> You are continuing to let your experience with a single, hostile work environment cloud your openness to something that... isn't even controversial.
I'm flattered that you want to talk about me, but really, I'm not the subject of the discussion here, and it's inappropriate to talk about what's going through my head or to try and psychoanalyze me.
> These are not high cost processes, these are basic, common sense practices we're talking about, that nobody really has any excuse to not have in place.
I've worked at a few different places on this spectrum in my career. Three of them have been fairly open, internally, like the way Google apparently operates. Maybe there are some high-value IP repositories you don't have access to, but you mostly have access to any source code you want to look at without getting access reviewed first. These companies were very open about the risks that this entailed, and openly discussed the fact that leaks were possible. The benefits became rather clear the longer I worked at each place. Whenever a system I worked on interacted with another system, I could follow what the other system was doing and even submit patches to other systems if necessary.
Saying that restrictive security is "common sense" or "not even controversial" is begging the question and argumentum ad populum, respectively. My argument here is that there are benefits to open access to most company IP, and that these benefits are important enough that the decision should be made on a company-by-company basis.
The access controls that would have prevented this particular case from happening would have to be rather draconian indeed. Anthony Levandowski's work was basically the genesis of autonomous vehicles at Google. Google purchased Levandowski's autonomous driving startup, 510 systems, in 2011. I don't know what kind of access controls you'd need to prevent a startup founder from accessing the technology built on top of his company's IP.