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How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

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Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#41
post #8
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How could a site make an article behind a paywall that's available for free somewhere else, especially if it's not their article... getting money from others work seems a little bit odd.

yeah, no clue. after seeing this article behind a paywall I simply googled "nasty gal" and the results returned this article first and a LA Times version of the story second. no paywall on the LAT for me. whether or not the story was the same quality, I have no idea.

Weil somebody Posted a link from the same author and the first three lines were exactly the same. I think that there is not a single word that differ. Shame on WSJ that they try to monetize such a thing.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#42
post #33
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Revenue is often used as a vanity metric. On the other hand... revenue is tangible, profit is an accounting construct.

Would you elaborate? It seems the pile of money you have after paying expenses is tangible in the same way as the pile of money you receive.

Revenue is absolute. Money either came in or it didn't. Profit is fungible because the accountants and business principals decide what counts as a cost and what counts as a surplus.

An infamous example of this is "Hollywood accounting" [0], whereby major studios spin off independent LLCs for each film project they pursue, charge these LLCs exorbitant fees for marketing, distribution, etc., and then the LLCs never post a profit. As I understand it, such structures have been used on some of the most successful film franchises of all time, including Lord of the Rings and Harry Potter. This tactic is commonly believed to be a mechanism to avoid paying royalties.

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hollywood_accounting

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#43
post #31
post #21

The nastygal google ads are pointing to http://localhost/error.html Is this common? They are out of ad money and Google will not charge if pointed to localhost?

Google charges regardless of URL. This is just a mistake.

My experience has been that Google rejects ads that don't have a valid URL. We got all kinds of warnings about potentially having our Adwords account banned if we didn't fix a typo in a URL in one of our ads.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#44
post #29

The clothes were awful. It sounded like a good story from a distance, but if you looked at the catalog it was a definite maybe and if you saw the clothes in person you realized they used cheap materials and were photographed from the good angle.

One HN user wrote about why she liked them in a previous thread on Nasty Gal: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12923367

Everyone interested in female fashion buying should read this post.

I have a sister who made millions selling women's shoes. She's a horrid person, whom literally stole money from her mother, but she knows fashion. She knows what women buy. She once told me, "If I lowed the price, they wouldn't buy it. All they need is a somewhat sincere compliment, and their Mine. Ca--Ching!". She also told me if a item of fashion is pricey, it can't be called cheap, or trashy. She would point out "the easy breezy" women who sauntered into her shoe store. My sister, "Do you have any clue how much thought, money went into that casual, just rolled out of bed, look?"

The amount some women spend on fashion I still find mind blowing. I said some women, and I'm glad. I understand looking good, but there's a limit. Most of the high ticket items just look rediculious, but my opinion doesn't matter.

Look at those hideous fashion uniforms Hillary, and Elisabeth Warren ware. How much do those Star Trek uniforms cost?

I want to "out" the fashion industry.

I cringe when I see women shelling out $600 for shoes they don't even look good in.

I cringe when I see the disparity of prices between men's clothing and women's clothing.

I cringe whenever I think about how devious my sister became. She once told me if I was a man, "I would get a pat on the back?". I didn't tell her, but most men don't manipulate lonely alcoholic men in order to get business funds, and stealing family money is just wrong, especially when the family is middle class/poor. Yea--Sweet Heart took all her mother's money. In a weird legal way, but so immortal it's sickening.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#45
I was very close to insiders at the company, can't tell you who I know, but you'll have to trust me. Nasty Gal was a lot worse of an environment that this article leads on. There's a lesson to learn here, so that's why I'm posting.

Basically, Nasty Gal made a string of horrible investments, one after another, which makes one wonder if they were trying to fail. Lots went wrong, but I'll cover the stuff that hasn't been reported.... First they tried to raise their average price point from $60 to like $400. They started off selling cheap crap from asia (think F21), but then when Sheree Waterson from Lululemon came onboard, she convinced Sophia they could follow the Lululemon model and charge insane prices for clothes. (Keep in mind Waterson was a failed exec from Lululemon that joined NG after being fired from Lululemon so she had her own issues) That idea failed and NG alienated customers, while also having a lot of inventory they could sell on hand. Huge loss of capital on that idea.

Second, Sophia Amoruso became increasingly obsessed with building a "cult of personality" around herself and using that to sell clothes. Amoruso would regularly commandeer NG's customer mailing list to send out mailers about herself and what she was up to. These emails would result in the highest unsubscribe rates. NG, like a lot of online retailers, lived and died by their weekly emails. Then she decided she had to write a book, so she spent around $500,000 of company money on a ghost writer and marketing for the book. She had a publisher, but the publisher only picked her up because Amoruso was paying all the costs to publish out of the NG's pocket. Amoruso, again use the company mailing list to promote the book, which resulted in a lot of unsubs.

Amoruso basically bet that women would buy her clothes if they identified with her story, so she doubled down on building her cult of personality and plastered her face and story all over Nasty Gal. There was some degree of success for Amoruso in the form of fame, but this did NOT result in an increase of sales to the company. Essentially, Amoruso traded company revenue, for personal fame.

Thirdly, there were frequent and arbitrary layoffs at NG which killed moral. If Amoruso didn't like a how a project was going, she would fire the whole team. This lead to lawsuits and Nasty Gal has had deal with at least 5-10 different plaintiffs claiming wrongful termination. Many of these settled out of court for a good sum of money. Some of the fired women were pregnant and they accused Amoruso of firing them for actually being pregnant. They had enough of a claim that Amoruso had to settle with them out of court.

Fourthly, going back to Amoruso's vanity... She became obsessed with building a lavash office in downtown Los Angeles. She spent about $10-20M on a beautiful, but very expensive office. This came back to bite them later.

