypto, not consistency of security) is even more questionable than running SJCL (a good crypto done by good people in questionable environment) in browser.