Why doesn't this seem to be in a release? The last release of the client was back in October: https://github.com/keybase/client/releases/tag/v1.0.18
It's in our released downloads at https://keybase.io/download We don't use GitHub releases often.
Is there another location for official source releases? The Nix expression [1] builds from source from GitHub releases, but it could easily be modified to point to an different address on the web to stay more up-to-date.
OP here! I had to trim the post down for brevity, but I thought the HN community in particular might be interested in the API side of things. Undocumented in the post: you can invent channels for app-to-app communication from the JSON API. For example, it's possible with Keybase chat to have a program posting encrypted messages for another person or program, without cluttering up the visual chat interface. Also - to…
I'm entirely unconvinced by your argument regarding backing up a perfect forward secrecy chat. PFS is about preventing any listener of the messages in-transit from ever effectively decrypting those messages - it says nothing about security guarantees once the message is received. It'd be like arguing that by enabling PFS also creates a social contract that the receiver guarantees that their device isn't compromised.…
To be clear, all of Keybase's client-server traffic goes over TLS and benefits from TLS's forward secrecy on the wire.
This is the reason I am so excited about Keybase. I can't comment on the integrity of the software but the vision is there. All encrypted everything is where I see the future of the internet.
Does anybody know if they are working on a mobile app for at least the chat system? I don't necessarily need the whole desktop app on the phone but encrypted chat would be fantastic. (Currently using Signal but would be open to using everything keybase in the future)
This really does look great. Edit: since I haven't been running Keybase for the past 2 weeks, I missed the fact that they disabled continuous background proof verification due to my concerns: https://github.com/keybase/keybase-issues/issues/2782#issuec... Good on them! The rest of this comment is not actually applicable anymore and you should give Keybase Chat a try :) Original comment: ----------------- My biggest c…
Nice! Thanks for contributing that feedback and helping to get movement on it.
This is the last time I spam a Keybase thread with invite codes :) https://keybase.io/inv/6953921e2f https://keybase.io/inv/637bfd5d42 https://keybase.io/inv/20be67f672
If anyone is still looking I have quite a few sitting idle.
Warning to all OS X users: The Keybase Chat desktop app does a number of shady things that ultimately led me to delete it from my system. I am writing this purely as a public service announcement, to those who worry about installing unknown apps on their Macs. The Keybase Chat app: (1) Requires administrator privileges to launch on first run, to install a "Helper Tool". The app does not explain what this tool does, w…
Had an interesting manifestation of this overreach.
I'm using a gulp task to watch for file changes. `gulp-notify` gives me this error. I cleaned up keybase from my system but still getting this:
```
Message:
2017-02-09 11:37:56.154 terminal-notifier[2293:8114763] kCFURLVolumeIsAutomountedKey missing for file:///keybase/: Error Domain=NSCocoaErrorDomain Code=257 "The file “keybase” couldn’t be opened because you don’t have permission to view it." UserInfo={NSURL=file:///keybase/, NSFilePath=/keybase, NSUnderlyingError=0x7ffca345de60 {Error Domain=NSPOSIXErrorDomain Code=1 "Operation not permitted"}}
```
I disagree with the idea of allowing backup/restore of conversations defeats forward secrecy. There's a big difference between decrypting past conversations and decrypting chat logs. I have full control over my chat logs, I can choose to delete them, not store them with some people, encrypt them with a different password and rotate them monthly, etc. Even Signal and other apps store all your messages on your device,…
Agreed, logged history and in-transit communication should not be considered the same thing.
The continued fragmentation of chat into walled gardens is really annoying. I feel like Matrix has done a good job not only designing their protocol to be open and federated from the start, but also in that they are actively working to provide bridges to other services. It would be really nice if keybase would work to federate with Matrix servers. (Link to Matrix service, since they have an un-googleable name: https:…
I am convinced that we are cursed to relive this nightmare once a generation: 1. Some chat application blows up in popularity. 2. Everyone looks around and says "Hey, that's an easy problem, let's build a competitor but with feature X and Y!" 3. We are stuck with a nightmarish number of chat apps until someone reverse engineers the protocols for each. 4. The bubble bursts and everyone realizes there wasn't any money…
Yeah, though IRC seems to have weathered the years fairly well (at least with its core audience), and it's an open and federated protocol. Since Matrix bridges to IRC, and adds some features that you used to need IRC bouncers and such to get, and is federated itself, my (possibly naive) hope is that it can evolve into something at least akin to a "next generation" IRC with first-class support for E2E encryption and various other chat features that people tend to like these days.
I'm entirely unconvinced by your argument regarding backing up a perfect forward secrecy chat. PFS is about preventing any listener of the messages in-transit from ever effectively decrypting those messages - it says nothing about security guarantees once the message is received. It'd be like arguing that by enabling PFS also creates a social contract that the receiver guarantees that their device isn't compromised.…
To be clear, all of Keybase's client-server traffic goes over TLS and benefits from TLS's forward secrecy on the wire.
I can believe that is the case, but that just moves the attack vector to within Keybase's network, it doesn't mitigate it completely.
I'm entirely unconvinced by your argument regarding backing up a perfect forward secrecy chat. PFS is about preventing any listener of the messages in-transit from ever effectively decrypting those messages - it says nothing about security guarantees once the message is received. It'd be like arguing that by enabling PFS also creates a social contract that the receiver guarantees that their device isn't compromised.…
To be clear, all of Keybase's client-server traffic goes over TLS and benefits from TLS's forward secrecy on the wire.
In fact, you could even flip it around and let a shared notepad connected to the chat represent what you want to remember permanently, while the chat could remain ephemeral.
This makes for more accurate expectations and less risk of user error.