Lastly, Nasty Gal was continuing to generate money, about $70M a year according the bankruptcy docs, but they were still losing money on that. They still had a big email list that they built up years prior, so that kept them selling. They had to take out what basically amounted to a 'shark loan' from Hercules Capital to stay afloat. About $10MM in 2014. After they failed to right the ship, Hercules basically forced them into bankruptcy and that's why they are where they are now.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#46
It looks like overall a classic mistake of trying to go too fast too soon.

The issue with taking on VC capital is that you need to be in control of how you spend that money, and if you don't need it, then don't take it.

There are also challenges with any business in crossing the chasm. Selling to more customers, or a different set of customers is akin to searching for product market fit a second time and is tricky like the first.

The underlying business fundamentals are also critical.

A great example of a company taking on VC money but growing slowly and methodically is Github. They raised their Series A well after they had established significant revenue and were already profitable for many years.

Though they did get into an extravagent office that was largely unnecessary but they used the extra funds to double down on their own infrastructure and to expand github into the Enterprise. This shift to the enterprise was about finding product market fit with a different set of customers and also about updating the company culture.

But luckily they had revenue, profit, and great advisors to hep them navigate the turbulent waters which allowed them to grow but not crumble under their own weight.

It looks like Nasty Gal just did too many things at once. Moving to manufacturing, warehousing, retail brick and mortar stores, staffing up the company with senior hires that probably weren't a culture and product fit.

One of these errors is costly enough but taken together we now see the results.

Had they instead grown more organically, focused on what was working and double down they could have taken on significantly less money, continued to grow, and still be in business today.

But of course all analysis is easy from the sidelines and the inside story is rarely told.

None the less for a business to be bootstrapped and survive so many years it had to be profitable, then you take on VC money and it falls apart the overall theme is clear.

That's not an indictment on VC money either, because Google, Facebook, Snap, Twitter, Apple, all wouldn't be here without it.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#47

The most interesting part of this to me is the purchase by Boohoo.com, itself capitalising on legendary dotcom failure boo.com's branding. It sounds very much like the parent is running a business model very similar to the "one last draw" model Warren Buffet was so successful with earlier in his career. It might make a lot of sense for the right type of investor, too. The growth won't likely be there in the long term…

I agree this was very interesting especially if it really only included just the brand name and the company's customer list: > "Nasty Gal preparing to sell its brand name and other intellectual property for $20 million" Was any remaining inventory included? Were the social network accounts included?... It's hard to judge a $20mm deal without knowing more info. But $20mm buys a lot of ads and other marketing campaigns…

According to the bankruptcy docs, NG had about $70M in top line revenue which they were generating a loss on.

In an e-commerce business, the brand, url, and email list are the most valuable assets. Email lists are super fucking valuable, because emails convert to sales very well. No inventory was included in the deal.

BooHoo is basically going to use their existing supply and fulfillment channels to sell their inventory on NastyGal.com. Basically NG, will just be a front more boohoo.com inventory.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#48
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Would you elaborate? It seems the pile of money you have after paying expenses is tangible in the same way as the pile of money you receive.

Revenue is absolute. Money either came in or it didn't. Profit is fungible because the accountants and business principals decide what counts as a cost and what counts as a surplus. An infamous example of this is "Hollywood accounting" [0], whereby major studios spin off independent LLCs for each film project they pursue, charge these LLCs exorbitant fees for marketing, distribution, etc., and then the LLCs never pos…

> Revenue is absolute. Money either came in or it didn't.

That's actually quite incorrect. The way you recognize revenue and the timelines over which you recognize them are different.

Two example. One is groupon, another is more universally applicable.

So for Groupon, if you as a customer pay 10 dollars, groupon gets 5 dollars and the merchant gets 5 dollars. Groupon was recognizing 10 dollars as revenue and five dollars as cost, even though it knew it would have to pay out the 5 dollars immediately. It could have just booked 5 dollars as revenue, but chose to book 10 dollars as revenue and 5 dollars as a cost, because it made its revenue growth more impressive. (https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/groupon-changes-its-...).

Another example is recognizing recurring revenue. If you sign a deal for a maintenance contract for 200 bucks over 2 years, you could recognize 25 dollars every quarter, or 200 bucks in the first quarter and none for the rest.

In summary, revenue is far from absolute and can be played with like profit.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#49
post #33
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Revenue is often used as a vanity metric. On the other hand... revenue is tangible, profit is an accounting construct.

Would you elaborate? It seems the pile of money you have after paying expenses is tangible in the same way as the pile of money you receive.

The profit is not the pile of money remaining at the end of the year. Other accounting measures (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cash_flow_statement) are closer to what you're thinking, but are not without issues.

Re: How Nasty Gal Went from an $85M Company to Bankruptcy

#50
To learn about the facts leading up to the bankruptcy, a great resource is to read the declaration in support of the first day motions. This is filed under penalty of perjury so there is a reasonable expectation it is factually accurate. From the filing, here are the financial details [1]:

"For the year ended January 31, 2015, the Debtor reported revenues of approximately $85.0 million, gross profit of approximately $34.0 million and EBITDA of negative $6.3 million. For the year ended January 30, 2016, the Debtor reported net revenues of approximately $77.1 million, gross profit of approximately $22.8 million and EBITDA of negative $15.4 million. Through August, 2016, the Debtor has reported revenue of approximately $41.1 million, gross profit of approximately $17.7 million and EBITDA of negative $3.3 million.

The Debtor projects that, for the year ending January 27, 2017, it will generate net revenue of $77.0 million, gross profit of $33.3 million and EBITDA of negative $1.4 million."

[1] https://pdf.inforuptcy.com/pacer/cacbke/1768567/dockets/4/1-...

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