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Encrypted email is still a pain

incoherency.co.uk

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Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#331

Most prominent mail clients have built-in S/MIME support (Outlook, iOS, Thunderbird, Mail.app on macOS). The problem is that the there is no easy and free/cheap way to get an S/MIME certificate. My hope is that Let's Encrypt or Keybase or someone will make this easier someday.

Another comment on this article actually shows this isn't true: Comodo offers free S/MIME certificates. ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13635591 ) I went ahead and just grabbed one for myself after learning this.

S/MIME support has to be more widespread than just one or two providers with free certificates. Comodo's own iOS and Android instructions do not look straightforward at all.

Also, what happens when your certificate expires? Are you supposed to keep all expired certificates so you can still read older encrypted email? Does that even work?

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#332
post #108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

does this only work if both parties have @protonmail.com ?

It works seamlessly/automatically between protonmail users and you can also send encrypted mail to non-protonmail users - they receive a link via email that they need a password to access. You can also export your PGP public key and receive encrypted email from anyone else too.

I like Protonmail, but its a far cry away from 'real' GPG. They are just now adding SMTP. They don't allow key uploads. They don't let you send (gpg) encrypted E-Mail to non Protonmail users and there are some other problems.

I wish them a lot of luck fixing and working on this stuff.

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#333
post #7

Encrypted email is pretty much over in 2017. The emerging consensus among experts is that it's not worth the trouble, or, worse, incapable of doing much more than generating a false sense of security. That's for a bunch of reasons: * An enormous installed base of clients that won't do encryption, meaning that at best you're attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted transport. * A protocol that leak…

>* An enormous installed base of clients that won't do encryption, meaning that at best you're attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted transport.

All encrypted communication on the internet is 'attempting to tunnel encrypted messaging over an unencrypted transport.' That's literally the entire point. I don't care that my messages are broken down into unencrypted IP packets, because my messages are secured by PGP.

>* A protocol that leaks metadata, including some message content, at the envelope layer.

Could you elaborate more on this? I don't really understand what you mean.

>* Hundreds of millions of users that primarily access messages through browser clients that can't meaningfully implement crypto.

They don't. They could, but they don't. There's no lack of capability.

>* An archive-always UX that ensures that huge amounts of plaintext are scattered around the Internet by both senders and receivers.

That's nonsensical. Nothing about archiving data requires that it be stored in plaintext. Again, that's basically the whole point of encryption.

>* An unencrypted installed base that ensures encryption will be opt-in for the foreseeable future, meaning that users will routinely reveal plaintext accidentally by, for instance, quoting messages and forgetting to encrypt.

That's just bad UI design. At the end of the day, your intended recipient has to be able to actually read the plaintext, and they will always be able to reveal its contents, if they want to. No matter what you do, they can always just take a screenshot or show someone their device's physical screen.

Making it easy or difficult for them to accidentally reveal it is entirely about UI design. If you quote encrypted mail when composing an unencrypted mail, make the screen go red!

>* End user demands for things like search that can only be delivered efficiently at scale by databases of plaintext (most likely at centralized servers).

Rubbish. GMail is clearly what you're mainly referring to, and the idea that GMail requires big plaintext databases for spam prevention or searching is bullshit. It doesn't.

>All these problems are probably surmountable (with enormous, concerted effort).

Most of them aren't real problems, and those that are, are quite easily fixable.

>But: why bother? Email is just one of dozens of messaging systems available to Internet users. Better to move sensitive conversations to things like Signal, WhatsApp, or Wire --- the double ratchet construction is designed specifically to make IM-like protocols secure even when conversations are sporadic and last months.

Sorry, but I have no interest in proprietary messaging protocols. I want to use email. I like email. Everyone understands email. Git understands email.

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#334

Why would spy agencies wanted to read people's messages from server, when they can get plain text in each device ? Nonsense. Current encryption type secures only storage and transmission states. What secures kernel, decryption, caching and read states ?

Economics.

Attacking all end devices all the time is incredibly difficult. It simply not economically practical.

So we need to secure all communication and all data at rest. That's most important. Fixing all bugs in all end user devices is a hole bigger problem (or doing something to avoid escalation). It is getting a lot of attention too, for example Linux Kernal Hardning project). People switching languages away from C also helps.

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#335
post #170

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The emerging consensus among experts "conseunsus"? a few blog posts about some bad user experience with GnuPG / the PGP ecosystem is, at best, just an (re)emerging topic on HN, not the end of email encryption. OpenPGP implementations may not be the easiest encryption software out there (its usability issues have been discussed for two decades now) but that's simply because PGP was not designed to be used by the lai…

> "consensus"? a few blog posts about some bad user experience with GnuPG / the PGP ecosystem is, at best, just an (re)emerging topic on HN, not the end of email encryption. Well, tptacek is himself an expert. As he's the founder of a successful security consultancy who has friends among academic cryptographers, I took his comment to mean the belief among himself and his peers. It's ultimately an appeal to authority,…

>As he's the founder of a successful security consultancy who has friends among academic cryptographers, I took his comment to mean the belief among himself and his peers.

Security consultants are who you should trust the least when dealing with security. They aren't interested in reliable, easy-to-use and widespread security. They are interested in difficult, interesting security that breaks and needs consultants.

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#336
post #234
post #170

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The emerging consensus among experts "conseunsus"? a few blog posts about some bad user experience with GnuPG / the PGP ecosystem is, at best, just an (re)emerging topic on HN, not the end of email encryption. OpenPGP implementations may not be the easiest encryption software out there (its usability issues have been discussed for two decades now) but that's simply because PGP was not designed to be used by the lai…

Why use PGP anymore when you can use Keybase and the next generation of key management? Instead of having one master key for your identity, the paradigm is changed: Identity is a set of claims "X on domain A is Y on domain B". That's it. "Domain" can refer to a server-based service such as reddit, or a client app on a device. Such proofs are easy: 1) For public identity on sites which don't support this scheme, X sim…

You can just use Keybase to distribute PGP keys though, right?

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#337

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "consensus"? a few blog posts about some bad user experience with GnuPG / the PGP ecosystem is, at best, just an (re)emerging topic on HN, not the end of email encryption. Well, tptacek is himself an expert. As he's the founder of a successful security consultancy who has friends among academic cryptographers, I took his comment to mean the belief among himself and his peers. It's ultimately an appeal to authority,…

>As he's the founder of a successful security consultancy who has friends among academic cryptographers, I took his comment to mean the belief among himself and his peers. Security consultants are who you should trust the least when dealing with security. They aren't interested in reliable, easy-to-use and widespread security. They are interested in difficult, interesting security that breaks and needs consultants.

And all developers purposefully write spaghetti code while sysadmins hide passwords and secret configurations, all for job security.

Do you truly believe everyone is so cynical? Of course there are some bad actors, in all jobs and all domains. But not everyone—I'd argue the majority of people—are just out to screw everyone else.

Re: Encrypted email is still a pain

#339

Earlier quoted context omitted.

These are good points but I'll nitpick on one of them: we already maintain a collection of emails, phone numbers, etc. for everyone we know, and a public key is just one more data point in the contact list.

Totally agree; it's just been my experience that crypto specialists don't care about UX any more than UX people care about crypto.

Whoah. Hang on there. Crypto specialists aren't the people lobbying loudly for PGP-encrypted email in 2017. They're the ones who made the world's most popular messaging application double-ratchet deniably encrypted by default without the userbase even noticing.
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