Live data from Hacker News

Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

security.googleblog.com

51–60 of 524 posts

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#51
post #39

Is a 30 day disclosure period really enough for something like this? It's obviously not possible to 'fix' big systems that rely on SHA-1 such as git or github in only 30 days. Hardware devices that use SHA-1 as a base for authenticating firmware updates?

I may have misread, but I thought from the article they said that the period would be 90 days before the release?

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#52
About tor: if an attacker produces a public key that collides with the SHA-1 hash of someone else's hidden service, then he would still need to generate the corresponding RSA-1024 private key, which is infeasible as of today.

Is this correct?

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#53
post #19
post #2

So good timing to have just started working on a sha3 version of git I guess...

Funny, just yesterday I thought about what would be necessary to change and deploy this. Apparently the SHA1 hash wasn't designed as a security feature, but I would not be surprised if it is being abused as one today.

It's not used as a security feature in Git (though SHA-1 is designed as a cryptographically secure hash) but Git commit singing does use SHA-1 b/c GPG.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#54

Big things affected: * DHT/torrent hashes - A group of malicious peers could serve malware for a given hash. * Git - A commit may be replaced by another without affecting the following commits. * PGP/GPG -- Any old keys still in use. (New keys do not use SHA1.) * Distribution software checksum. SHA1 is the most common digest provided (even MD5 for many). Edit: Yes, I understand this is a collision attack. But yes, it…

None of what you mentioned is affected since this is a collision attack. They purposely created 2 files with the same hash.

Creating a file with the same hash as legit file is a preimage attack and is much more difficult to perform (many orders of magnitude more difficult).

This still doesn't mean that SHA-1 isn't dogshit however. It should have been phased out years ago.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#55
post #41
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

EDIT: My original comment was wrong. Git commit signing apparently only signs the commit hash itself, so it's only as trustworthy as the integrity of the hash. However, see also other comments which point out that this isn't a pre-image attack; you can't find a collision for a given thing (in this case, the linux kernel); rather, you can generate from scratch two pieces of data which happen to collide. Still, this is…

>git has commit signing What the commit actually signs? Is it the sha1 hash?

[deleted]

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#56
post #7

Here's a good blog about how SHA-1 works: http://www.metamorphosite.com/one-way-hash-encryption-sha1-d... . The biggest risk I see with this is how torrents are affected: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torrent_poisoning There's also a problem with git, but I don't see it being that as susceptible as torrents: http://stackoverflow.com/a/34599081/6448137

>torrents Good, if something stronger and better comes out it'll still be a win.

Bittorrent is not a static/unchanged old protocol. It has constantly evolved to keep up with any attacks that could be mounted on it's distributed nature.

I'm sure a BEP will also come up, and speedtracked on the back of this news.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#57
post #32
post #16

>Nine quintillion computations; 6,500 years of CPU; 110 years of GPU Is there a rough calculation in terms of today's $$$ cost to implement the attack?

Say you want to replicate this in 1 month, you need 1320 GPUs for a month. They didn't specify which ones, but say at 1000 bucks per GPU, that's a 1.3M USD investment. And some pocket change for power etc. There isn't anything new about this result actually, Google just set aside the necessary resources to demonstrate it.

With depreciation over a year, that falls to a USD 100k investment per attack; if realistic to depreciate over 3 years, that falls to USD 30k per replication. Not so expensive on these terms.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#58
post #29
post #16

>Nine quintillion computations; 6,500 years of CPU; 110 years of GPU Is there a rough calculation in terms of today's $$$ cost to implement the attack?

Probably peanuts to any 3 letter government agency.

71 device years, on an p2.16xlarge instance, I think the NSA could certainly come up with something way moar better in a shorter timeframe, assuming they haven't already done so.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#59

Big things affected: * DHT/torrent hashes - A group of malicious peers could serve malware for a given hash. * Git - A commit may be replaced by another without affecting the following commits. * PGP/GPG -- Any old keys still in use. (New keys do not use SHA1.) * Distribution software checksum. SHA1 is the most common digest provided (even MD5 for many). Edit: Yes, I understand this is a collision attack. But yes, it…

None of what you mentioned is affected since this is a collision attack. They purposely created 2 files with the same hash. Creating a file with the same hash as legit file is a preimage attack and is much more difficult to perform (many orders of magnitude more difficult). This still doesn't mean that SHA-1 isn't dogshit however. It should have been phased out years ago.

Create 2 torrents with the same hash.

Release one into the wild.

Wait.

Infect.

Re: Announcing the first SHA-1 collision

#60

Big things affected: * DHT/torrent hashes - A group of malicious peers could serve malware for a given hash. * Git - A commit may be replaced by another without affecting the following commits. * PGP/GPG -- Any old keys still in use. (New keys do not use SHA1.) * Distribution software checksum. SHA1 is the most common digest provided (even MD5 for many). Edit: Yes, I understand this is a collision attack. But yes, it…

None of what you mentioned is affected since this is a collision attack. They purposely created 2 files with the same hash. Creating a file with the same hash as legit file is a preimage attack and is much more difficult to perform (many orders of magnitude more difficult). This still doesn't mean that SHA-1 isn't dogshit however. It should have been phased out years ago.

It was broken 12 years ago, so no serious software that require cryptographically secure hash functions should use it.
Post reply on HN