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The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

security.googleblog.com

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Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#81

Post by viraptor »

niftich wrote: post #43

I don't think this is a bad thing. Instead of a third-party you trust (or rather, your user-agent trusts) vouching that Google's indeed Google, it's now Google vouching for itself, and you trust them by the virtue that they're Google. This ought not be surprising: presumably, who better to say that Google is indeed Google than Google itself? The reason everyone doesn't run a root CA is because it's difficult to coord…

> fairly easy to verify that they're indeed Google, considering they just published their public keys on their own website

This doesn't prove anything, unless you already trust another CA which can vouch that you're looking at Google's site in the first place. Or by some sort of consensus with other people that you see the same key.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#82

Post by hannob »

andy_ppp wrote: post #27

I mean people don't trust Google's motives but I trust the certificate authorities less... How do we (or Google) know that the CIA and FBI can't create certificates from all the CAs because they have stolen/demanded the Root CA for them? If I was a TLA I'd want the ability to perfectly MITM anyone. I think these questions imply that there needs to be a better way to think about security and trust for web endpoints in…

> How do we (or Google) know that the CIA and FBI can't create certificates from all the CAs because they have stolen/demanded the Root CA for them?

Well, we know they don't do this on scale, because we'd spot the rogue certs in the certificate transparency logs.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#83

Post by lima »

andy_ppp wrote: post #27

I mean people don't trust Google's motives but I trust the certificate authorities less... How do we (or Google) know that the CIA and FBI can't create certificates from all the CAs because they have stolen/demanded the Root CA for them? If I was a TLA I'd want the ability to perfectly MITM anyone. I think these questions imply that there needs to be a better way to think about security and trust for web endpoints in…

> How do we (or Google) know that the CIA and FBI can't create certificates from all the CAs because they have stolen/demanded the Root CA for them?

Certificate Transparency.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#84

Post by inopinatus »

zokier wrote: post #22
algesten wrote: post #3

I have no love for most the major CAs I've interacted with, but this feels wrong, though I can't quite pin point why. Perhaps just a general feeling that all the internet eggs are being put, one by one, in one single alphabet basket.

As far as I can tell, this is more like Goog gathering their own eggs in their own basket. They are becoming more and more self-sufficient, but don't really seem that interested in taking over the whole market. As long as it stays that way, I don't mind much.

Ponder the meaning of the words in the title: The foundation of a more secure web. There's a clear implication of using market power to exercise universal control, and (as we've seen with email & browsers) this is not a new behaviour for Google.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#86

Post by FabHK »

mastax wrote: post #57
reddiric wrote: post #4

"If you are building products that intends to connect to a Google property moving forward you need to at a minimum include the above Root Certificates." The foundation of a more secure web apparently requires you to trust Google with the entire internet, using their properties as leverage to force it to be so.

Is Google less trustworthy than Go Daddy? Or CNNIC? Or the Hong Kong Post Office? Yes the CA system is broken but framing that as an anti-Google argument seems silly.

FWIW, I think Google is less trustworthy than the HK Post Office.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#87

Post by kyrra »

Cyph0n wrote: post #73
aduffy wrote: post #65

You can now have a website secured by a certificate issued by a Google CA, hosted on Google web infrastructure, with a domain registered using Google Domains, resolved using Google Public DNS, going over Google Fiber, in Google Chrome on a Google Chromebook. Google has officially vertically integrated the Internet.

What's remaining is: server written in Go, running on a Google server OS, located on a Google designed server appliance, which is centrally controlled by a Google designed microprocessor, which is finally manufactured in a Google owned semiconductor foundry. Oh, and the sand used for silicon purification is sourced from a Google-owned stretch of beach. I haven't considered the internals of the datacenter though...

Go poke around: https://research.google.com/pubs/papers.html

You will see lots of custom stuff that Google does. There are many things that are better to outsource to 3rd parties, but many things are better in-house because the solutions just don't exist or they cost too much for the volume they need. Some examples:

Network routers for CLOS topology (there are pictures of some of the hardware): https://research.google.com/pubs/pub43837.html

Custom built SSDs (custom firmware/controller with a mix of flash chips from various vendors): https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/fast16/fast16...

Then you the TPU custom chip for running Tensorflow.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#89

Post by closeparen »

amalag wrote: post #21
satai wrote: post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The certificates are OK. The issue is the way they are signed and distributed. Lots of issues with the current PK infrastructure is limited by the certificate transparency.

The main issue I see is ease of MITM for corporate environments. In a corporate environment a trusted root is installed, then an appliance can intercept all SSL certs and re-create the trust chain to introduce their own trusted root so they can read all SSL traffic and your browser says "SECURE". That is broken IMO.

It's broken that device owners can make them behave according to their intentions?

Shall we eliminate software freedom too? Otherwise companies can just install a fork of Firefox/Chrome with MITM support added back in to their managed endpoints.

Re: The foundation of a more secure web: Google Trust Services

#90

Post by pkulak »

niftich wrote: post #43

I don't think this is a bad thing. Instead of a third-party you trust (or rather, your user-agent trusts) vouching that Google's indeed Google, it's now Google vouching for itself, and you trust them by the virtue that they're Google. This ought not be surprising: presumably, who better to say that Google is indeed Google than Google itself? The reason everyone doesn't run a root CA is because it's difficult to coord…

> When Google's CAs start issuing certs to non-Google parties, we can revisit the 'eggs-in-basket' question.

I'm not really seeing the problem there, either. Unless we trust Google to do this less than we trust every other root CA. All evidence I've seen points to Google caring very much about internet security.

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