Earlier quoted context omitted.
The are uncountably many polynomial over the reals. There are uncountably many functions from N to N. The premise of your question is incorrect.
OP never claimed there were countably many functions from N to N, only that there are countably many Turing machines which is true. By "polynomials" OP doesn't mean polynomials over the reals but over, for example, the rationals – the point is that there's a countable subset of R that's algebraically closed.
The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
81–90 of 153 posts
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#82Earlier quoted context omitted.
Are there any good books on this topic?
Yes. An uncountable number are in the Library of Babel. (actually - I'm guessing there's actually a countable number in the Library of Babel but it didn't read quite so amusingly that way. In any case - all the ones I flicked through were trash.) Edit - The Library of Babel is actually finite isn't it? Fixed alphabet and fixed book length? It's a while since I read it.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
Good luck developing analysis with only countable infinities. Limits will take you out of the realm of countable spaces. Most of your derivatives and integrals won't exists, if you force them to take values in countable sets.
One of the observations in programming language semantic proofs is that one doesn't need coinduction. Statements can be proven by good old fashion induction, by indexing them with the number of steps in the computation, then proving they hold for any finite number of steps. I suspect the same technique applies to analysis. We don't need to prove a statement holds for reals with "infininte" number of digits, but merel…
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
OP never claimed there were countably many functions from N to N, only that there are countably many Turing machines which is true. By "polynomials" OP doesn't mean polynomials over the reals but over, for example, the rationals – the point is that there's a countable subset of R that's algebraically closed.
I know those things. OP does not claim that the set of functions from N to N is uncountable. One gives up things if only countable things are considered. For instance those things that I mentioned.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#85There are many problems with this puzzle that go against the intuition. - the number of prisoners is infinite, so they will never finish answering the question. At any point in time, only a finite number of prisoners will be freed. - a single prisoner must process an infinite amount of information to reach the decision. In fact, by observing only a finite number of hats he cannot possibly choose the answer. - the num…
This puzzle seems rather hand-wavy to me. If we actually define a specific finite number N in the equivalence relation "two such sequences [are] ‘equivalent’ if they are equal after [N] entries", no one is in a position to take advantage of the equivalence classes. Either their position Or their position > N, in which case they cannot see the entire sequence after N entries and thus cannot determine which equivalence…
The equivalence class does indeed not specify the colour of the hat. The invocation of the Axiom of Choice was used to tell the prisoner what to guess in that equivalence class, although there is no guarantee that it is correct in their specific case.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#86Here follows Terence Tao's comment (refer to the original to have proper rendering of math symbols):
"This paradox is actually very similar to Banach-Tarski, but involves a violation of additivity of probability rather than additivity of volume.
Consider the case of a finite number N of prisoners, with each hat being assigned independently at random. Your intuition in this case is correct: each prisoner has only a 50% chance of going free. If we sum this probability over all the prisoners and use Fubini’s theorem, we conclude that the expected number of prisoners that go free is N/2. So we cannot pull off a trick of the sort described above.
If we have an infinite number of prisoners, with the hats assigned randomly (thus, we are working on the Bernoulli space {\Bbb Z}_2^{\Bbb N}), and one uses the strategy coming from the axiom of choice, then the event E_j that the j^th prisoner does not go free is not measurable, but formally has probability 1/2 in the sense that E_j and its translate E_j + e_j partition {\Bbb Z}_2^{\Bbb N} where e_j is the j^th basis element, or in more prosaic language, if the j^th prisoner’s hat gets switched, this flips whether the prisoner gets to go free or not. The “paradox” is the fact that while the E_j all seem to have probability 1/2, each element of the event space lies in only finitely many of the E_j. This can be seen to violate Fubini’s theorem – if the E_j are all measurable. Of course, the E_j are not measurable, and so one’s intuition on probability should not be trusted here.
There is a way to rephrase the paradox in which the axiom of choice is eliminated, and the difficulty is then shifted to the construction of product measure. Suppose the warden can only assign a finite number of black hats, but is otherwise unconstrained. The warden therefore picks a configuration “uniformly at random” among all the configurations with finitely many black hats (I’ll come back to this later). Then, one can again argue that each prisoner has only a 50% chance of guessing his or her own hat correctly, even if the prisoner gets to see all other hats, since both remaining configurations are possible and thus “equally likely”. But, of course, if everybody guesses white, then all but finitely many go free. Here, the difficulty is that the group \lim_{n \to \infty} {\Bbb Z}_2^n is not compact and so does not support a normalised Haar measure. (The problem here is similar to the two envelopes problem, which is again caused by a lack of a normalised Haar measure.)"
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#87Earlier quoted context omitted.
- Every real number can be represented as a limit of rational numbers, which are uncountable. - So for every countable subset you can find a (Cauchy) sequence of rationals that does not converge. Hence, you loose one of the most important tools in Analyisis (Cauchy criterium for convergence). You can still work with the remaining set, but formulating and proving theorems, is going to be much harder. - If integrals ov…
I"m not sure what you're saying. There are only countably many computable sequences of rational numbers, so why shouldn't they all converge?
If you add the requirement that the sequence itself must be constructible things _might_ change. It depends on how you define constructible sequence.
I thought Cantors argument would show that there are uncountable constructible sequences: - Assume there are countable many C[1], C[2] - Construct a new one D = C[1][1] + 1, C[2][2] + 1, ... - D in constructible, hence it's on the list: C[j] = D - But D[j] =/= C[j][j] - Contradiction. This proof is however not correct. The sequence D does not need to be constructible.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#88There are many problems with this puzzle that go against the intuition. - the number of prisoners is infinite, so they will never finish answering the question. At any point in time, only a finite number of prisoners will be freed. - a single prisoner must process an infinite amount of information to reach the decision. In fact, by observing only a finite number of hats he cannot possibly choose the answer. - the num…
As soon as you start treating the axiom of choice as a superpower for a conscious being you are in conceptual la la land. How do I guess the color of my hat if there's an uncountable number of possible colors? Doesn't that mean that communicating the value of that color involves transmitting an infinite amount of informtion?
How did you do that? Weren't there an uncountable number of possible numbers?
Ah, you may say, but I obviously wasn't going to choose one with an infinite information content, so all but countably many possible numbers had probability 0.
Which is true. But in fact it's true that whenever you have a probability measure on an uncountable space then all but countably many elements have probability 0, so that escape clause applies equally well to the hat colours.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#89The axiom of choice always seemed intuitively wrong to me. You can't just take a set and arbitrarily pick something out of it! Making a choice requires information, and you can't pluck information out of thin air at whim; applying the axiom amounts to creating information out of nothing. I suppose this is because i'm not a mathematician, but have a natural sciences background. In the physical universe, memorably, "th…
True, but how can you "have a set", i.e. reference a set in any way, without having information about that set? There seems to be a requirement of some bare minimum of information enough to specify the set, and so enough to pick out a member of the set.
Re: The Axiom of Choice Is Wrong (2007)
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is a misunderstanding. Statement A is actually true in the system, you just cannot prove that it is true. Adding an axiom specifying its falsity would be a contradiction (although you could not prove this).
Adding either the Godel sentence or its complement would ruin the consistency of the axiomatic system, because the whole point of the Godel sentence is that it claims that itself cannot be proven to be true in its axiomatic system. But you don't get to add axioms to an axiomatic system anyway, because doing so yields a new axiomatic system to which the original Godel sentence does not refer.
So, assuming the initial system is consistent, adding the godel sentence, or its negation, produces a new consistent system, iirc. But in the second case, it would be omega-inconsistent ?