I think SSL certificates need to be replaced. Security can NOT be designed with the 'good guy' in mind. if it can be broken at all we need an alternative.
The certificates are OK. The issue is the way they are signed and distributed. Lots of issues with the current PK infrastructure is limited by the certificate transparency.
No, the certificates are pretty terrible too. Take a look at Peter Gutmann's presentations, or read the SPKI RFCs.
Among other things, certificates conflate identification, authentication & authorisation; they are based on a flawed, centralised, global phone book model; they are ASN.1; in one case, I believe that the meaning of a single flag has been inverted because of a mistake in a (Microsoft?) library that everyone has had to be bug-compatible with.
Some folks think that XPKI is so broken precisely in order to discourage its use (others claim the same thing about IPsec). I don't actually think that's true, but sometimes when I'm banging my head against some stupidity in XPKI, I wonder. I really do.