A330 flight control laws saved Voyager, inquiry finds

Post by Intermernet » Wed, Feb 08, 2017, 10:16 AM UTC

6stringmerc wrote: post #74

After reading the summary it sounds like a "CAPTAIN HAD A MASSIVE HEART FAILURE AND SLUMPED FORWARD ON THE CONTROLS DO NOT CRASH AIRPLANE FROM CRUISE ALTITUDE IF POSSIBLE" which might sound pretty obvious but, uhh, that's some nice code work. That's why there are two (2) pilots in theory/practice, because human redundancy is a valuable asset. I can't help but think if there was a video camera in the cockpit it might…

Post by gcp » Wed, Feb 08, 2017, 10:59 AM UTC

happosai wrote: post #106

Neliquat wrote: post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly. This is why level 2-4 automated cars scare the hell out of me.

The autopilot, carefully designed to handle all situations the engineers have imagined, suddenly throws hands up "you human handle this!". You, having let the car drive itself all the time have 0 hours hands-on driving time. You are now put in a fast-evolving situation too complicated for computers and are expected to do the right thing. This how AF447 happened.

Post by lmm » Wed, Feb 08, 2017, 11:21 AM UTC

NamTaf wrote: post #95

Dylan16807 wrote: post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

kg/N varies, but by less than your normal margin of error. That's vastly different from deciding to use newtons to weigh "kilograms indicated" on your trip to mars when they give a vastly different number.

My point was that we don't weigh ourself in 'newtons' despite that being what we are actually measuring. We make some reference conversion to a much more intuitive unit, kilograms. We rely on the fact that it's a pretty constant conversion between the two. Is this really much different than that? I don't think so. The aerodynamics of the plane (stresses on the structure, performance of the aircraft w.r.t. stall, etc.…

Post by hueving » Wed, Feb 08, 2017, 11:49 AM UTC

mseebach wrote: post #111

closeparen wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is it me or has seat-belt-sign discipline gone out the window? Over my December travels, dozens of passengers on all 4 segments I flew openly flaunted the seat-belt sign, getting up to go to the bathroom and standing in the aisle waiting for it in full view of flight attendants, who didn't say anything. I broke down and did so myself, as the seat belt sign was on for the vast majority of the flight and I was getting…

This is something I've heard and don't recall where, so grain of salt and YMMV, but there are supposedly two modes of seat-belt-sign on: "advisory" and "hard". The latter is for take-off and landing, and very bad weather, the former is "there may be some turbulence, so take care when walking around (and stay seated if you're in doubt)". You can tell the difference by whether the flight attendants are seated.

Post by cyberferret » Wed, Feb 08, 2017, 12:07 PM UTC

dorfsmay wrote: post #108

cyberferret wrote: post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bear in mind that the AF447 crash was primarily due to a junior officer not knowing basic flight principles. Visibility of the side stick to the other two crew (the captain had come back into the cockpit and was positioned between the first and second officer) is an issue, but I am not sure that central style yokes like Boeings have would have been a huge help to a crew already overloaded with an insurmountable amoun…

In the case of AF447, the first officer (Robert) has to constantly ask the second officer (Bonin) what he is doing and why he is climbing, he's clearly worried about air speed (starting at 2:10:16 in [1]. Had the FO had direct control over the input, he could have felt that the SO was pulling back, and push back the column in neutral himself. In the case of Crossair 498 (your first link), the copilot knew the captain…